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Chapter 1
General Introduction to the Dissertation
1.1 Context
The demographic landscape across many European and other Western countries has been chang-
ing drastically over the last few decades. In OECD countries, fertility has fallen from 3.24
children per woman in 1960 to 1.74 in 2014 (World Bank, 2015). Over the same period, life
expectancy at birth has risen by 12.8 years, from 67.3 to 80.1 years on average (World Bank).
Both factors contribute to major shifts in the way the population is structured. On the one hand,
the low fertility rate leads to less children and, hence, a smaller inflow into the group of people
at working age (15-64). On the other hand, an increased longevity leads to a larger number of
people above 65. Importantly, both evolutions imply that the number of people at working age
-of whom younger and older people are dependant- is under stress. The OECD (2006) report
predicts that if work and retirement patterns remain as they are now, EU countries would by
2050 reach almost one older inactive person for every worker.
Naturally, an ageing population puts a substantial amount of pressure on public finances. As
the European Employment Observatory Review (2012) report notes, there is pressure on both
the expenses of the government budget and on the income. Expenses are increased due to more
spending on public pensions and public health expenditure. Income could be decreased due to
less people at the working age, directly via a decrease in labour tax revenues and indirectly via
slower rates of economic growth per capita (OECD, 2006)
The above challenge of population ageing is however not completely insurmountable. As
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the Eurofound (2012) report notes, we can be fairly confident in the age structure prognosis
described above, especially regarding older people. These older people are already alive today
and longevity prognosis tend to be rather accurate. However, the assumptions in the prediction
in the OECD report mentioned above are not set in stone. Work and retirement patterns can
be changed, through a variety of initiatives. While for example increased immigration, fertility
or productivity growth could play a role, they are unlikely to be the solution to the ageing
challenge. Instead, all reports mentioned above stress the need for a more profound solution,
with an important role for the mobilisation of available labour reserves, especially within the
older age groups. Activating labour reserves would result in increased labour force participation
rates. The European Union, for example, recognises the importance of this goal and has set
targets to increase employment. Most notably in this respect is its “Europe 2020" target of a
labour market participation rate of 75% for men and women men aged 20 to 64 by 2020.1
In order to reach this target, it appears that there is especially a lot of potential among older
workers. Figure 1.1 shows the labour force participation (LFP) rates for younger (yellow, ages
25-54) and older (blue, ages 55-64) individuals in the EU-15 in 2015. A first observation is that
participation rates of older workers are substantially below those of younger workers. For the
entire EU-15, the difference is as large as 25.9 percentage points, and for Luxembourg even
47.4 percentage points. This is in line with the relatively low ages at which people effectively
retire. Note that the figure hides the gender differences among older workers. The LFP rates of
older women are considerably lower than those of older men, and women also retire earlier. The
differences between younger and older workers (by gender) are comparable though.
Second, while the rates for younger workers are of similar magnitude (the difference between
the highest and lowest LFP rate is 14.1pp), they vary considerably more among older workers
(38.5pp difference between Sweden and Luxembourg). It thus appears that the lower LFP rates
of older workers are not primarily due to biological reasons but could rather be attributed to the
institutional setting of the national labour markets, such as the existence of early exit schemes,
the organisation of working life at the workplace, or attitudes (OECD, 2006; Eurofound, 2012).
Lastly, while older workers could still make progress, the potential is much lower for younger
workers, as they already have very high levels of LFP, which are moreover in line with or above
most other high income OECD countries.
1http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/europe-2020-in-a-nutshell/targets/index_en.htm
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Figure 1.1: Labour force participation rates of younger and older individuals (OECD, 2015)
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Author calculations based on OECD.stat variable “Annual labour force participation rate" for 2015. Total number of individuals
(men + women). Source: OECD.stat, data extracted on August 30, 2016 from http://stats.oecd.org.
In response to the challenges posed by an ageing and rather inactive older workforce, policy
makers have initiated a large variety of efforts to increase the activity rates of older workers.
Some of these efforts try to lower barriers to employment that some older workers meet, such
as negative perceptions of their older age and capacities, depreciation of human capital over
time, or health problems. Possible policy initiatives are the introduction of age-discrimination
legislation, information campaigns, training, or adjusted working conditions (OECD, 2006).
Better employment prospects might encourage older workers to stay in the labour force or to
re-enter it after a spell of inactivity. This latter transition is still not used regularly in practise, as
the OECD study reports that on average less than 5% of individuals aged between 50 and 64 are
employed one year after being observed in inactivity.
Other policy measures try to delay the moment of exit from the labour force. Many policies do
this via (implicit) financial incentives embedded in the pension system and the other welfare
benefits workers can receive when they exit from the labour force (OECD, 2006). For example,
some policies tighten the possibilities to exit early from the labour force, such that those who
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still leave early receive less (future) benefits. Some other policies increase the full retirement age,
which is equivalent to a reduction in pension benefits (Staubli and Zweimüller, 2013). Naturally,
the examples discussed above are just a selection of the many policy initiatives targeted at older
workers that are or have been implemented.
1.2 Structure of the Dissertation
In the four chapter of this doctoral thesis we evaluate whether efforts to improve the employment
prospects of older workers have been successful in a Belgian context. That is, we study the causal
effects of old age and policies targeted at older workers on the entry in and exit from employment.
The idea is to provide policy makers with empirical evidence on which policies are working well
or, if not, how they could be improved, and this mostly from a Belgian perspective. In every chap-
ter we pay attention to gender differences, as especially older women have low levels of labour
force participation. Chapter 5 is even devoted entirely to a policy change targeted at older women.
In Chapter 2 we focus on the hiring phase. We study the extent of a specific type of barrier
to employment for older workers, namely whether there is age discrimination in the Flemish
labour market. Age discrimination could be one of several possible explanations for the low
re-employment rates among older job seekers found in the OECD (2006) report. It finds that the
hiring rate of workers aged 50 and above is less than half of the rate for younger workers (ages
25-49). If older workers are discriminated against, this could severely limit their employment
prospects and thus aggravate the ageing population challenge. To measure the potential existence
of age discrimination in the hiring of workers we carry out a field experiment in which we
compare the response of recruiting firms to fictitious job applications of older workers with
different career paths. Our empirical set-up augments the classical “within-pair" randomisation
-where two applications to the same vacancy differ on the grounds of discrimination (age)- with
a “between-pair" randomisation, where we assign different career paths to the older worker in
each pair of applications, from a period of inactivity during his or her career to having spent the
entire career in the sector of the firm to which the applicant applies. The additional between-pair
randomisation allows us to qualify our findings more accurately than previous studies. Our
findings suggest that our evidence for age discrimination critically depends on the career paths
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of the older applicants. Older applicants only receive less responses to their job applications if
they have interrupted their career due to a spell of inactivity or because they have worked part of
their career in another sector than the one to which they apply. Applicants who always worked
in the sector of the firm to which they apply do not receive less responses to their applications.
Next, Chapters 3 and 4 evaluate working hours reductions at the end of the career.2 Such
transitions are believed to smooth the transition from work to retirement by reducing the work
load and, as such, could prolong the careers of participating workers.
In Chapter 3 we study working hours reductions through a so-called “subsidised old age part-
time (OAPT)" scheme in Belgium and look whether participation in it prolongs the time in
employment before leaving the labour market. This type of policy effectively provides gradual
retirement and has been implemented in several European countries. We evaluate the scheme
by comparing the number of years spent in employment of participants to those of eligible
non-participants with an inverse probability weighting matching approach. In other words, we
link the employment outcomes of participants to those of comparable non-participants to find the
causal impact of working hours reductions on the time spent in employment. Methodologically,
we add to the existing literature on working hours reductions by incorporating the possibility
for eligible non-participants to enter the OAPT scheme later (based on the study of Vikström,
2014. Moreover, we consider a competing risk approach where we measure the treatment
effect according to different (possibly selective) pathways to early retirement. The data for this
chapter -as well as for Chapter 6- is provided by the Belgian Crossroads Bank for Social Security,
which merges administrative registers of the diverse Social Security institutions for all Belgian
inhabitants. We find that although the scheme initially prolongs employment, once participants
become eligible for early retirement they are implicitly incentivised financially to leave the
labour force prematurely. These adverse incentives are stronger for men and for individuals who
reduce their working time most. The more favourable effect for women likely stems from their
lower opportunities to enter early retirement.
The approach in Chapter 5 is different, as we consider working hours reductions at an older
age in a wider framework and for a variety of countries. More specifically, next to the impact
of reduced working hours on labour market outcomes such as employment and unemployment,
we also consider individual well-being and worker preferences. The chapter is based on a
2The appendix to Chapter 3 is included as Chapter 4.
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literature review and structured as a policy note, with the aim of providing policy makers with a
broader understanding of the preferences for and effects of late life working hours reductions
than just the effects on employment as in Chapter 3. Evidence shows that a substantial number
of older workers prefers to gradually reduce working hours before retiring fully, for reasons such
as beneficial effects on well-being, health, or a better work-family balance. Additionally, the
empirical literature on the effect of old age part-time work policies on the decision to leave the
labour market indicates that such policies should be designed carefully. In order to successfully
prolong careers they should prevent participants to enter early retirement prematurely, such as
we showed in Chapter 3.
Lastly, in Chapter 6 we evaluate a policy measure that has been implemented in many countries
as a means to increase effective retirement ages: an increase in the official (or full) retirement age.
We study the 2006 increase in the female full retirement age from 63 to 64 for women working
in the private sector in Belgium and assess whether this policy change is successful in prolonging
the careers of Belgian women. The idea is that with a higher full retirement age and for a given
career length, the discounted sum of pension benefits is lower. To keep future pension benefits
stable, individuals are thus encouraged to work longer. We compare birth cohorts just affected
by the reform to birth cohorts just not affected by the reform via a Regression Discontinuity
approach. Through a weighting procedure our sample spans the full population within these
birth cohorts. As such we are able to study the impact of this reform on a range of labour market
outcomes for the full population, which is different than most studies, who start from a selective
sample of employed women. We find that while affected women did postpone their pension
claims, only a small fraction -around 2 percentage points- left employment later than unaffected
women (although compared to the small number of women still employed this effect is large
in relative terms.). This is because most women leave the labour force to early retirement and
disability schemes, amongst other, well before the conventional retirement age and because most
workers who were employed had an opportunity to leave the labour force at that moment (as the
early exit possibilities were not affected by the reform). This finding is much in accordance to
the findings in Chapters 3 and 4: individuals appear to act according to the incentives created by
the various early retirement possibilities.
While all four chapters study older age and policies aimed at older workers, especially Chapters
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2, 3, and 6 also share a methodological link. These three chapters are empirical studies, where we
examine the causal relation between a treatment (old age or policies aimed at older workers) and
an outcome (e.g. response to a job application, time spent in employment, or the employment
rate). To find this causal relationship, ideally we would like to know what a “treated" individual
would have done in the absence of the treatment (i.e. his counterfactual outcome). As this
is in practise not possible, we employ empirical strategies which allow us to simulate this
counterfactual outcome, such that we can arrive at the causal effect of interest.
However, each of the three empirical studies approaches causality from another angle, applying
a different identification strategy. In Chapter 2 we carry out a field experiment, sending fictitious
job applications to real job openings to monitor response rates. By keeping all observable
characteristics constant except for the grounds for discrimination (age in our setting), the
outcome for the younger individual can serve as a counterfactual to determine the causal impact
of the age of the applicant on his or her chance to get a response from the employer. In Chapters
3 and 5 we use the quasi-experimental setting created by the policies we evaluate to perform
micro-econometric analyses on a large register dataset. In Chapter 3 we apply an inverse
probability weighting estimator, adjusted to take dynamic treatment assignment into account.
Generally speaking, we compare participants to comparable non-participants based on observable
characteristics and account for the possibility that some of these non-participants reduce their
working hours at a later point in time. As such, we can simulate what participants would have
done if they would have remained in full-time work, and thus obtain the causal effect of interest.
Finally, the increased full retirement age we study in Chapter 6 provides an ideal setting for a
regression discontinuity approach. The policy change (treatment) is only binding for women born
after a specific birth date. Women born within just a few months of each other are therefore either
treated or not. As there is no a-priori reason to expect these women to be different apart from
the fact that some are treated and some are not, we can use the outcomes (e.g. the employment
rate) of women just not treated by the policy as a counterfactual to the outcomes of women just
treated. Again this allows us to obtain the causal impact of the policy change we are looking for.
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Chapter 2
Getting Grey Hairs in the Labour Market.
An Alternative Experiment on Age Discrimination1
2.1 Introduction
Population ageing is one of the most pressing challenges facing the western world. In 2050, for
every person over the age of 65, there will be only 2.7 individuals of working age in the United
States and 1.9 in Western Europe, compared to 5.4 and 4.2, respectively, in 2000.2 This ageing
places substantial pressure on public finances with respect to pensions and medical care. It is
a widespread belief that the only viable solution to cut this ageing cost without compromising
living standards is to encourage older workers to remain in the labour force (Lahey, 2008; OECD,
2006; Riach and Rich, 2010). During the past decade, many countries have carried out reforms
in this direction. Sonnet et al. (2014) review that these reforms have improved the labour market
situation of older workers. Still, activity rates among the older age groups are relatively low,
especially in Europe. In the EU-15, the employment rate in 2013 for the 50 to 64 age group
was 61.2% compared to 77.0% for the 25 to 49 age group. In Belgium, the country of analysis
in this study, these numbers are even more divergent: 54.0% versus 79.9%, respectively.3 It
is important to determine the nature of these remaining gaps to design further effective policy
1In collaboration with Stijn Baert, Jennifer Norga and Marieke Van Hecke
2Source: United Nations, World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision (“Old-age dependency ratio 65+/(15-
64) by major area, region and country"; Estimates 1950-2015; Medium fertility variant prospections 2015-2100).
Western Europe comprises Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Switzerland.
3Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey (“Employment rate by age groups").
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actions. Theoretically, there are three explanations for these gaps: (i) differences in employee
productivity, (ii) differences in employee preferences and behaviour and (iii) differences in
employer preferences and behaviour (Kautonen et al., 2015; Lahey, 2008; OECD, 2006). While
traditionally policy discussions have focussed only on supply-side factors, policy attention has
recently shifted more to the latter channel, better known as discrimination (Sonnet et al., 2014).
In this study, we focus on the estimation of age discrimination at first hiring decisions. This is
the moment at which age discrimination is most likely to occur, as it is then least likely to be
detected and, therefore, least costly for employers (Bendick Jr, Brown, et al., 1999; Cédiey et al.,
2008).
Hiring discrimination against older candidates can be expected, based on the theories of taste-
based discrimination (Becker, 1957) and statistical discrimination (Arrow, 1973). Following
the former theoretical model, employers, customers and co-workers may experience a disutility
when interacting with older workers. Following the latter model, employers may judge individual
older workers on group characteristics rather than on their individual merits. Adverse group
characteristics of the elderly, at least in the perception of employers, might be: (i) showing less
energy, motivation, creativity, flexibility and/or adaptability; (ii) being more difficult to supervise;
(iii) having poorer health; (iv) facing obsolescence of their human capital; and (v) having higher
salary aspirations (Albert et al., 2011; Bendick Jr, Jackson, et al., 1997; Lahey, 2008; Riach and
Rich, 2010).
Over the last two decades, scholars have attempted to measure age discrimination in the labour
market. To this end, 10 studies applied the gold standard to identify unequal treatment in the
labour market, i.e., correspondence experiments. Within these experiments, pairs of fictitious
job applications are sent to real job openings. These applications differ only by the ground
of discrimination that is tested. By monitoring the subsequent call back, unequal treatment
based on this characteristic is identified and can be given a causal interpretation. Based on the
application of this experimental setting, high levels of age discrimination are found in Australia,
England, France, Spain, Sweden and the United States (Ahmed et al., 2012; Albert et al., 2011;
Bendick Jr, Jackson, et al., 1997; Bendick Jr, Brown, et al., 1999; Gringart and Helmes, 2001;
Lahey, 2008; Riach and Rich, 2006a; Riach and Rich, 2007; Riach and Rich, 2010; Tinsley,
2012). However, the (classical) application of the correspondence experimentation framework by
the cited former contributions is problematic, due to a complication that we term in the present
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study as the Difference in Post-Educational Years Problem. An older person inevitably has, in
comparison with a younger person with the same educational background, a higher number of
post-educational years at the moment of her/his application. The mentioned correspondence
studies “filled" these additional years in the resume of the older candidates with a particular
activity (additional in-field employment, out-of-field employment or inactivity) or let employers
fill them in themselves (by limiting the mentioned professional experience to the most recent
career years). This mentioned or perceived particular activity undertaken by the older candidates
may, however, yield a positive or negative signal towards employers per se and might, thereby,
bias discrimination measures downwards or upwards, respectively. In other words, based on
the experimental design applied by the former contributions, it is difficult to determine whether
unequal treatment is attributable to age discrimination or discrimination based on differences in
human capital or career gaps.
In the present study, we deal with the Difference in Post-Educational Years Problem by proposing
an extended correspondence experiment. In this extended design, we combine the classical within-
pair-randomisation of the age of fictitious job candidates with a between-pair-randomisation of
the activity the older candidates undertook during their additional post-educational years. With
this procedure, one avoids focusing on only one type of extra post-educational experience of
the older worker, as previous studies have done. As a consequence, a lower and upper bound
of discrimination is obtained. We report on the application of this framework to measure age
discrimination in the Belgian labour market. During six months, we sent out pairs of fictitious job
applicants (both female and male) to a balanced number of vacancies for the (middle-)low-skilled
occupations of production worker, administrative clerk and waiter, and for the (middle-)high-
skilled occupations of laboratory worker, management assistant and sales representative. For
each vacancy, in one of the applications, the younger age of 38 or 44 was disclosed, and in the
other one, the older age of 44 or 50 was disclosed. Furthermore, we randomly assigned one out
of three activities performed during her/his 6 or 12 extra post-educational years to the older pair
member: in-field employment, out-of-field employment or inactivity. As a consequence, this
setting allowed us to measure unequal treatment based on age in three realistic situations.
The present study contributes to the existing literature for a number of additional reasons.
First, while former contributions have focussed on estimating age discrimination in one or
two, mostly (middle-)low-skilled, occupations, we test vacancies in six occupations at two
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different qualification levels and in three different areas. This design is not only preferable
in terms of generalisability of the research results, but it also allows us to investigate whether
age discrimination is heterogeneous by qualification level and/or by occupation characteristics.
Second, we use both pairs of female and pairs of male applicants, which also allows us to inspect
gender heterogeneity in age discrimination. Third, the difference in age within a pair is within
our setting 6 or 12 years. On the one hand, these age differences are substantially smaller than
the age differences adopted in the literature (on average 20 years),4 yielding, in our opinion, a
more realistic experimental setting; unequal treatment of relatively close age groups is a stronger
signal for age discrimination per se, as other factors (e.g., public policy) have less room to
play. On the other hand, this variation in age difference allows us to look into whether unequal
treatment varies linearly with this difference. Fourth, several of the mentioned features of our
experimental design (e.g., different career patterns that might affect statistical discrimination
but not taste-based discrimination and occupations with and without a high level of customer
contact) allow us to discuss the validity of the taste-based and statistical discrimination models
in their application to age discrimination.
The present study is structured as follows: In the next section, we provide the reader with a
systematic literature review of the former correspondence studies on age discrimination, with
a focus on how these former contributions dealt with the Difference in Post-Educational Years
Problem. In Section 2.3, we explain how we take this problem into account by means of
our experimental design. Section 2.4 reports our measures of age discrimination based on an
econometric analysis of the experimentally gathered data. A final section concludes.
2.2 The Literature and its Main Lacuna
2.2.1 Correspondence Experimental Evidence on Age Discrimination
Over the past few decades, economists have conducted various correspondence experiments to
measure discrimination in the labour market. Within this type of experiment, pairs of fictitious
job applications are sent to real job openings. These applications differ only in the characteristic
that is to be tested. This characteristic is randomly assigned within each pair of applicants.
4Own calculation based on columns (5) and (6) of Table 2.5.
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By monitoring subsequent call-back, unequal treatment in first hiring decisions based on this
characteristic can be identified.
Correspondence experiments focus on a very specific interaction between employers and employ-
ees: by means of a correspondence test, one simply measures call-back rates for first interviews;
the research results based on such a test do not allow making any statements about discrim-
ination in the later stages of the selection process, let alone in promotion opportunities and
wages. However, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) argue that a lower number of interview
rates are expected to be reflected in reduced job offers and in lower earnings. Moreover, since
job interviews are costly, firms invite candidates to an interview only if these candidates have
a reasonably high chance of getting the job. In addition, Lahey (2008) argues that employers
who wish to discriminate against certain groups of workers without being sued would prefer to
do this in the first step of the hiring stage, since it is more difficult for individuals to determine
why they fail to receive a job interview than it is to determine why they do not get the job after
an interview or why they do not get promoted or get fired after being hired. This reasoning is
consistent with the international evidence of (i) a relatively low number of job-losses among older
workers compared to other age categories, on the one hand, and (ii) a relatively low probability
to leave unemployment for work within a given period of time among them (Tinsley, 2012), on
the other hand. Moreover, Bendick Jr, Brown, et al. (1999) and Cédiey et al. (2008) reported
(based on their field experiments comprising all stages of the hiring process) that, at the moment
of their study, about 75% of age discrimination in the United States and about 85% of ethnic
discrimination in France, respectively, occurred in the first stage of the recruitment process.
Correspondence testing is the gold standard for identifying unequal treatment in the labour
market, as it allows, in theory, disentangling discrimination from supply-side determinants of
labour market outcomes (Eriksson and Rooth, 2014; Kroft et al., 2013; Pager, 2007; Riach and
Rich, 2002). This is the case when, in practice, the experiment is designed in such a way that
it strictly controls all productivity-related characteristics of the fictitious applicants so that the
only distinguishing feature of the two pair members is the characteristic that is to be tested. In
its application to race and sex discrimination, unequal treatment is easily isolated by randomly
assigning the pair members’ names. In the case of age discrimination, strictly equating candidates
except for their age is trickier, as will become clear in the following subsection.
In Table 2.5, we systematically review the former correspondence studies on age discrimination
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of which we are aware.5 As indicated in column (1) and column (2), these studies were published
between 1996 and 2012, based on experiments in Australia, England, France, Spain, Sweden and
the United States. In columns (3) to (7) important features of these experiments are summarised:
the tested occupation(s), the gender of the applicants, the age combinations used and the sample
size. Columns (8) and (9) focus on the level of unequal treatment estimated. In the latter column,
the overall measure of discrimination is presented for each study. This measure is the positive
call-back ratio. It is calculated by dividing the percentage of applications receiving a positive
call-back for the younger candidates (whose ages are in column (5)) by the corresponding
percentage for the older candidates (whose ages are in column (6)). The definition of positive
call-back used in the studies is mentioned in column (8). For instance, the positive call-back ratio
of about 3.2, found by Ahmed et al. (2012), indicates that the 31-year-old candidates in their
experiment received on average 3.2 times more job interview invitations than their 46-year-old
counterparts when applying for positions as a seller or a waiter in Sweden.
We identify three important patterns through the examination of Table 2.5. First, in all tested
countries, age discrimination is present and relatively high in magnitude. All presented positive
call-back ratios are statistically significantly different from 1, at the 5% significance level.
Moreover, the levels of age discrimination are higher than the levels of discrimination based
on ethnicity, gender or sexual orientation, as estimated by other field experiments in the same
country during the same period (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004; Riach and Rich, 2006b; Wood
et al., 2009).
Second, age discrimination is already present at relatively early ages. For instance, Albert et al.
(2011) reported that Spanish firms show a substantial fall in interest for 38-year-old candidates
compared to candidates aged 24 or 28.
Third, the outlined studies differ substantially in the features of their experiments. The age
of the younger candidates ranges from 24 to 45 and the age of their older counterparts from
38 to 62. As mentioned in Section 2.1, the former contributions have focussed on estimating
age discrimination in specific, mostly (middle-)low-skilled occupations. Administrative (clerk)
jobs and vending jobs (seller and waiter) dominate the tested positions, with the exception of
5In addition, simultaneously with our field experiment, Neumark et al. (2016) conducted a large-scale experiment
on age discrimination in the United States. In contrast to our findings (see below), they conclude that there is
“not much indication that using resumes that limit older applicants’ experience, to make them more comparable to
younger applicants, biases these kinds of studies towards finding evidence of age discrimination."
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Lahey (2008), who studied a variety of entry-level jobs (e.g., teachers, sales persons, managers,
craftsmen and operators). Remarkably, the positive call-back ratios are more to the detriment
of older candidates in experiments testing the vending occupations compared to experiments
testing administrative occupations. We come back to this observation later when we present our
own research findings. Further, no clear patterns emerge in the discrimination ratio by the region
(country and continent) of the experiment, the gender of the applicants and the particular age
combinations used.
2.2.2 Difference in Post-Educational Years Problem
As mentioned above, in order to obtain clean estimates of discrimination by means of a cor-
respondence experiment, one has to strictly equate the applications of the fictitious pairs that
are sent to employers, except for the ground of discrimination. However, in the case of age
as a ground of discrimination, equating equally educated candidates of a different age with
respect to their past career is essentially impossible. We term this problem as the “Difference in
Post-Educational Years Problem".
This problem is related to the fact that the older candidate within each pair will have a higher
number of post-educational years at the moment of her/his application. As a result, it is only
feasible to equate a part of the career of both pair members, i.e., a period of the length of the
younger pair member. The remaining part may result in more active years for the older candidate
and, therefore, more (potentially in-field) experience. This additional amount of experience
might yield a positive signal towards employers and, therefore, higher hiring chances, ceteris
paribus. On the other hand, more experience may translate into higher salary aspirations so
that the effect on hiring chances may just as well go in the opposite direction. Alternatively,
the older candidate’s additional years may result in more inactive years, filled by, for example,
unemployment or at-home care tasks. This might yield a negative signal towards employers and,
thus, lower hiring chances, ceteris paribus.
As a result, it is not possible to disentangle unequal treatment caused by this additional trajectory
from discrimination, based on age by means of a classical correspondence test in which the
post-educational years of the older candidate are filled in a particular way, as the contributions
listed in Table 2.5 did. As mentioned in the previous section, in these studies, the younger and
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older candidates within the pairs sent to employers differed in age, on average, by 20 years. It is
very unlikely that the activities job candidates undertake during such a long period do not affect
employers’ hiring decisions. This problem was mentioned in many of the studies, and authors
often provide the reader with an argumentation for their particular choice for (not) filling in the
surplus years, but it was never tackled fundamentally, either by adapting the correspondence
experimentation framework or by another way out. Their approaches towards the Difference in
Post-Educational Years Problem are summarised in column (10) of Table 2.5.
A first approach, adopted by Ahmed et al. (2012), Bendick Jr, Jackson, et al. (1997), Bendick
Jr, Brown, et al. (1999), and Gringart and Helmes (2001), has been to fill the additional post-
educational years in the resume of the older candidates with inactivity or out-of-field employment,
i.e., employment unrelated to the vacancies for which these candidates applied. For instance, the
additional years were ascribed to military employment in Ahmed et al. (2012) and to military
employment or teaching in Bendick Jr, Brown, et al. (1999). When authors chose to fill in the
additional years with inactivity, older candidates mentioned, for example, that they had been out
of the labour force while raising children. Strictly speaking, these solutions yielded younger
and older candidates with the same educational attainment as well as the same relevant (i.e.,
in-field) work experience. However, as mentioned above, both the choice for employment in
another field and the choice for being out of the work force might be perceived by employers as
a negative signal. Employment in another field may be perceived as a signal of less interest in
the occupation for which one applied (or lower specific human capital), while inactivity may be
perceived as a signal of weak labour market commitment (or lower general and specific human
capital). Following this reasoning, the measure of discrimination against older workers found by
this approach might be biased upwards.
A second approach used in the literature is to fill in the extra post-educational years of older
candidates with in-field employment, as done by Albert et al. (2011), Riach and Rich (2006a),
Riach and Rich (2007), and Riach and Rich (2010). These authors argue that one should accept
that, in reality, the experience component of (the human capital of) a candidate does vary between
age groups and, therefore, allow this dimension to vary within the experiment. On the other
hand, Riach and Rich (2010) acknowledge that age discrimination in this setting should be seen
as a lower bound (“a very significant level of prejudice") of age discrimination in reality. They,
in other words, accept that their measures of unequal treatment are, in fact, a combination of
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age discrimination (expected to be to the detriment of older candidates) and a profit-maximising
response to differential human capital (in favour of older candidates).
A last alternative approach used by earlier correspondence studies was the one outlined by Lahey
(2008) and Tinsley (2012). In their experiments, both the younger and older candidates only
mentioned the last part of their career trajectories in their written resumes. Thereby, the authors
did not have to inform the employer about what the older candidate did during her/his extra
post-educational years. In our opinion, this approach is cleaner than the former two. In addition,
Lahey (2008) argues that her design is realistic. In a footnote of her study, she mentions that
recruiters in the United States even indicated that ten-year career histories are -or at least were at
the moment of her research- the gold standards for resumes. While this setting might, indeed,
be realistic (for women in entry-level jobs) in the United States, this may not be the case (for
males or females in other positions) in other countries. For instance, in Belgium, a sample of
ten human resource managers declared that resumes most commonly comprise an exhaustive
enumeration of one’s former jobs. In addition, by not mentioning the complete career of the job
candidates, one, in fact, lets employers fill in the gaps themselves. As a result, it is unclear in
which setting age discrimination is measured. Moreover, the effect on hiring chances of limiting
one’s work history to the last five or ten years might be heterogeneous by the candidate’s age,
which might bias discrimination measures.
By just picking out one of the potential activities undertaken by older candidates during their
extra post-educational years (or by not mentioning these activities), the former correspondence
studies on age discrimination did present unequal treatment in a particular situation, without
knowing how far their measures were from the upper or lower bound of discrimination in reality.
In addition, the different approaches adopted by the former correspondence studies on age
discrimination make their results highly incomparable.
In the present study, we propose extending the classical correspondence testing framework with
the randomised assignment of one out of the three mentioned possibilities with which they may
have filled their additional post-educational years (in-field employment, out-of-field employment
and inactivity) to the older candidates’ resumes. Thereby, we are able to study unequal treatment,
based on age in three realistic situations. Moreover, the discrimination measures in each of these
situations provide us with an indication of the importance of the Difference in Post-Educational
Years Problem.
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2.3 The Experiment
We conducted our experiment between December 2014 and May 2015 in the labour market
of Flanders, the Northern part of Belgium. Two applications of job candidates were sent to
each vacancy we selected from the database of the Public Employment Agency of Flanders, the
region’s major job search channel. For each tested occupation, we constructed two comparable
job application templates, only differing in details and layout. For each vacancy, we randomly
assigned the younger and older age to one of these template types and sent the resulting combina-
tions in a randomised order to the employer. In addition, three particular age combinations, three
different activities undertaken by the older candidates during their extra post-educational years
and the female or male gender (equal for both pair members) were randomly assigned between
the pairs of templates. Thereafter, reactions from the employers were analysed to investigate
unequal treatment in hiring, based on age, in general, and by specific candidate and vacancy
characteristics.
2.3.1 Selection of Vacancies
We sent pairs of fictitious job applications to real vacancies for six occupations in three areas
(industry, administration and vending) and two classification levels (higher secondary (ISCED
3)6 and lower tertiary education (ISCED 5 - Bachelor) as a functional level). These occupations
were: production operator, administrative clerk, waiter, laboratory analyst, management assistant
and sales representative.
Testing occupations in multiple areas and at multiple qualification levels enabled us to avoid
the danger inherent to many earlier correspondence experiments in which researchers simply
selected one occupation with, potentially, an unrepresentatively high (or low) effect of the tested
characteristic. In addition, due to the particular occupations chosen, we are able to measure
heterogeneity in unequal treatment, based on age by the educational attainment required by
the vacancy and the area of the occupation. In general, theoretical and empirical studies show
that candidates’ higher education levels can act as a prejudice-reducing device (Baert, Cockx,
et al., 2015; Wood et al., 2009). Thus, we might expect age discrimination to decrease with
the educational attainment of candidates. However, some of the aforementioned characteristics
6We employ the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) levels of education.
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of older workers in the perception of employers (such as showing less creativity) might play a
more important role in the assessment of the higher educated, so that the interaction between age
discrimination and education level might just as well go in the opposite direction. Concerning
the area of the occupation, based on the mentioned model of taste-based discrimination, one
could expect higher levels of unequal treatment in occupations, where personal contact with the
employer, customers or co-workers is higher (Lahey, 2008; Riach and Rich, 2010). We took
this aspect into consideration for our choice of occupations. As a consequence, we are able to
compare age discrimination by occupation (characteristics).
2.3.2 Construction of Job Application Template Pairs
For each occupation, we constructed two types of templates (type A and type B), comprising
a resume and a motivation letter matching the general requirements of these kinds of jobs. To
ensure that our applications were realistic and representative, example resumes and motivation
letters from the Public Employment Agency of Flanders were calibrated for our purposes.
Type A and B templates differed, concerning inessential peculiarities and layout, to avoid
detection. It is important to note that these minimal differences between the type A and type B
job application templates could not bias discrimination measures, as the younger and older age
identities were randomly assigned to these types. The same is true with respect to (heterogeneity
in discrimination by) the variables that were randomly assigned between the pairs of applicants.
Moreover, our regression analysis presented in Section 2.4.2 will show that the small differences
between the application templates did not yield different call-back outcomes for the type A and
type B versions.
All fictitious applicants were born and living in Antwerp or Ghent, the largest cities of Flanders,
with approximately 503,000 and 251,000 inhabitants, respectively. Applicants mentioned in
their resumes that they were married and had two children (without disclosing their ages). All
applicants had graduated from the same types of school, with comparable reputations. The
candidates applying for a job as a production operator, administrative clerk and waiter graduated
from secondary education with a degree in mechanics or commerce. Those applying for a job as a
lab analyst, management assistant and sales representative held a Bachelor’s degree in Chemistry,
Management Assistance and Commercial Sciences, respectively. To avoid employers’ detection
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of the experiment, a variety of common wordings was used for these degrees. The candidates
with secondary education degrees graduated at the age of 18, those with Bachelor’s degrees at
the age of 21. These are the common ages in the case of no grade retention in Belgium.
Importantly, all candidates were employed at the start of the experiment in in-field jobs that
started in 2006. In addition, they had worked in similar jobs immediately after graduation. This
experience ensures that the employer perceives the candidates as attached to the labour market
and, more specifically, to the sector of the vacancy. For the years in between, we randomly
assigned to the older workers one out of three activities. In Section 2.3.4 we provide more details
as to the exact procedure we followed to do so.
In addition, we added to all applications the following features: a typically Flemish-sounding
first name and surname, a Belgian nationality, a day and month of birth, an address with
an existing street name but a non-existing house number in a middle-class neighbourhood, a
telephone number and an email address from major providers, adequate Dutch, English and
French language skills, comparable computer skills, one sport activity and a driver’s license. The
resume and motivation letter templates are available upon request.
2.3.3 Randomised Assignment of Older Age Within Pairs
The younger and older identities were alternately assigned to the type A and type B application
templates. This was done by just adding a different year of birth to these templates. As mentioned
in the previous subsection, the day and month of birth were fixed at the application template type
level. In addition, the ages of the candidates were also signalled by the summary of their past
careers, on which we elaborate in the next subsection.
2.3.4 Randomised Assignment of Particular Age Combinations, Career
Trajectory and Gender Between Pairs
In order to measure age discrimination at multiple (older) ages, on the one hand, and for varying
difference in age between the younger and older candidates, on the other hand, we alternately
assigned three age combinations to the pairs of applicants. More concretely, we tested all
(pairwise) combinations of candidates aged 38, 44 and 50 years. This yielded a variation in age
difference between the pairs of fictitious candidates (6 versus 12 years). Our a priori expectation
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was that a double dose of older age would result in a more adverse effect on employment
opportunities.
We chose 38 as the youngest age, as from this age onward, the probability of pregnancy becomes
reasonably low. Statistics from the Flemish Agency for Care and Health show that in Flanders,
the age-specific fertility rate peaks at the age of 29. Only one out of twenty mothers is 38 or older
when she gives birth. Before this age, for female candidates, it would be difficult to distinguish
between unequal treatment based on age and unequal treatment based on potential maternity
leave in the future.
In addition, we chose 50 as the oldest age, as employed individuals at this age are not yet
eligible for any old age labour market programmes. This is important, because in the case where
employers would get wage subsidies when hiring one of our experimental identities, it would be
impossible to disentangle age discrimination from profit-maximising, unequal treatment based
on older candidates’ eligibility for these subsidies. In addition, at the age of 50, job candidates
are still not too close to their retirement age. In Belgium, the official retirement age is 65 - it
will become 66 in 2025 and 67 in 2030. However, due to the widespread use of early retirement
regimes, the effective age of labour market exit was 59.6 for men and 58.7 for women in Belgium
in 2013 (OECD, 2013). Candidates who are substantially older than 50 may, therefore, be
treated unfavourably by employers, just because of the profit-maximising reflection that their
return on hiring investments will be lower. At the age of 50, however, obsolescence of human
capital should not be a rational worry yet (for most occupations), especially since our fictitious
candidates all had worked in similar jobs as the one for which they were applying. Descriptive
evidence of Vandenberghe et al. (2013) indeed suggests that, at least in Belgium, the average
pay-productivity gap becomes positive only from age 56. If these arguments would not hold,
one could expect that unequal treatment based on age would be more to the detriment of the
applicants aged 50 (when compared to those aged 44) than of the applicants aged 44 (when
compared to those aged 38), ceteris paribus. However, our regression analysis presented in
Section 2.4.2 will show that this is not the case.
Next, to deal with the Difference in Post-Educational Years Problem, we alternated between the
three relevant activities that could have been undertaken by the older candidate during their extra
years over the pairs sent to employers. These activities were those used individually by the former
contributions mentioned in Table 2.5. Figure 2.1 schematises the resulting career trajectories of
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our experimental identities. As mentioned in Section 2.3.2, all candidates had worked in jobs
within the same occupation as the one mentioned in the vacancy immediately after graduation
(“in-field job 1") and were employed in other similar jobs at the start of the experiment (“in-field
job 2"). For the younger candidate within the pairs, the former job was immediately followed
by the latter job. For the older candidate, three different activities could have been undertaken
during her/his additional 6 or 12 years in between her/his comparable periods in in-field job 1
and in-field job 2. In the first third of the cases, the older candidate had been employed 6 or
12 years longer in in-field job 1. In the second third of the cases, she/he had been employed in
an out-of-field job during this period. For the (middle-)low educated profiles, this had been a
position as a maintenance staff member, and for the (middle-)high-educated profiles, this had
been a position as a teacher at an organisation offering apprenticeship and entrepreneurship
training. In the final third of the cases, the older candidate’s resume mentioned that she/he had
been inactive: out of the labour force for child-rearing tasks during this period. This inactivity
might send a different signal, depending on the applicant’s gender. More specifically, women
might face less discrimination than men for a period of home-caretaking tasks.
Figure 2.1: Experimental identities
Younger candidate In-field job 1 In-field job 2
Older candidate with more 
years of in-field employment
In-field job 1 In-field job 1 (continued) In-field job 2
Older candidate with years of 
out-of-field employment
In-field job 1 Out-of-field job In-field job 2
Older candidate with years of 
inactivity
In-field job 1 At-home-caring tasks In-field job 2
School graduation September 
2006
December 
2014
(start of experiment)
6 or 12 additional post-
educational years of the 
older candidate
Finally, we alternated between female and male pairs of fictitious candidates. Our a priori belief
was that heterogeneity in age discrimination by this dimension would be, if present, to the
detriment of older women. This belief was formed, because various studies have argued that
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females age sooner than males in terms of (perceived) employability. This is related to their more
age-dependent, perceived attractiveness and to their observed earlier retirement and (thereby)
lower employment rates at older ages (Gringart and Helmes, 2001). Empirically, Gringart and
Helmes (2001) found that older females were, compared to their younger counterparts, indeed
relatively more disadvantaged than older males, albeit in a statistically insignificant way.
2.3.5 Classification of Call-Back
We sent the 36 resulting combinations of the two job application templates, three particular age
combinations, three career patterns for the older candidates and two genders in an alternating
order to the selected job postings, with a one-day delay in between. To avoid detection, we only
applied to the same employer with one pair of applications. Based on the relative supply of
vacancies within the occupations mentioned in Section 2.3.1, we decided to send out 72 pairs of
applicants to each of the occupations of administrative clerk, waiter, laboratory analyst and sales
representative and 144 pairs to each of the occupations of production operator and management
assistant, resulting in 1,152 job applications for 576 vacancies, which is higher than the median
sample size of 468 in the literature, as summarised in Column (7) of Table 2.5.
Reactions from the employers were received via telephone voice-mail and email. To minimise
inconvenience for the employers, we immediately terminated the recruitment procedure after
getting a positive reaction. All call-backs received later than 30 days after the date of application
submission were discarded. However, this turned out to be an unnecessary restriction, as we
hardly received any (positive) responses after 30 days.
As mentioned in Table 2.5, a small majority of the former correspondence studies on age
discrimination defined positive call-back as getting any positive reaction. This might be an
invitation to a job interview, the receipt of an alternative job proposal, a request to provide more
information or a request to contact the recruiter. The other studies defined positive call-back,
in a stricter sense, as getting invited for an interview for the job for which one applied. In the
present study, we will present measures of unequal treatment based on age separately for both
definitions.
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2.4 The Results
In this section, we present the empirical insights, based on a statistical examination of the
experimentally gathered data. First, we report positive call-back rates for the younger and
older fictitious candidates, in general, classified by the activity the older worker undertook
during her/his extra post-educational years and classified by further vacancy and candidate
characteristics. Second, we discuss a regression analysis that allows us to control for vacancy
fixed effects and to measure the independent effect of relevant variables interacted with the older
age of the candidate.
2.4.1 Discrimination Ratios
Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 present positive call-back rates for the younger and older candidates
within the pairs of fictitious job applications we sent out. In Table 2.1 (Table 2.2) we follow the
strict sense (broad sense) definition of positive call-back. Statistics with regards to all tested
vacancies together are presented in Panel A of these tables. In total, the younger candidates got
an invitation for a job interview (any positive reaction) in 8.0% (16.5%) of their applications,
while their older counterparts got an invitation (a positive reaction) in only 4.9% (11.8%) of the
cases. Column (3) of 2.1 and 2.2 shows that the positive call-back rate in strict sense is about 1.6,
while the positive call-back rate in broad sense is 1.4. These numbers indicate that the younger
candidate within the pairs had a 64.3% higher chance of getting invited for a job interview and a
39.7% higher chance of getting any positive reaction. Both statistics are significantly different
from 1 at the 1% significance level.
This overall finding of hiring discrimination against older candidates is in line with the results
of the correspondence experiments reviewed in Section 2.2. Our interview invitation ratio of
1.6 lies in between the comparable ratios found by Bendick Jr, Brown, et al. (1999) and Lahey
(2008) for the United States, on the one hand, and those presented by Ahmed et al. (2012) and
Riach and Rich (2010) for Sweden and England, on the other hand. Our positive reaction ratio is
higher than the one presented by Gringart and Helmes (2001) and Lahey (2008) but lower than
the one found by the other studies. Moreover, our results corroborate with the evidence from
other countries in the sense that the levels of age discrimination found are higher than the levels
of discrimination, based on ethnicity, gender or sexual orientation estimated in Belgium (Baert,
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Table 2.1: The Probability of Interview Invitation by Age: Descriptive Analysis
(1) (2) (3)
Interview rate Interview rate Interview ratio
younger candidate older candidate (1) / (2)
A. All vacancies [N = 576] 0.08 0.049 1.643*** [3.021]
B. Classification by the older worker’s activity during her/his extra years
In-field employment [N = 192] 0.047 0.057 0.818 [0.706]
Out-of-field employment [N = 192] 0.104 0.036 2.857*** [3.724]
Inactivity [N = 192] 0.089 0.052 1.700* [1.818]
C. Classification by the tested occupation
Production operator [N = 144] 0.111 0.09 1.231 [0.774]
Administrative clerk [N = 72] 0.042 0.042 1.000 [0.000]
Waiter [N = 72] 0.167 0.069 2.400** [2.164]
Laboratory analyst [N = 72] 0.042 0.028 1.500 [1.000]
Management assistant [N = 144] 0.042 0.014 3.000** [2.021]
Sales representative [N = 72] 0.083 0.042 2.000* [1.757]
D. Classification by age of the candidates
38 versus 44 [N = 192] 0.073 0.019 3.876** [2.336]
38 versus 50 [N = 192] 0.073 0.047 1.556 [1.293]
44 versus 50 [N = 192] 0.094 0.068 1.385* [1.675]
E. Classification by gender of the candidates
Male [N = 288] 0.09 0.049 1.857*** [2.713]
Female [N = 288] 0.069 0.049 1.429 [1.503]
T-statistics, indicating whether the probability of getting an invitation for a job interview is the same for candidates from both age groups, are
between brackets. Standard errors are corrected for clustering of the observations at the vacancy level. * (**) ((***)) indicates significance at
the 10% (5%) ((1%)) significance level.
Cockx, et al., 2015; Baert, De Pauw, et al., 2016).
Next, we breakdown the positive call-back ratios by the activity of the older candidate within the
pair during her/his additional post-educational years. Panel B of Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 indicates
that, on the one hand, equal treatment can be rejected for the subsamples in which the older
candidates had years of out-of-field employment or inactivity. Clearly, a period of out-of-field
employment is perceived as the worst signal by employers. The probability of getting invited
to a job interview decreases by 65.0%,7 and the probability of any positive reaction decreases
by 44.8% for the older fictitious candidates who revealed out-of-field employment during their
additional years compared to their younger counterparts. The punishment for older age in
combination with inactivity is somewhat lower: 41.2%, with respect to interview invitation, and
765.0% = 1− 12.857 .
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Table 2.2: The Probability of Any Positive Reaction by Age: Descriptive Analysis
(1) (2) (3)
Positive reaction rate Positive reaction rate Positive reaction rate
younger candidate older candidate (1) / (2)
A. All vacancies [N = 576] 0.165 0.118 1.397*** [3.327]
B. Classification by the older worker’s activity during her/his extra years
In-field employment [N = 192] 0.135 0.125 1.083 [0.446]
Out-of-field employment [N = 192] 0.198 0.109 1.810*** [3.358]
Inactivity [N = 192] 0.161 0.12 1.348* [1.799]
C. Classification by the tested occupation
Production operator [N = 144] 0.167 0.146 1.143 [0.726]
Administrative clerk [N = 72] 0.083 0.097 0.857 [0.445]
Waiter [N = 72] 0.222 0.125 1.778* [1.981]
Laboratory analyst [N = 72] 0.194 0.139 1.400 [1.424]
Management assistant [N = 144] 0.153 0.069 2.200*** [2.900]
Sales representative [N = 72] 0.181 0.153 1.182 [0.815]
D. Classification by the age of the candidates
38 versus 44 [N = 192] 0.135 0.099 1.368* [1.706]
38 versus 50 [N = 192] 0.172 0.141 1.222 [1.096]
44 versus 50 [N = 192] 0.188 0.115 1.636*** [3.205]
E. Classification by the gender of the candidates
Male [N = 288] 0.163 0.104 1.567*** [2.911]
Female [N = 288] 0.167 0.132 1.263* [1.774]
T-statistics, indicating whether the probability of getting any positive reaction is the same for candidates from both age groups, are between
brackets. Standard errors are corrected for clustering of the observations at the vacancy level. * (**) ((***)) indicates significance at the 10%
(5%) ((1%)) significance level.
25.8%, with respect to any positive reaction. On the other hand, we cannot reject equal treatment,
with respect to the pairs in which the older candidate had more (in-field) experience. With regards
to the probability of job interview invitation, the positive call-back ratio is even (insignificantly)
smaller than 1. Apparently, the older candidates in our experiment had to compensate their older
age by additional in-field experience. Otherwise, if they had strictly the same level of in-field
experience, younger candidates were preferred.
Two reflections are worth noting at this point. First, our results underline that the Difference in
Post-Educational Years Problem, which we aim to take into account in this study, is an important
problem. Discrimination measures fundamentally vary by the way older candidates’ extra years
are filled in within experiments on age discrimination. By means of our extended correspondence
experiment, we get an indication of the lower (zero) and upper bound (the ratios in cases where
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the older candidates had out-of-field experience) of age discrimination in the tested occupations
in Flanders. If we would have picked just one out of these three potential situations, as the former
correspondence studies on age discrimination did, the experiment would have only allowed us to
present one arbitrary value out of this band, without knowing how far from the upper or lower
bound we were.
Second, this variation of age discrimination by the career pattern of older candidates points
in the direction of statistical discrimination. If age discrimination could be fully explained by
employers, customers and co-workers having just a distaste for interacting with older workers,
the past career of older candidates should not affect these candidates’ hiring outcomes. In
addition, given the particular ordering over the older candidates by their career patterns we
observe, this statistical discrimination seems not to be driven by the perception of higher salary
aspirations among older candidates, as this perception should be the highest with respect to older
candidates with more in-field experience. We come back to the interpretation of our results
within the taste-based and statistical discrimination in the next paragraph.
In Panels C, D and E of Table 2.1 and Table 2.2, we breakdown the experimentally gathered
data by the tested occupation, the particular age of the candidates within the pair and their
gender, respectively. First, the discrimination measures with regards to the classification by
occupation are the highest (and statistically significantly different from 1) within the occupations
of management assistant, waiter and sales representative. The latter finding might be explained
by employer and customer discrimination in the sense of the taste-based discrimination model of
Becker (1957). On the one hand, personal cooperation with the employer is probably the highest
within the occupation of management assistant. These employers might have a taste for younger
individuals in their direct neighbourhood. On the other hand, the high discrimination ratios in the
vending occupations (waiters and sales representatives) might point in the direction of customer
discrimination partly underlying age discrimination as customer contact is on average higher
in these occupations than in the other ones. This observation squares with the aforementioned
pattern in Table 2.5 that the evidence of discrimination found in the former contributions testing
the occupations of seller and waiter was, on average, higher than the measures in studies testing
other occupations.
Second, our overall finding of age discrimination in terms of job interview invitations (any
positive reactions) is driven by the comparison of the 38-year-old to the 44-year-old (44-year-old
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to the 50-year-old). Somewhat surprisingly, the discrimination ratios are the lowest for the
comparison of the 38-year-old to the 50-year-old.
Third, based on the ratios presented in Panel E, our overall ratios are driven by the male rather
than by the female pairs. We come back to the significance of these dimensions of heterogeneity
in age discrimination when we present our regression results in the next subsection.
2.4.2 Controlling for Vacancy Fixed Effects
As the younger and older ages are assigned randomly within our pairs of applications, regressing
positive call-back (in strict or broad sense) on an indicator of being the older candidate within
the pair leads to exactly the same empirical conclusion as the one based on Panel A of Table 2.1
and Table 2.2. In addition, as we randomly assigned these variables between pairs, regressions,
including interactions between older age and (i) the activity the older candidate undertook during
her/his additional post-educational years, (ii) the particular age combination of the candidates
and (iii) their gender, should lead to the same empirical pattern as the one in Panel B, Panel D and
Panel E of Table 2.1 and Table 2.2, at least for a sample size approaching infinity. However, our
sample size is finite. Thus, some of these variables randomly assigned between pairs may happen
to correlate with observable and unobservable vacancy characteristics. As these characteristics
may affect the hiring chances of our fictitious candidates, not controlling for them might yield
biased measures of the heterogeneity of age discrimination by the older candidates’ past careers,
the particular age combinations and the gender of the candidates used. Therefore, we further
explore the experimentally gathered data by means of a regression analysis controlling for
vacancy fixed effects.8
Table 2.3 and Table 2.4 present our regression results. We regress the outcome of positive
call-back in a strict sense (Table 2.3) and in a broad sense (Table 2.4) on various sets of key and
control variables by means of a linear probability model with vacancy fixed effects. For reasons of
comparability of the results for our different regression models, except for the variable indicating
individuals that were the older candidate within a pair, all independent variables are normalised by
8Analyses controlling for fixed effects at the vacancy level only weight pairs with a different value for the
dependent variable (and not pairs that are treated the same). Therefore, we also conducted linear probability model
and probit model regressions not controlling for fixed effects (but with standard errors corrected for clustering of the
observations at the vacancy level). The regression results are very comparable to those in Table 2.3 and Table 2.4
and available upon request.
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subtracting their mean among the subpopulation of older candidates. Variables that are included
in interaction with the indicator of older age, are not included without this interaction, as they
are all constant at the vacancy level and, therefore, controlled by our fixed effects estimations. In
what follows, we first focus on the results outlined in Table 2.3. Afterwards, we compare these
results with those in Table 2.4.
In regression model (1), we only include an indicator of older age as an explanatory variable. By
doing that, we find that this older age decreases the probability of a job interview invitation by
3.1 percentage points. Obviously, this outcome equals the difference between the overall positive
call-back rates in a strict sense among the younger and older candidates mentioned in Section
2.4.1.
Next, in model (2), we interact the older age with (normalised) indicators for the two least
beneficial activities undertaken by the older pair member during her/his additional years (with
additional in-field employment as a reference category). We observe, in line with the findings
reported in Table 2.1, a significantly negative effect of these interactions on the probability of
getting an invitation for a job interview. In addition, an F-test performed to assess the statistical
difference between these interaction variables does not allow us to reject that they are equal.
Therefore, we conclude that older age is only punished if the older and younger candidates have
the same amount of in-field experience and that this punishment is irrespective of whether the
older candidate filled her/his additional post-educational years with out-of-field employment or
inactivity.
In regression model (3), we extend the set of independent variables with variables indicating
type B applications and applications that were the first one of the pair sent to the vacancy. Next,
in regression model (4), we add additional interactions between the indicator of older age and
indicators for (i) (middle-)high-educated candidates, (ii) vacancies for administrative occupations
and vacancies for vending occupations (keeping vacancies in the industrial area as a reference
category), (iii) candidates being 50 years old, (iv) candidates being 12 years older than their
pair member and (v) candidates being of female gender. As the extra variables included in
models (3) and (4) are, by construction of the experiment, not correlated with the older age and
career pattern dummies, their adoption does not change the coefficients for the main variables of
interest.
In addition, the estimation results for model (3) show, as announced in Section 2.3.2, that
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Table 2.3: The Probability of Interview Invitation by Age: Regression Analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Older candidate -0.031*** (0.010) -0.031*** (0.010) -0.031*** (0.010) -0.031*** (0.010) -0.031*** (0.010) -0.031*** (0.010)
Older candidate x Out-of-field employment (normalised) -0.078*** (0.025) -0.078*** (0.025) -0.078*** (0.025) -0.078*** (0.025) -0.078*** (0.025)
Older candidate x Out-of-field employment x 12 years older (normalised) -0.017 (0.067) -0.017 (0.067)
Older candidate x Out-of-field employment x Female (normalised) 0.052 (0.050) 0.053 (0.050)
Older candidate x Years of inactivity (normalised) -0.047* (0.025) -0.047* (0.025) -0.047* (0.025) -0.047* (0.025) -0.046* (0.025)
Older candidate x Years of inactivity x 12 years older (normalised) -0.021 (0.068) -0.023 (0.068)
Older candidate x Years of inactivity x Female (normalised) -0.052 (0.050) -0.051 (0.050)
First application sent (normalised) 0.014 (0.010) 0.014 (0.010) 0.014 (0.010) 0.013 (0.010)
Job application template type B (normalised) -0.011 (0.010) -0.012 (0.012) -0.012 (0.012) -0.012 (0.012)
Older candidate x (Middle-)high-educated (normalised) 0.008 (0.021) 0.008 (0.021) 0.008 (0.022)
Older candidate x Vacancy for administrative occupation (normalised) -0.003 (0.025) -0.003 (0.025) -0.005 (0.026)
Older candidate x Vacancy for vending occupation (normalised) -0.052* (0.027) -0.052* (0.027) -0.055** (0.028)
Older candidate x 50 years old (normalised) 0.018 (0.023) 0.018 (0.023) 0.018 (0.023)
Older candidate x 12 years older (normalised) -0.009 (0.033) 0.004 (0.051) 0.004 (0.051)
Older candidate x Female (normalised) 0.021 (0.021) 0.021 (0.036) 0.020 (0.036)
Older candidate x Vacancy offering part-time contract (normalised) 0.011 (0.031)
Older candidate x Vacancy offered by interim office (normalised) -0.011 (0.034)
Constant 0.080*** (0.007) 0.080*** (0.007) 0.080*** (0.007) 0.080*** (0.007) 0.080*** (0.007) 0.080*** (0.007)
Vacancy fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-test for equality of coefficients “Older candidate x Out-of-field 0.211 0.212 0.215 0.21 0.21
employment" and “Older candidate x Years of inactivity" (p-value)
Observations 1,152 1,152 1,152 1,152 1,152 1,152
The presented results are linear probability model estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is getting an invitation to a job interview. Except for the variable “older candidate", all
independent variables are normalised. The triple interactions “Older candidate x Out-of-field employment x Female" and “Older candidate x Years of inactivity x Female" are normalised by subtracting their
mean among the subpopulation of older candidates with years of out-of-field employment and older candidates with years of inactivity, respectively. The other variables are normalised by subtracting their mean
among the subpopulation of older candidates. * (**) ((***)) indicates significance at the 10% (5%) ((1%)) significance level.
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Table 2.4: The Probability of Any Positive Reaction by Age: Regression Analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Older candidate -0.047*** (0.014) -0.047*** (0.014) -0.047*** (0.014) -0.047*** (0.014) -0.047*** (0.014) -0.047*** (0.014)
Older candidate x Out-of-field employment (normalised) -0.078** (0.034) -0.078** (0.034) -0.078** (0.034) -0.079** (0.034) -0.079** (0.035)
Older candidate x Out-of-field employment x 12 years older (normalised) 0.058 (0.092) 0.057 (0.092)
Older candidate x Out-of-field employment x Female (normalised) 0.031 (0.069) 0.030 (0.069)
Older candidate x Years of inactivity (normalised) -0.031 (0.034) -0.031 (0.034) -0.031 (0.034) -0.031 (0.034) -0.032 (0.035)
Older candidate x Years of inactivity x 12 years older (normalised) 0.036 (0.093) 0.040 (0.094)
Older candidate x Years of inactivity x Female (normalised) -0.020 (0.069) -0.021 (0.069)
First application sent (normalised) 0.033** (0.014) 0.033** (0.014) 0.033** (0.014) 0.034** (0.014)
Job application template type B (normalised) -0.019 (0.014) -0.022 (0.016) -0.022 (0.016) -0.022 (0.016)
Older candidate x (Middle-)high-educated (normalised) -0.029 (0.029) -0.029 (0.029) -0.030 (0.030)
Older candidate x Vacancy for administrative occupation (normalised) -0.009 (0.034) -0.009 (0.034) -0.004 (0.035)
Older candidate x Vacancy for vending occupation (normalised) -0.025 (0.037) -0.025 (0.037) -0.019 (0.038)
Older candidate x 50 years old (normalised) -0.012 (0.032) -0.012 (0.032) -0.012 (0.032)
Older candidate x 12 years older (normalised) -0.014 (0.045) -0.046 (0.070) -0.047 (0.070)
Older candidate x Female (normalised) 0.024 (0.028) 0.021 (0.049) 0.022 (0.049)
Older candidate x Vacancy offering part-time contract (normalised) -0.020 (0.043)
Older candidate x Vacancy offered by interim office (normalised) 0.024 (0.046)
Constant 0.165*** (0.010) 0.165*** (0.010) 0.165*** (0.010) 0.165*** (0.010) 0.165*** (0.010) 0.165*** (0.010)
Vacancy fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-test for equality of coefficients for “Older candidate x Out-of-field 0.174 0.168 0.17 0.174 0.177
employment" and “Older candidate x Years of inactivity" (p-value)
Observations 1,152 1,152 1,152 1,152 1,152 1,152
The presented results are linear probability model estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is getting any positive reaction. Except for the variable “older candidate", all independent
variables are normalised. The triple interactions “Older candidate x Out-of-field employment x Female" and “Older candidate x Years of inactivity x Female" are normalised by subtracting their mean among
the subpopulation of older candidates with years of out-of-field employment and older candidates with years of inactivity, respectively. The other variables are normalised by subtracting their mean among the
subpopulation of older candidates. * (**) ((***)) indicates significance at the 10% (5%) ((1%)) significance level.
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the probability of job interview invitation does not vary across template types. Moreover, it
is invariant with respect to whether an application was sent as the first pair member or not.
Concerning the interactions added in model (4), we find a (weakly) significant interaction effect
with regards to the vending occupations (waiter and sales representative). Potentially driven
by the aforementioned customer taste-based discrimination, revealing an older age lowers the
probability of getting a job interview in these occupations, with an additional 5.2 percentage
points compared to the reference category of industrial occupations. The other interactions are
not significant: we cannot reject that age discrimination in Belgium is invariant with respect to
whether candidates differ 6 or 12 years in age and to the candidates’ gender.
The latter finding might be explained by the fact that positive and negative interaction effects
with regards to these dimensions for the various career paths of the older candidates cancel each
other out. For instance, it is possible that 12 years of extra post-educational years yield, when
compared to 6 years, a positive surplus when filled with in-field employment while they lead
to a more severe punishment for older candidates when filled with other activities. In addition,
due to gender stereotypes, years of inactivity might be punished less for females. To test this, in
model (5), we add triple interactions (i) between older age, the activity of the older candidate
during her/his extra post-educational years and an indicator of whether the candidates differed
12 years in age and (ii) between older age, the activity of the older candidate during her/his extra
post-educational years and an indicator of female gender. These triple interactions are normalised
by subtracting their mean among the relevant subpopulation of older candidates (those with
years of out-of-field employment or inactivity). However, none of the added interactions yields
significant results.
Last, in model (6) we add indicators for vacancies offering part-time contracts and vacancies
offered by an interim office in interaction with an indicator for being the older candidate within
the pair. None of these interactions has a significant effect on the probability of job interview
invitation. However, by including these variables, the interaction with respect to vacancies for
vending occupations becomes significant at the 5% significance level.
Table 2.4 presents the corresponding results, using positive call-back in broad sense as an
outcome variable. The most important difference when comparing column (6) of this table to the
same column in Table 2.3 is that the (weak) significance of the interaction between the indicators
of the older candidate and inactivity as a way to fill her/his additional post-educational years
2.5. Conclusion 33
disappears. Thus, for positive call-backs in broad sense, we cannot reject that the treatment of
older candidates is equal for those who were inactive during their additional years and those
who gained additional in-field experience. However, we also cannot reject that the treatment
of older candidates is equal for those who were inactive and those who were employed in an
out-of-field job. Moreover, an alternative econometric specification of model (6), in which we
do not normalise the interaction variables, reveals that, also after controlling for vacancy fixed
effects, older age is punished for those older candidates who were inactive during their additional
years.9 A second difference between column (6) of Table 2.3 and the comparable column of
Table 2.4 is that the interaction between older age and the indicator of vending occupations
loses its significance. Last, the broad sense outcome is significantly more in favour of the first
candidate sent. For this candidate, the chance of getting any positive reaction is 3.3 percentage
points higher, ceteris paribus.
2.5 Conclusion
This study contributed to the empirical literature on age discrimination. We argued that former
contributions to this literature employing classical correspondence experiments, the golden
standard to identify unequal treatment in hiring, were not able to disentangle age discrimination
from unequal treatment, based on the activities older workers undertake during their additional
post-educational years (which may lead to additional human capital or career gaps).
In our approach to this “Difference in Post-Educational Years Problem", we proposed an exten-
sion of the correspondence testing framework. More concretely, we presented a setting in which
the random assignment of a younger and an older age within pairs of fictitious job applications
that are sent to real job openings is combined with the random assignment of various realistic
activities undertaken by the older worker during her/his extra post-educational years between
these pairs.
We applied this extended field experimental framework to the Belgian case. We sent out pairs of
fictitious job candidates to real vacancies in Flanders, the Northern part of Belgium, between
December 2014 and May 2015. Alternately, in one application, the younger age of 38 or 44
9The F-statistic testing whether the sum of the constant term and the interaction with respect to having been
inactive during one’s additional post-educational years, is significant at the 10% significance level (with a p-value of
0.087).
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was disclosed, and in the other one, the older age of 44 or 50 - the resulting variation in age
difference (6 or 12 years) allowed us to look into whether age discrimination varied linearly
with this difference. To the older candidate within the pair, we randomly assigned one out of
the three most realistic activities she/he could have undertaken during her/his 6 or 12 years of
additional labour market time: in-field employment, out-of-field employment or inactivity. We
further contributed to the literature by measuring the heterogeneity in age discrimination by the
skill level and the area of the occupation and by the gender of the candidate. To this end, we sent
our pairs of applications to a balanced number of vacancies in six different occupations, and we
randomly assigned the gender of the candidates between these pairs.
We found that, in line with the literature, the younger candidate within a pair of applicants had,
on average, a 64.3% higher chance of getting invited for a job interview than the older candidate
and a 39.7% higher chance of getting any positive reaction. However, when we classified
this invitation probability by the activity of the older candidate during her/his additional post-
educational years, we found that older age was only punished if the older and younger candidates
had the same amount of in-field experience and that this punishment was irrespective of whether
the older candidate filled her/his additional post-educational years with out-of-field employment
or inactivity. In other words, the older candidates in our experiment had to compensate their
older age by additional in-field experience in order not to be discriminated against. Thus, also
empirically, the Difference in Post-Educational Years Problem turned out to be important. In
addition, we interpreted this finding of age discrimination, varying with the past career of the older
candidates as an indication of statistical discrimination. However, as we also found that unequal
treatment was most detrimental to those older candidates who applied for vending occupations,
we also saw a role for taste-based customer preferences underlying age discrimination.
Our application of the proposed experimental approach to measure age discrimination is limited in
terms of scope. We measured unequal treatment based on age only for particular age combinations
in jobs posted in the database of the Public Employment Agency of Flanders. This limitation is
less acute in our design in comparison to former contributions, as we made the conscious choice
to test industry- as well as administration- as well as vending-oriented and (middle-)low as well
as (middle-)high-skilled occupations. Moreover, because this limitation is expected to cause a
similar shift in the punishment of all older candidates, irrespective of their past careers, it should
not bias the conclusions with respect to the relative surplus of the various activities the older
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candidates undertook during their extra post-educational years. Nevertheless, due to differing
labour market institutions, our results might not be simply generalised to other Western European
countries, let alone to other continental regions. In addition, other dimensions of heterogeneity
in age discrimination (for instance, the interaction between age and ethnicity) are interesting
to explore. Therefore, we are in favour of large-scale, cross-country implementations of our
experimental setting to measure age discrimination. The outcomes of these experiments might
not only facilitate more accurate policies and interventions but may also make employers more
aware of the responsibility they carry with respect to the labour market situation of older workers
and, thereby, with respect to handling the problem of population ageing.
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Table 2.5: Literature Review: Correspondence Experiments on Age Discrimination
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Study Country Tested occupation(s) Gender
of appli-
cants
Age of
younger
applicants
Age of
older
applicants
# vacancies (#
resumes /
vacancy)
Definition of
positive call-back
Positive
call-back
ratio
Approach towards Difference in
Post-Educational Years Problem
Ahmed et al. (2012) Sweden Seller and waiter Male 31 46 466 (2) Interview invitation 3.23 Years of out-of-field employment for the
older candidate
Albert et al. (2011) Spain Clerk (accountancy,
administration,
sales)
Female
or male
24 or 28 38 1062 (10) Any positive
reaction
1.694 More years of in-field employment for
the older candidate
Bendick Jr, Jackson,
et al. (1997)
United
States
Clerk (administra-
tion, copy-writing,
ICT)
Female
or male1
32 57 775 (2) Any positive
reaction
1.467 Years of inactivity (out-of-field
employment) for the older candidate in
the administration (other) area
Bendick Jr, Brown,
et al. (1999)2
United
States
Clerk (administra-
tion or sales)
Female
or male3
32 57 102 (2) Interview invitation 1.135 Years of out-of-field employment for the
older candidate
Gringart and Helmes
(2001)
Australia Clerk (accountancy) Female
or male
32 57 452 (1 or 2) Any positive
reaction
1.238 Years of inactivity (out-of-field
employment) for older candidate for
female (male) pairs
Lahey (2008) United
States
Random entry-level
jobs
Female 35 or 45 50, 55 or
62
8002 (2) Interview invitation 1.418 Work histories limited to the last ten
years (for females at entry-level jobs)
Any positive
reaction
1.19
Riach and Rich
(2006a)
France Waiter Male 27 57 345 (2) Any positive
reaction
3.571 More years of in-field employment for
the older candidate
Riach and Rich
(2007)
Spain Waiter Male 27 57 340 (2) Any positive
reaction
3.5 More years of in-field employment for
the older candidate
Riach and Rich
(2010)
England Random entry jobs,
seller and waiter
Female
or male4
21 or 275 39 or 47 470 (2) Interview invitation 1.883 More years of in-field employment for
the older candidate
Tinsley (2012) England Clerk (administra-
tion) and waiter
Female 24 or 256 50 or 51 1227 (2) Any positive
reaction
2.146 Work histories limited to the last five
years
The positive call-back ratio is calculated by dividing the percentage of applications receiving a positive call-back (in the sense of column (78)) for the younger candidates by the corresponding percentage for the
older candidates. The presented ratios are our own calculations, based on the mentioned studies -positive call-back ratios for different occupations or cities were weighted by their number of tested jobs. All these
ratios are statistically significantly different from 1, at least at the 5% significance level. 1 Female pairs were sent to the administration and copy-writing jobs, and male pairs were sent to the copy-writing and
ICT jobs. 2 This study is in fact an “audit experiment", as it comprises all stages of the hiring process (Pager, 2007; Riach and Rich, 2002). For reasons of comparability, the positive call-back ratio mentioned in
this table for Bendick Jr, Brown, et al. (1999) only relates to the first stage of the tested recruitment process. Important to mention is that in this experiment, the older candidate always applied (shortly) before
the younger one. 3 Female pairs were only sent to six job openings. 4 Female pairs were sent to the random entry jobs and sales positions, and male pairs were sent to the positions as a waiter. 5 Candidates
applying for entry jobs were 21 or 39 years old; the others were 27 or 47 years old. 6 Candidates applying for clerk positions were 24 or 50 years old; those applying for jobs as a waiter were 25 or 51 years old.
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Chapter 3
Working Time Reductions at the End of
the Career.
How do they Prolong the Time Spent in Employment?1
3.1 Introduction
Population ageing puts enormous pressure on Social Security provisions in many developed
countries. One of the main factors involved in this is the low labour force participation of
older workers, and in particular of older women. In EU-15 countries in 2013, the labour force
participation rates of workers aged 55-64 was 29 percentage points below that of workers aged
25-54 (OECD, 2015). This difference was even more pronounced for Belgium, the country of
analysis in this paper, where the participation rate of the older age group is 41 percentage points
lower than the younger one. Gradual reduction of the working time at the end of the career has
been proposed as a tool to prolong the working career and to increase the activity rates of older
workers (e.g. Schmid, 1998). This would reduce the risk of dropping out of the labour force
due to health problems (Ahn, 2015) or improve the work-life balance, partly by taking up care
obligations (Gielen, 2009; Van Looy et al., 2014). These benefits of gradual retirement have,
however, been contested by others. Employers may use subsidised part-time employment at the
end of the career as an easy way to get gradually rid of less productive older workers and, as
1In collaboration with Andrea Albanese and Bart Cockx
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such, a bridge to early retirement (Graf et al., 2011). In this paper we aim at shedding more light
on this controversy based on the evaluation of a scheme that subsidises working time reductions
at the end of the career in Belgium.
Several EU countries have put gradual retirement schemes in place for older workers.2 These can
take different forms. In Sweden, Finland and Denmark workers can reduce their working time
and top up their income by prematurely drawing from their pension entitlements. In Belgium,
Germany and Austria the government subsidises working time reductions at the end of the career
to partially compensate for the income loss. In these countries employees can also choose the
so called “block-model". This model concentrates the reduced working time in the years prior
to retirement by taking a leave of absence, inducing retirement to be early instead of gradual.
Finally, before the abolition in 2012, Dutch employees could “save" time early in their career to
reduce working time later on.
Evidence on the effectiveness of gradual retirement schemes based on counterfactual impact
evaluations is scarce. Graf et al. (2011) and Huber et al. (2016) estimate the effects of the
Austrian, respectively German, gradual retirement scheme based on flexible methods that solve
the selection problem by conditioning on a rich set of individual, firm and regional characteristics.
Both studies find that gradual retirement reduces the likelihood of unemployment. However,
this does not imply that these workers remain employed longer, because if the “block model"
is chosen, the worker is officially employed without actually working. Berg et al. (2015) also
evaluate the German partial retirement scheme, but based on a difference-in-differences strategy.
They find that participation in the scheme prolongs the working career for men, but less so in
periods of more intensive use of the block model. Finally, Elsayed et al. (2015) use a stated
preferences experiment based on vignettes to evaluate the effect of various hypothetical pension
reforms in the Netherlands, among which the introduction of gradual retirement. This study finds
that gradual retirement would induce workers to retire one year later on average, but also that
total lifetime labour supply would still fall by 3.4 months.
In Belgium private sector employees older than fifty are subsidised within the Time Credit (TC)
scheme to reduce their working time by 20%, 50% or 100% until retirement. Since the 100%
working time reduction is like a “block model" that resembles more an early than a gradual
retirement scheme, focusing on the partial working time reductions is more informative for
2See Table 3.2 in the Appendix A for an overview of such schemes in the countries mentioned in the text.
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our research question (Berg et al., 2015). We evaluate the impact of TC on the survival rate in
employment up to eight years after entry in the scheme as well as on the different exit destinations.
To that end we exploit a very rich administrative data on social benefit receipt, labour market
histories (from as early as 1957), and some essential firm and household characteristics. We argue
that we can eliminate the potential selection bias by conditioning on this abundance of relevant
information. In particular, even if information on important variables, such as ability, motivation
and health, is missing, these time-constant unobserved factors are captured by conditioning on
the complete employment history of the individuals, i.e. by exploiting the panel structure of the
data (Lechner et al., 2011; Huber et al., 2016).
We contribute to the literature in the following ways. First, by considering a competing risks
duration model, we explicitly study how the effect of the working time reduction interacts with
supply incentives to exit the labour force via early retirement schemes. In particular, we find
that the TC scheme delays labour force withdrawals as long as participants are not eligible to
early retirement. When they are, exits from the labour force are reinforced, especially to the
early statutory retirement scheme which provides a more generous replacement rate for TC
participants than the other early retirement schemes. Second, to the best of our knowledge, we
are the first to provide evidence on the impact of gradual retirement on the incidence of sick
leave. Finally, from a methodological perspective, we explicitly take into account that the TC
scheme is not entered at a fixed moment, but can happen at any time. Fredriksson and Johansson
(2008) have shown that in case of dynamic assignment into treatment methods that eliminate
the selection bias by conditioning on a set of observables while maintaining the assumption
that the treatment assignment is static are biased. As to take into account a selective censoring
problem that was overlooked by the aforementioned authors, we follow the estimation procedure
recently proposed by Vikström (2014). We demonstrate that, in particular in the competing risk
framework, correcting for this selectivity can eliminate substantial bias relative to the method of
Fredriksson and Johansson.
Our findings can be summarised as follows. We estimate a positive short run effect of the TC on
the survival rate in employment. This effect becomes negative after two (four) years for men
(women). Qualitatively these effects are similar to those found by Graf et al. (2011) for Austria
and Huber et al. (2016) for West-German men. In contrast to the findings in Austria, where
demand factors are the most likely explanation, we argue that in Belgium supply factors matter
3.2. Literature Review 43
more. The short run positive effect are more compatible with an improved work-life balance than
with a cheap mode of getting rid of less productive older workers, because the strict employment
protection in Belgium makes it unlikely that employers would fire workers in the counterfactual
of no participation in TC. Moreover, the dominant explanation for the subsequent enhanced
labour force withdrawal is mainly driven by enhanced take up of conventional early retirement,
which is difficult to impose involuntarily and which is the most favourable early retirement
regime from the perspective of the worker, because, in contrast to other regimes, part-time
TC-recipients remain entitled to a full-time pension benefit. We also find that participation in
TC slightly reduces the incidence of sick-leave, but not significantly, so that improved health is
not the dominant explanation for the positive effect. We argue that this weak effect is due to the
targeting of TC to a relatively healthy population. Overall, the existing scheme does not pass the
cost-benefit test.
The paper is structured as follows. We start with a literature review. Section 3.3 describes the
institutional context and Section 3.4 the sampling scheme and the data. Section 3.5 outlines the
empirical strategy (identification and estimation) and presents the empirical results. The final
section summarises the findings and concludes. The Appendix contains tables with supplemen-
tary results, a comparison of gradual retirement schemes in Europe, and a description of the
endogenous stratification of the sample. The Internet Appendix contains a detailed account of
the sample selection, the estimation methods and the cost-benefit analysis.3
3.2 Literature Review
Working time reductions may reduce the risk of dropping out the labour force by counteracting
the declining health of older workers (Ahn, 2015) or by allowing workers to improve their work-
life balance, partly by taking up care obligations (Gielen, 2009; Van Looy et al., 2014) . Firms
may voluntarily grant working time reductions to keep valuable (firm-specific) competences and
transfer know-how to younger employees (Eurofound, 2001; Kantarci and Van Soest, 2008).
However, institutional constraints, such as provisions that the pension allowances depend on the
last wage, or that a pension cannot be drawn upon while working part-time, may discourage older
workers to reduce working time. In addition, employers may not be willing to award gradual
3The Internet Appendix is included at the end of this Chapter.
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retirement options (Hurd, 1996; Charles and DeCicca, 2007; Gielen, 2009) so that government
coercion or incentives may be necessary.
It is, however, far from guaranteed that eliminating institutional barriers and offering an explicit
option to gradually retire by part-time work would keep older workers longer in the workforce or
increase the total number of hours worked. First, pay of older workers may exceed their produc-
tivity.4 If employment protection is strong, firms may use subsidised part-time employment at
the end of the career as an easy way to get gradually rid of these less productive workers. Gradual
retirement is then just a “bridge" to (early) retirement and does not prolong the working career
(Graf et al., 2011). This process may be reinforced if a phased reduction in working hours (i)
does not lead to a proportional reduction in the workload (Devisscher and Sanders, 2007; Rudolf,
2014), (ii) signals to employers a preference for early retirement (Machado and Portela, 2014),
or (iii) just decreases labour market attachment. Finally, even if the withdrawal from the labour
force is delayed, the total number of hours worked may still decrease. An hours-constrained
worker without the possibility to reduce working time can either stop working altogether or stay
working full-time. With the possibility to adjust the working time, the number of hours worked
increases in the first case and decreases otherwise. The net effect on the number of hours worked
depends on the relative size of these effects (Gielen, 2009; Graf et al., 2011).
The empirical literature studying the effectiveness of gradual retirement schemes based on
counterfactual evaluations is very sparse. Graf et al. (2011) study the Austrian old age part-time
(OAPT) scheme based on the conditional independence assumption (CIA) using propensity
score methods (see e.g. Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). They contrast participants in the OAPT
scheme between 2000 and 2003 to a control group to whom a hypothetical start date was assigned
according to the simulation procedure described in Wunsch and Lechner (2008).5 They find that
the OAPT scheme increases the number of days employed by 30 days on average during each
of the first two years after entrance. However, in the fourth and fifth year the OAPT decreases
the number of days employed by about 35 for women and by nearly 50 for men, leading to a
cumulatively negative effect over five years. Moreover, as OAPT participants work part-time,
4There is some evidence that declining productivity with age or deferred compensation schemes induce a
pay-productivity gap for older workers (e.g. Hellerstein and Neumark, 2007; Aubert and Crépon, 2003; Aubert and
Crépon, 2007; Ilmakunnas and Maliranta, 2005) and in particular in Belgium (Cataldi et al., 2012; Vandenberghe
et al., 2013). By contrast, no pay-productivity gap is found by Cardoso et al. (2011) and Van Ours and Stoeldraijer
(2011).
5This procedure has been criticised by Fredriksson and Johansson (2008).
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the full-time equivalent time worked diminished over five years by 26 (23) percentage points
for men (women). On the other hand, the time spent in unemployment fell over this period by
37 (43) days for men (women). This is most likely because in the “block-model" these workers
were not required to be made redundant, since they were not working anyway.
Huber et al. (2016) use the CIA to study the effect of introducing partial retirement in Germany.
They estimate the intention-to-treat effects of the OAPT by contrasting the labour market
outcomes of male employees in firms that started offering partial retirement between 2000 and
2002 to those in firms that did not offer this opportunity in this period. In East-Germany the
option of partial retirement did not have any significant impact on the timing at which the labour
market was left but it did decrease the exit to unemployment schemes. However, as in Austria,
the “block-model" affected the pathway to retirement. Rather than transiting to unemployment
prior to retirement participants entered the non-employment block of the scheme. Though in
the first two years the effects in West-Germany are not very different, after three to four year,
the effect on unemployment disappears and the share of treated workers exiting the labour force
increases. The authors attribute the different effects between West and East-Germany to the
difficult labour market conditions in the latter region.
Berg et al. (2015) also evaluate the German partial retirement scheme based on a difference-in-
differences strategy which contrasts a younger control group of 50-54 year olds to a treatment
group of 55-65 year olds in the pre-treatment period (1993-1998) and two post-treatment periods:
1999-2001 and 2002-2004, respectively a period in which the block-model was less and more
intensively used. During the period of less (more) intensive use of the block-model male
participants remained 1.8 (1.2) years longer employed than non-participants, if the time not
worked during the second phase of the block model is not considered as employment. The
employment of female participants was, however, not affected in the former period, while it even
declined by 0.2 years in the latter.
Finally, Elsayed et al. (2015) use vignettes in a web-based survey of 3,611 Dutch public servants
to evaluate the introduction of an early retirement scheme in the Netherlands. In this survey
respondents get different vignettes of hypothetical retirement scenarios, including gradual
retirement with a 50% working time reduction of working time and an entitlement to half the
full pension. For each vignette respondents state at which age they would retire. To provide
causal interpretations of the systematic relations between the responses and the scenarios, the
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scenarios were randomly assigned to the respondents. The study finds that gradual retirement
would induce workers to retire on average one year later. However, total lifetime labour supply
would still fall by 3.4 months, because the reduced working hours within the gradual retirement
scheme dominate the delayed exit from the labour force.
3.3 Gradual Retirement in Belgium: Time Credit Beyond the
Age of 50
In 2002 the Career Break scheme, in place since 1985 and available in both the private and
public sector, was reformed and relabelled “Time Credit" (TC) scheme in the private sector. The
scheme aims at generating a better work-life balance by enabling and encouraging employees
to slow down their working pace, even without needing to specify a specific motive. Workers
younger than 50 can temporarily reduce their working time, while older workers can participate
without any time limit, to enable a more gradual transition to retirement (Devisscher, 2004). We
focus on a description of the main features of the latter section of the TC scheme, also called the
end-of-career TC. We restrict our description to the regulations in place during the 2002-2007
period. This covers the relevant period for the empirical analysis in this research. In 2015, the
scheme is still in place, but most of the eligibility conditions have been strengthened considerably.
Most notably, the age of eligibility was raised to 55 years in 2012 and starting from 2015 this
age will gradually increase to 60 in 2019.
Individuals older than 50 who are employed in a private sector firm are, under certain conditions,
entitled to reduce their working time to 80% or 50% of a full-time, or even completely. They
are entitled to a lump-sum state subsidy that partially compensates for the earnings loss that the
transition to part-time work involves. Notice that the possibility to completely stop working was
much less used than the other regimes, possibly because the subsidy was only 34% higher than
the one obtained for the 50% regime and more generous early retirement schemes were available,
although generally only at older ages (see below). Since our interest is in gradual retirement, we
do not further consider the full-time time credit regime. The main eligibility conditions for the
end of career TC scheme were the following:
1. Being at least 50 years old at the start of the working time reduction;
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2. Being full-time employed during the year prior to entry for the 20% regime; being
employed for at least 75% of a full-time schedule for the 50% regime;
3. At least 5 years of tenure in the same firm;
4. At least 20 years of labour market experience;
5. Consent of the employer, if the number of employees in the firm is at most 10 or, in case
the firm employs 11 workers or more, if the fraction of employees in the TC is strictly
larger than 5% (can be revised by a collective agreement);
6. Notification to the employer at least 3 months prior to the working time reduction.
If these eligibility conditions are satisfied the employee is entitled to a monthly lump-sum subsidy
of, (i) in case of the 20% regime, e2246 for singles with or without dependent children and e186
for other household types, and, (ii) in case of the 50% regime, e400 for all household types. For
the sample of TC beneficiaries analysed in this research, this results in a median replacement
rate of 83% of the full-time gross wage for those working 80%, and of 57% for those working
half-time. As a comparison, the replacement rate after the top-up was 70% for a half-time worker
in Germany and 75% when working 40% to 60% in Austria. The replacement rate is therefore
generally substantially lower for a median wage worker in Belgium. However, since the subsidy
is lump-sum in Belgium and proportional in Germany and Austria, the replacement rate may
increase to the Austrian and German levels for low-wage workers.7
The end of career TC was very popular. The number of participants grew steadily from 8,700 in
2002, the year it was introduced, to 88,000 in 2011, the year prior to the one in which the age of
eligibility was raised to 55. As a share of private sector employees aged 50 or more, participation
steadily increased from 2.5% in 2002 to 16.0% in 2011. This growth is related to both, the rising
employment rate of older women in this period and to the increased generosity of the TC relative
to the Career Break. The subsidy amount was raised by about 20% in the 50% regime and by
nearly 40% in the 20% regime. The share of female TC participants steadily grew from 27% in
2002 to 52% in 2011.
Apart from the lump-sum subsidy, another major benefit for TC participants is that for the
determination of the level of replacement income in the branches of Social Security, such as
6All ein the text are indexed by the CPI and expressed in constant 2004 euros.
7For the 20% (50%) regime the first and third quartile of this replacement rate ranges between 81% (55%) and
91% (62%), while the 90th percentile of this replacement rate, i.e. for low-wage workers, is as high as 96% (75%).
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(early) statutory retirement and unemployment, TC beneficiaries are assimilated to workers
with the same time schedule as before the working time reduction. This means that relative to
their current part-time income, TC participants earn a much higher replacement income if they
leave employment for (early) retirement than workers who remain full-time employed. As a
consequence, the incentive to stop working is significantly enhanced, especially for workers who
choose the 50% TC regime: the numerator of their replacement income is unaffected, while the
denominator significantly decreases. In line with these incentives, we will show in the empirical
analysis that participation in TC eventually enhances the transition to early retirement. Moreover,
because these incentives were different across the different early retirement schemes, they also
altered the pathway to early retirement. To understand this point, we briefly describe the different
early retirement options in Belgium and the impact of the TC on the benefit level in these options.
In Belgium there are essentially three early retirement schemes in the private sector: early
retirement within the statutory regime, the conventional pre-retirement scheme (also known as
the “bridge pension") and the, so-called, “Canada Dry" system.8
• In the period of analysis, early retirement within the statutory regime started from age 60
after minimum 35 years of employment experience.9 The benefit level is determined as at
the statutory age and provides in case of a career of 45 years a replacement rate of 75% or
60%, depending on whether the partner of the beneficiary, if any, has any (replacement)
income or not. This amount is proportionally reduced if the career is shorter than 45
years and is bracketed by a floor and a ceiling. Due to relatively low generosity of this
scheme for full-time workers in the private sector,10 take-up in the two alternative regimes,
especially the bridge pension, is much more important.
• The bridge pension is available to workers with more than 20 years of employment
experience and aged at least 60.11 Because of a supplement equal to half of the differ-
ence between the unemployment benefit (UB) and the wage, the bridge pension is more
attractive, at least if they are not in TC (see below).
8“Canada Dry" refers to publicity for the drink Canada Dry: “It has the colour of Whisky, but it is not Whisky".
9This is an early retirement scheme, because the statutory retirement is normally entered after 45 years of labour
market experience or at age 65. The statutory retirement age for women was raised by one year every three years
from 60 before 1997 to 65 from 2009 onwards.
10For public sector employees the scheme is much more generous and, hence, more widely used.
11This can be lowered to 58 by a sectoral collective agreement, such as in many industrial committees of the
manufacturing sector. In restructuring firms and for arduous professions, the age condition could drop to 50, 52 or
55, depending on the sectoral agreement.
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• The “Canada Dry" is an unofficial early retirement scheme in which the employer pays,
as in the bridge pension, a supplement to the UB. This scheme is more flexible for the
employer, because it does not impose an age limit among others (Albanese and Cockx,
2015). Since there is no obligation for the worker to report the supplement to the UB she
obtains, no official figures on the use of the Canada Dry scheme are available.
As already mentioned, the UB and the statutory (early) retirement pension for a beneficiary of
TC is calculated on the basis of the fictitious earnings that the employee would have had if she
would not have reduced her working time. By contrast, TC does decrease the benefit level of the
bridge pension. Even if the entitlement to UB is based on the fictitious earnings, the supplement
is equal to 50% of the difference between the effective part-time wage in TC and the UB and,
hence, much lower or even zero if the UB is higher than the wage in TC, which can happen in
the 50% TC regime. Consequently, to the extent that the more restrictive age and experience
requirements are satisfied, the statutory early retirement scheme is relatively more attractive
than the bridge pension (and the Canada Dry) for beneficiaries of TC than for full-time workers.
Moreover, the statutory early retirement can be entered without consent of the employer, while
the bridge pension, Canada Dry or plain unemployment does require this consent, because the
employer must then also compensate for the dismissal, which is costly for these older workers
with substantial seniority. This explains why we find in our empirical analysis that TC increases
the likelihood of ending the career through the statutory early retirement, especially in the 50%
TC regime.
3.4 Data and Sample Selection
3.4.1 Database
We use rich individual data that were obtained by merging administrative registers of the diverse
Social Security institutions and of the National Register containing all Belgian inhabitants. The
database became more comprehensive over time. From as early as 1957 until 1998 we have for
employees in the private sector yearly information on earnings, the number of working days and
hours (in case of part-time work) and the worker type (blue or white collar). From 1998 onwards
this information is available on a quarterly basis (measurement at the end of each quarter), not
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only for employees in the private sector, but also in the public sector. In addition, from then
onwards it also provides information about the firm (size and sector), the industrial committee
to which the worker belongs,12 the timing of self-employment spells, the UB receipt, as well
as the participation in the Career Break, TC schemes and early retirement schemes. Finally,
since 2003 the data have been complemented by information on sick leave, receipt of statutory
(possibly early) retirement benefits and replacement income in case of disability, occupational
diseases or accidents. Since 1998 the National Register also provides yearly information on
December 31 on individual and household characteristics, such as age, gender, nationality, district
of residence, household size (by age group) and type (single or couple, with or without children).
The observation period in this study ends in the last quarter of 2011.
3.4.2 Sample Selection
We base our analysis on a sample that was drawn with the purpose to evaluate the effect of a wage
cost subsidy for private sector employees aged 58 years or more (Albanese and Cockx, 2015). To
that end a representative sample was drawn of 243,655 individuals born between the 1st of April
1941 and the 31st of March 1950, i.e. aged between 52 and 61 in 2002. Because in Belgium
many individuals are already inactive in that age bracket, the sample is stratified to over-represent
groups that are relatively less present in that age bracket and more responsive to the labour
market policy reform: low-wage employees in the private sector and individuals transiting in and
out of employment during this period. Five strata r(=1,2,...,5) are defined and nine birth cohorts
c(=1,2,...,9) for each gender. These strata were defined according to employment status in the
private sector and the earned wage around 2002 (cf. Appendix B). Because the stratification
involves outcome variables of interest, it is endogenous and it is well known that consistent
estimation then requires to appropriately weigh the data in these strata (e.g. Manski and Lerman,
1977; Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). If we denote the sampling weight for individual observation
i belonging to birth cohort c and to substratum r by W(cr, i), then
Wcr,i = NcrN ∗ nncr (3.1)
12Industrial committees are organised for each type of worker at the sectoral level. In these committees trade
unions and employer organizations negotiate the collective agreements. These agreements are binding for all
workers belonging to this industrial committee, irrespectively of whether they are unionised and, hence, represented
in the negotiation.
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where Ncr denotes the size of the population in substratum cr, ncr the corresponding sample
size, N ≡∑9c=1∑5r=1 Ncr the total population size and n the corresponding sample size. To avoid
cumbersome notation, gender is not explicitly referred to. The weighting formula comes from a
double re-weighing, within and between cohorts.13
In this study we evaluate the impact of participating in TC on the survival rate in employment for
each year after the entry into treatment. The TC scheme was introduced in 2002. Nevertheless,
we start the evaluation only from 2003 and this for two reasons. First, we wish to consider the
scheme at a moment when it is well established and the rules are well known. Second, we aim at
integrating the incidence on sick leave as a second outcome. As mentioned before, information on
sick leave is only available since 2003. To have a sufficiently high number of treated individuals
and increase precision we perform two separate analyses on two treatment groups, depending
on whether the TC started in 2003 or 2004, and pool the estimates. In principle we could also
consider TC that started in later years but these additional treatments would not be helpful in
identifying the long-run effects (up to eight years after the start of the treatment) in which we are
particularly interested.
Next, the mandatory three-month employer notice implies that participation is always anticipated
and thus that treatment might start before the beginning of the working time reduction. We take
this into account by assuming that actual treatment starts one quarter before the contractual
treatment. For example, while individuals in the first treatment group are contractually starting
the TC at the beginning of 2004, they are actually treated at the beginning of the fourth quarter
of 2003. Additionally, we assume that individuals never leave employment between the actual
and contractual start of the treatment. The resulting upward bias on the treatment effect (due to
higher survival in employment for the treated) is arguably small. It is unlikely that individuals
who agreed with the employer to start TC within the next quarter would decide to stop working
beforehand, with the exception of reasons of force majeure, such as an accident.
Finally, to enhance the comparability of treated and control groups, we impose that at the moment
of sample selection both groups should satisfy the eligibility criteria described in Section 3.3
(for a full description of this selection see the Internet Appendix). Our treated sample contains
13First, to restore the representativeness within the cohorts we reweigh the units within each cohort by W ccr =
Ncr
Nc
∗ ncncr (where Nc and nc are the size of the cohort in the population and in the sample). To make the cohorts in
the sample representative for the population, we weigh each cohort a second time: SWcr =W ccr ∗ NcN ∗ nnc , so that
Wcr = NcrN ∗ nncr .
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1,227 men and 762 women, representing 5,124 individuals in the Belgian population (i.e. if
weighted by Wcr,i). If we retain all individuals employed in 2002q3 (2003q3) and do not impose
the eligibility conditions, the comparison group contains 142,154 men and 83,983 women. Once
imposing the eligibility conditions, the size of the control group shrinks to 29,791 men and 9,658
women. Note that the same control unit may appear in each of the two years of analysis, while
treated units can only be present in one year.
3.4.3 Descriptive Analysis
To have a first idea on the possible effect of the TC we compare the survival rate in employment
of the treated and the two control groups in Figure 3.1. In general, treated individuals, especially
women, are more likely to survive in employment in the first years, but the cumulated effect on
the survival rate eventually reverses and becomes highly negative. The figure also shows that it is
crucial to impose the eligibility conditions on the control group, especially for men: non-eligible
individuals are more likely to leave employment, so that a neglect of these conditions would
severely downward bias the treatment effect of the TC on the survival rate.
Even if the individuals satisfying the eligibility conditions are already homogeneous in several
dimensions (e.g. private sector employment experience, tenure, firm size, and working full-time
prior to the selection), they still differ significantly in a number of other dimensions. The latter is
apparent in Table 3.1, which reports, by gender, the averages of the observed characteristics for
treatments14 and eligible controls, as well as the p-values for the tests of their equality.
Considering the variables measured in the last quarter prior to the start of the selection (i.e.
2002Q3 or 2003Q3), treated units tend to work in larger firms, live with a partner without
dependent children, are slightly younger, earn a lower hourly wage, and are more likely to
be Belgians living in Flanders. They are also concentrated in specific, mostly white-collar,
sectors, such as the banking and business related services, where bridge pension schemes are
less common.
Considering the employment history,15 in line with the year before the selection, treated individ-
uals earn a lower hourly wage five years before selection and had lower average annual earnings
1454.3% of the treated is in the 50% TC regime, the remainder in the 20% TC regime.
15The variables referred to the employment history are not combined to keep information coming from different
sources and periods with missing information separate.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics of Selected Treated and Eligible Control Groups (weighted by Wcr,i)
Men Women
T1 C P-val T C P-val
Firm size: 20-99 18.8% 30.2% 0.000 26.4% 32.9% 0.000
Firm size: 100-999 30.9% 37.8% 0.000 27.9% 36.7% 0.000
Firm size: > 1000 50.4% 32.0% 0.000 45.8% 30.4% 0.000
Household: Other 11.2% 13.4% 0.043 35.7% 40.8% 0.009
Household: with children 46.4% 48.1% 0.326 24.3% 24.4% 0.984
Household: without children 42.4% 38.5% 0.025 39.9% 34.9% 0.010
Age 55.5 55.8 0.000 55.4 55.7 0.000
Blue collar 23.5% 30.5% 0.000 10.3% 12.4% 0.095
Status 1y< Av. FT Hourly wage e20.7 e22.5 0.000 e17.5 e17.7 0.365
selection Belgian 98.0% 95.0% 0.000 97.2% 96.3% 0.236
(2002/2003) Household size 2.6 2.7 0.022 2.1 2.1 0.630
Region: Brussels 5.7% 7.1% 0.079 15.4% 19.2% 0.009
Region: Flanders 70.2% 64.8% 0.001 51.9% 48.0% 0.055
Region: Wallonia 24.1% 28.2% 0.007 32.8% 32.8% 0.968
Sector: Trade, transport, hotel 15.0% 20.7% 0.000 21.6% 24.6% 0.073
Sector: Bank, business services 44.6% 18.7% 0.000 39.7% 24.5% 0.000
Sector: Other services 4.0% 6.8% 0.000 21.5% 26.3% 0.004
Sector: Manufacturing,
Agriculture, Construction
31.8% 47.5% 0.000 17.2% 24.6% 0.000
Sector: Construction (men) 4.6% 6.3% 0.018 - - -
Early retirement propensity in
Industrial Committee2
-1.0% 1.8% 0.000 -3.6% -2.0% 0.000
5y< selection Av. FT Hourly wage e20.2 e22.3 0.000 e17.0 e17.3 0.249
13y< selection Years with the same employers 10.6 11.8 0.000 11.1 11.7 0.000
1990-1997 Av. Working time (%) 98.0 97.5 0.002 95.8 96.2 0.272
1957-1997 Experience in years 31.2 31.0 0.071 30.1 29.7 0.023
Av. Earnings in the year e29.01 e30.25 0.000 e23.83 e23.37 0.141
N individuals Sample Size (Unweighted) 1.227 29.791 762 9.658
Represented Population Size (i.e.
weighted by Wcr,i
3.863 75.778 1.261 14.609
1
T: Treated individuals, C: Control individuals, P-value for equality
2
Estimation based on a linear probability model using the complete sample of 243,655 individuals (cf. Section 3.4.2) on the period 1998q1-
2002q3. We regress “transiting to a bridge pension" on dummies for the Industrial Committee (IC) or Nace if IC is missing, birth cohort
dummies, and gender. The retained variable contains the coefficients (i.e. marginal effect) of the IC dummies. In a sensitivity analysis we
replace these marginal effects (estimated by OLS) with the predicted probabilities (estimated by a probit model) at the average X’s. Results are
very similar and available upon request.
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Figure 3.1: Differences in Survival Rate in Employment by Treatment Status - whole or eligible control
Survival is defined with respect to employment and the point estimates are expressed in percentage points (pp). Pooled estimates
for the treated samples of 2003 and 2004. “Raw" estimates are obtained by using the whole control group (thick line), while
“eligible" restricts the control group to the individuals satisfying the eligibility conditions at year 0. Standard errors are cluster
robust to take into account correlation between the same individuals in the two samples.
since 1957 (the difference is statistically significant only for men). Tenure in the same firm is
slightly shorter and total accumulated working experience since 1957 is slightly more important.
If we consider also the 5 years of tenure prior to the sample selection, then the individuals in
the sample have on average about 36 years of experience, which makes many of them already
eligible to the statutory early retirement.
As to avoid that aforementioned differences in the observed characteristics between treated and
control units would bias the comparison, we implement an Inverse Probability Weighting (IPW)
estimator that takes these differences into account.
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3.5 Empirical Strategy and Results
3.5.1 Empirical Strategy
We are interested in estimating the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) in TC on the
survival rate in employment. An exit from employment is defined as soon as an individual is
not observed in employment at the end of a quarter. In case of an exit, 93% of the individuals
satisfying the eligibility conditions in 2003 (2004) never return to employment before the
statutory retirement age. This means that this exit is, in most cases, equivalent to an early
withdrawal from the labour market, i.e. a pathway to retirement. We impose that once a treatment
has started it cannot be reversed. This means that the treatment status is not affected in the rare
cases that the TC scheme is left immediately after having entered it.
This evaluation problem is very similar to the one described by Vikström (2014). Since we follow
Vikström’s methodology closely, we refer the reader to the Internet Appendix for a detailed
exposition. Here we just briefly mention the essential differences with Vikström’s approach.
First, we generalise his procedure to allow for the endogenous sampling present in our data.
Since Vikström implements an inverse probability weighting (IPW) estimator, this just involves
taking additional weighting terms into account. Second, we do not base the evaluation on a
flow sample of individuals in a state, but instead a stock sample of individuals who have been
employed for at least 5 years at sample selection. If we normalise time to zero at the beginning
of the two periods of analysis and consider the residual duration from then, we argue that the
analysis does not require any adjustment. Third, we propose a different trimming rule for the
determination of a common support for treated and control units. Finally, we propose a slightly
different bootstrap procedure for inference on the pooled sample.
The identification strategy is essentially based on the conditional independence assumption
(CIA). We argue that the available data are sufficiently rich to justify identification on the basis
of the CIA, i.e. that we observe all relevant determinants that influence the decision to participate
in TC as well as the survival rate in employment. The literature mentions the following key
determinants of gradual retirement also affecting the survival in employment: age, place of
living, entitlement to (early) retirement benefits, household composition, education, health, and
firm characteristics, such as size and sector, but also the degree of unionisation, organizational
features and staff related issues, such as staff and skilled workers shortages (e.g. Gustman and
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Steinmeier, 1984; Honig and Hanoch, 1985; Huber et al., 2016). The exhaustive information on
the labour market history since 1957 allows us to condition on the most essential information
required to determine the level of (early) retirement benefits to which workers are entitled.
Household information is sufficiently available. By contrast, the database does not contain
information on the level of education, and the available indicators of health can only be used as
outcomes, not as conditioning variables (see Section 3.4.2). Nevertheless, we believe that this is
not problematic, because health problems should be indirectly captured by gaps in the labour
market experience, in lower level of earnings, and being a blue collar worker or not. A similar
reasoning applies to the level of education. We condition on the available firm characteristics
(firm size and sector) because these are highly correlated with the degree of unionisation, and,
more relevant for the Belgian context, with the working conditions. As bridge pension is a major
pathway to retirement, it is important to control for factors that influence the transition to it. As
mentioned in Section 3.3, the availability of the bridge pension depends importantly on which
industrial committee the worker belongs to. Because the number of industrial committees is
too large to condition upon in the analysis, we therefore constructed a continuous measure of
the propensity of transition to a bridge pension. How this measure is constructed is explained
in a footnote to Table 3.1. Finally, note that we control for these characteristics on top of the
eligibility conditions used for selecting the sample. As Figure 3.1 shows, this first selection is
already very important.
3.5.2 Results
We first report the ˆAT Tt from the first until the eight year after entry in the TC (t ∈ 1, ...8) on the
main outcome of interest. We also consider how much the effect changes in comparison to the
descriptive evidence discussed above. Next, as we have argued in Section 3.3, relative to full-time
workers, TC participants have higher incentives to enter early retirement, in particular the early
statutory retirement scheme from the age of 60. Moreover, we argued that these incentives were
more important for participants in the 50% TC regime than those in the 20% regime. In Section
3.5.2.2, we demonstrate that the empirical evidence is in line with these incentives. To that
end we estimate the different ˆAT Tt of each TC regime separately for the three following exit
destinations of employment: bridge pension, statutory early retirement and other exits. In this
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section we also split the treated individuals according to treatment type: 20% or 50% working
hour reduction. In Section 3.5.2.3 we consider the impact participation in TC on the incidence of
sick leave. Finally, in Section 3.5.2.4 we briefly report the findings of the cost-benefit analysis
that we implemented. All analyses are conducted separately for men and women. The reported
results pool the 2003 and 2004 sample.
3.5.2.1 The Benchmark Analysis
In this section we show the estimates of the ATT on the survival rate in employment controlling
for selection on observables (Vikström, 2014). Figure 3.2 shows that, in line with the descriptive
evidence, treated men are more likely to survive in employment in the first two years (+7 pp and
+3.5 pp). For women, however, the positive effects last until the fourth year and are stronger (+8.8
pp, +10.9 pp, +8.6 pp and +3.2 pp). However, the results also confirm strong subsequent negative
effects, peaking at -20 pp and -12 pp after about five years for men and women, respectively.
Notice that as a consequence of ageing, all individuals -both treated and non-treated- will
eventually retire. This explains why the treatment effect eventually always tends to zero at the
end of the period of analysis. Figure 3.2 also reveals that controlling for the rich set of covariates
(“Eligible-Vikström") does not significantly affect the treatment affect that was obtained by just
imposing the eligibility conditions (“Eligible"). . Hence, imposing the eligibility conditions,
which in essence boils down to imposing a similar recent labour market history, seems to be
sufficient for eliminating the major component of the selection bias. These results are in line with
the findings of Graf et al. (2011) in Austria and Huber et al. (2016) for men in West-Germany, but
while in Austria the mechanism seems to be more induced by demand-side factors, in Belgium, as
in Germany, supply factors seem to matter more. The positive effects in the beginning are likely
present because in the absence of the option of working part-time some participants in TC would
have completely stopped working to allow them to improve their work-life balance (Gielen, 2009;
Van Looy et al., 2014), but not so much to accommodate declining health (see Section 3.5.2.3).
However, by working part-time individuals may decrease labour market attachment and/or signal
to employers a preference for early retirement (Machado and Portela, 2014). Consequently,
as the option of early retirement becomes available these workers choose or are induced by
their employers to choose this pathway to withdraw from the labour force. The latter process
is reinforced by the institutional framework in which TC-beneficiaries are entitled to pension
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Figure 3.2: ATT on Survival in Employment
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and descriptive differences considering all the control individuals (RAW) or only the eligible ones (Eligible) as reported in
Figure 3.1. The estimates of the ATT’s are the percentage points (pp) differences between the survival rate of the treated in case
of treatment and the estimated survival rate of the treated in the counterfactual of no treatment. Estimates are pooled over the
2003 and 2004 samples. Year eight only uses information from the 2003 sample. Standard errors are obtained by a stratified
bootstrap (clustering by individual) with 500 repetitions and 95% confidence intervals (CI) by assuming normality.
benefits of a full-time worker (Section 3.3) and for which we report more evidence in the next
section. Demand-side factors are less likely to be compatible with the time-pattern of the effects.
Graf et al. (2011) argue that subsidised working time reductions before forced early retirement
could be used by employers to get gradually rid of less productive older workers. However,
in order to generate the initial positive effects on employment this would require that treated
individuals would in the counterfactual of no participation be fired. This is unlikely in the Belgian
institutional framework in which the employment protection for experienced (older) workers is
very strict.
To corroborate the interpretation that eligibility to early retirement affects the impact of the TC
scheme, we split the sample between younger and older individuals. We set the cut-off age at
56.5 years at the moment of sample selection, i.e. at the end of year 0. In theory, the younger
workers are too young to already be eligible to any of the early retirement schemes. Thus, we
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expect a longer-lasting positive effect for them. As shown in Figure 3.6 in Appendix C, this is
indeed what we find.16
3.5.2.2 Competing Exit Destinations
In this section we decompose the estimated ATT on the survival in employment according to three
possible exit destinations: (i) bridge pension, (ii) statutory early retirement and (iii) other exits.
The last is a residual category comprising other schemes such as Canada Dry, unemployment,
disability, other forms of inactivity, and exit because the individual deceased. To simplify the
estimation procedure, we do not estimate these competing risks simultaneously, but right censor
the other destinations, when considering the destination of interest.17 We first estimate the
competing risks for the whole sample of participants, irrespectively of the TC-regime. After a
discussion of the sensitivity of the ATTs to the estimation method, we distinguish between the
TC-regime (20% or 50%).
To start, as Figure 3.3 shows, once we account for the possible exit destinations, the effect for the
whole sample of participants irrespectively of the TC-regime is clearly driven by the statutory
early retirement option.18 As treated individuals have the same entitlement to the statutory
(early) pension as full-time workers, their replacement rate is much higher than that of control
individuals. This explains the strong response on the survival in employment without exit to
statutory early retirement. Moreover, because women tend to have acquired slightly less labour
market experience than men (Table 3.1), they are less likely to be eligible for early retirement
which may explain their better overall effects of TC on the survival rate in employment.
Next, Figure 3.3 also allows to study to what extent it matters for our results to take the dynamic
assignment into treatment into account (Fredriksson and Johansson, 2008) and to, in addition,
control for selective (on observables) right censoring (Vikström, 2014). We first compare the
Vikström (V) estimator to the descriptive estimator without imposing the eligibility condition
on the control group (raw). This raw estimator does not control for differences in observables,
16As the monthly subsidy is lump-sum, we have also estimated treatment heterogeneity with respect to labour
market earnings at selection. The results are very similar to the different response by TC regime as two thirds of
the treated high earnings group take the 50% regime (symmetric figures for the low earnings group). Results are
available from the authors upon request.
17The descriptive analysis in Section 3.4.3 shows that most exits are to the first two destinations.
18To have an idea of the relative size of the ATT we report the survival rates of the treated and (reweighted)
control units in Figure 3.7 of Appendix C.
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Figure 3.3: ATT of Treated Men (A) and Women (B) and Comparison with Other Estimators
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nor incorporates dynamic assignment to treatment. We also compare our estimates based on V’s
methodology to the estimator proposed by Fredriksson and Johansson (FJ). The FJ estimator
controls for differences in observables through IPW but ignores dynamic assignment to treatment.
We deduce the following two observations from the figure. First, the raw estimates are usually
considerably different from the estimators conditioning on the eligibility requirements and the
additional observables. This is especially the case for the survival without exit to bridge pension,
as workers not eligible to the TC either have more discontinuous work histories or work in sectors
where the bridge pension is not commonly used (e.g. public sector or self-employment). Second,
the FJ estimator is downward biased relative to the V estimator for the survival in employment
without exit to the bridge pension and without other exit.
Together with the evidence from the benchmark analysis (Figure 3.2), these observations lead to
the following conclusions. First, in the benchmark model (without competing destinations) the
estimates are not sensitive to the inclusion of other covariates once the eligibility condition to
the TC scheme are imposed. Additional selection on observables is not important and the bias
induced by the dynamic assignment to the treatment is small, as only a small fraction of the not
yet treated group enters into treatment later on. Second, the estimation method matters more
when analysing competing risks, because in this analysis the fraction that is right censored (in
both treatment and control groups) is much more important than the dynamic assignment into
treatment. If the right censoring is selective on observables, which is clearly the case for exits to
the statutory early retirement,19 then this bias can only be avoided by using the V estimator.
Finally, for a better understanding of the role of financial incentives, we divided the treated
sample into participants in the 50% and 20% TC-regime (Figure 3.8). The treated sample is
divided in 942 units participating in the 50% TC-regime and 1,047 in the 20% regime. In the
corresponding population 54.3% of TC participants are in the 50% regime. Note that the same
control units are used for estimating the ATTs of these two treatment groups. As people in the
50% regime are more intensively treated, the positive ATT in the short-run and the negative ATT
in the medium-run are more pronounced compared to the participants in the 20% regime. Once
19Since exits to the statutory early retirement are treated as right censored observations for the other two
destinations, this explains the second observation that we deduced from Figure 3.3. The fact that the effect on the
survival rate in employment without exit to the statutory early retirement does not differ very much using either the
V or FJ estimator suggests that exits to the aforementioned other two destinations are not very selective. On the
other hand, the fact that these estimates do differ from the raw estimates reflects again that exits to this destination
are selective on observables.
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we right censor the exits to statutory early retirement, the effect for TC participants with the 50%
reduction is non-negative for the other two exit destinations. The treated individual working at
80% of a full-time have a less pronounced response, especially for the exit to statutory early
retirement, and rather show more noticeable differences by gender. Different from the 50%
regime, we now also observe for men a negative impact on the survival in employment without
exit to the bridge pension, while for women the impact is insignificant.
As described in Section 3.3, while the bridge pension is in general very appealing for older
workers in Belgium, it is not for workers in the 50% TC-regime, because they lose a large part of
the benefits. However, because this loss is less important for individuals in the 20% regime, the
scheme still remains attractive for them. This incentive does not affect the behaviour of women,
however, because they are on average less likely to work in industrial committees that intensively
use the bridge pension as instrument to terminate employment (see Table 3.1), and, hence, have
less opportunities to use this pathway to retirement.
3.5.2.3 The Impact on Sick Leave Incidence
It has been argued that granting working time reductions can reduce the incidence of sickness
(Ahn, 2015). We test this hypothesis in this section. In the administrative data used in this
analysis health problems can be identified in one of the following ways. First, individuals can be
identified on sick leave if it results in an absence from the workplace of more than one month.
This is because in the data only the period that the sickness insurance pays out the replacement
income is registered. Prior to this moment the payments during sickness absence are due by
the employer. During the period of observation about 16% of the control group and 13% of
the treated group experiences at least one such absence, suggesting a slighter lower incidence
of sickness for TC-beneficiaries. In the data such absences are not registered as an exit from
employment as long as this absence does not last more than one year. Exits to these disability
benefits are together with exits to work injury benefits a second way in which the data can identify
health problems. However, virtually nobody in the retained sample exits to these destinations.
Finally, individuals could stop working because they die, but this involves only a sample share
of less than 1%. As the incidence of the last two mentioned health problems is negligible, we
focus our analysis on the first mentioned sickness absence only. Since relatively few individuals
entered sick leave, we could not consider sick leave as a separate exit destination in the analysis,
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Figure 3.4: ATT on the Survival in Employment & Employment and Not on Sickness Leave
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ATT on the survival rate estimated by controlling for the dynamic selection on observables (Vikström, 2014). The survival is in
employment (ATT empl.) or in employment while not on sick leave (ATT empl + no sick leave). The estimates are expressed in
percentage points (pp). Estimates are pooled over the 2003 and 2004 samples. Year eight only uses information from the 2003
sample. The pooled sample is composed of 1,227 (762) treated and 29,791 (9,658) control units (men and women). Standard
errors are obtained by a stratified bootstrap (clustering by individual) with 500 repetitions and 95% confidence intervals (CI)
by assuming normality The CI reported are referred to the benchmark scenario having employment as the outcome (ATT empl
benchmark).
because the number of transitions is too small. Instead, we estimate the impact of TC on the
survival rate in employment in case sickness absence is considered as an exit and contrast it to
the case were it is, i.e. the benchmark (Section 3.5.2.1). In Figure 3.4 we report the evolution
of these two treatment effects. We observe that the new treatment effect (dashed line) always
exceeds the benchmark (solid line). This confirms that TC reduces the incidence of sick leave.
However, the difference is small and the dashed line is mostly comprised in the 95% confidence
interval of the benchmark ATT, suggesting that the effect is not statistically significant. An
explanation for this finding is that the eligibility criteria for TC weed out individuals with major
health problems: such individuals are unlikely to have been full-time employed during the last
five years and to have more than 20 years of labour market experience.
3.5.2.4 Cost-Benefit Analysis
Finally, we perform a cost-benefit analysis in which we estimate, based on the CIA and using
the administrative data, both the net budgetary costs for the state and the net welfare gains (or
costs) for society. Overall, as shown in Figure 3.5, the gradual retirement scheme fails the
cost-benefit test. Only under the extreme assumption that employers fully compensate for all
working time reductions by hiring other equally productive workers the TC scheme displays
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a net benefit for society during the first two (four) years for men (women). The assumptions,
detailed methodology and results are reported in the Internet Appendix.
Figure 3.5: Monthly Cost of the TC per Treated of 2003 (2004)
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Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) on the pooled sample of participants in TC of 2003 and 2004. CBA in monthly costs (benefits if
negative) in 2004 euros per treated individual (the size of the treated sample as defined in 2003/2004). The Net Budgetary Cost
(NBC) for the government is the average cost (gain) of the policy for the state, net of savings for the public budget. The Net
Welfare Cost (NWC) for society is the efficiency cost of the NBC minus the production value of employment. No Replacement
scenario: CBA without replacement of the part-time workers. Replacement scenario: baseline scenario with the additional
assumption that all hours reduced by part-time workers (treated and controls) are recovered by hiring extra (unemployed) workers
with similar characteristics. The CBA ignores potential substitution and anticipation effects. The costs to society ignore the value
of leisure and potential distributional and health impacts of the measure. Year 8 only contains information from the 2003 sample.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper studies whether the Time Credit (TC) scheme in Belgium, a scheme that facilitates
gradual retirement through working time reductions, can lengthen the professional career of older
workers. Recently, many EU countries have implemented similar programmes with this aim.
However, evidence on the effectiveness of such policies is scarce and provides mixed results.
Our research brings new evidence on this question.
Overall our evidence is in line with the findings of Graf et al. (2011) in Austria and Huber
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et al. (2016) for men in West-Germany, but while in Austria the mechanism seems to be more
induced by demand-side factors, in Belgium, as in Germany, supply factors seem to matter more.
Participation in TC initially prolongs the time spent in employment (during the first two years for
men and four years for women), but subsequently it accelerates the exit to early retirement. In
the beginning the effect is positive, because participants are not yet eligible for early retirement.
However, as soon as they are, participants have much higher incentives to enter early retirement
than non-participants, because the replacement rates in these schemes (with regard to their labour
income) are much higher for TC participants than for non-participants.
The positive effects in the beginning are likely present because in the absence of the option of
working part-time some participants in TC would have completely stopped working to allow
them to improve their work-life balance (Gielen, 2009; Van Looy et al., 2014). However, by
working part-time individuals may decrease labour market attachment and/or signal to employers
a preference for early retirement (Machado and Portela, 2014). Consequently, as the option
of early retirement becomes available these workers choose or are induced by their employers
to choose this pathway to withdraw from the labour force. The latter process is reinforced
by the aforementioned institutional framework in which the TC-beneficiaries are entitled to
pension benefits of a full-time worker. We find that participation in TC slightly improves health
conditions, but the effect is statistically insignificant and, hence, not the main driver of the
positive effect. We argue that this small effect can be explained by the targeting of the TC on a
relatively healthy population for whom no large health improvements can be expected.
Given this responsiveness to financial incentives, we believe it may be possible to prolong the
positive effect of TC schemes by eliminating the perverse incentives to retire early. Since 2015
the Belgian government has raised the eligibility age to bridge pensions from 58 to 62 years (with
some exceptions) and since 2012 the minimum eligibility age to the conventional early retirement
is gradually increased from 60 to 63 years by 2019. Based on our findings we speculate that this
could increase the TC scheme’s effectiveness. However, since 2015 the Belgian government has
also raised the minimum eligibility age of the end of career TC to 60 years. As a consequence,
the starting age of gradual retirement has been set so close to the minimum early retirement age
that it can hardly have any significant positive effect on the career length of employees. While
our findings support the decision to raise the early retirement age, the decision to simultaneously
increase the minimum age of eligibility to the end of career TC scheme cannot.
3.A Gradual or Part-Time Retirement Schemes in Other European Countries
Table 3.2: Comparison of Gradual and Part-Time Retirement Schemes in Europe
Country Years active Age-Eligibility Replacement Rate Reduction in Hours
Austria 2000 - present ≥55 (m), >50(w) + career restrictions 75% 40-60%, max 6.5 1/2 y
(blocking possible)1
Belgium 1985 - present2 50-65 (+ career restr.) fixed rate/reduced hour 20% or 50%
Denmark 1987 60-64 fixed rate/reduced hour Remaining working hours of
12-30h/week
Finland 1987 (1989)-present in
private (public) sector
56 (<2005), then 58 and 60 (≥2011).
Until 64
50% difference regular and
part-time earnings
Remaining working hours of
16-28h/week
France 1988-2005 55-65 top up of 30% 40-50%
Germany 1996-2009 ≥55 (+ career restr.) 70% 50% (blocking possible)
Netherlands 2006-2011 All ages, but can be used as part-time
retirement two years before retirement
own savings, 70% 50%
Sweden 1976-2000 61 55% from 1994 onwards 10h/week (max 25% of the
work week)
2003 - present 61-65 60% of reduction in wage Reduce with ≤50%
1 In the block model workers can “block" their working time. Instead of working part-time throughout the whole period of participation in the OAPT
scheme they work full-time for half of the time and enter an inactive phase in the second half, while still being attached to the employer.
2 Characteristics given for the time at which we evaluate the scheme, i.e. between 2002 and 2011. The current eligibility age has been raised to 60.
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3.B The (Endogenous) Stratification of the Sample
The population is stratified for each gender in 9 birth cohorts defined in Table 3.3. The reference
periods by birth cohort were chosen as to observe sufficient transitions in and out of private sector
employment for both treatment and control groups determined as to evaluate the 2002 reform
mentioned in the main text on the basis of a difference-in-differences strategy (Albanese and
Cockx, 2015). Each of these 18 strata is subsequently endogenously stratified in five substrata:
1. The population exiting salaried employment in the private sector within the reference
period;
2. The population entering salaried employment in the private sector within the reference
period and not contained in substratum 1;
3. The population employed throughout the reference period as salaried worker in the private
sector and earning a gross wage lower than e100 per day at the start of this period;
4. The population employed throughout the reference period as salaried worker in the private
sector and earning at least e100 per day at the start of this period;
5. The population that was not employed as salaried worker in the private sector during
the reference period, i.e. individuals who were out of the labour force, unemployed,
self-employed or working in the public sector.
Table 3.3: Retained Birth Cohorts and Corresponding Reference Periods
Cohort (quarter/year) Reference Period (quarter/year)
1 2/41-1/42 [2/99-1/02]
2 2/42-1/43 [2/99-4/01]
3 2/43-1/44 [2/99-4/03]
4 2/44-1/45 [2/00-1/05]
5 2/45-1/46 [2/99-4/03]
6 2/46-1/47 [2/00-4/04]
7 2/47-1/48 [2/00-3/05]
8 2/48-1/49 [2/02-3/05]
9 2/49-1/50 [2/02-3/05]
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In each of the 18 strata a random sample of 2,000 individuals is drawn in this substratum, while
the sample size was 1,500 for substratum 4 and 5.20 The size of the population is known for each
substratum, so that it was straightforward to construct the appropriate weights to make inference
on the population.
3.C Supplementary Tables and Figures
Figure 3.6: ATT on Survival in Employment, Heterogeneous Effects by Age
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ATT on the survival rat in mployment estimated by controlling for the dynamic select on on observables (Vikström, 2014). Heterogeneous
effects by age in year 0: younger (below the age of 56.5) and older workers (at least 56.5 years old). The estimates of the ATT’s are the
percentage points (pp) differences between the survival rate of the treated in case of treatment and the estimated survival rate of the treated
in the counterfactual of no treatment. Estimates are pooled over the 2003 and 2004 samples. Year eight only uses information from the 2003
sample. Standard errors are obtained by a stratified bootstrap (clustering by individual) with 500 repetitions and 95% confidence intervals (CI)
by assuming normality.
20In cases that the population of the substratum was smaller than the population, the complete population was
sampled.
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Figure 3.7: Survival Rate in Employment - Men (A) and Women (B)
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Survival function of the treated and control units controlling for the dynamic selection on observables (Vikström, 2014) by gender (Panel A
for men and B for women). The survival rates are expressed in percentage points (pp) and defined as (from left to right and top to bottom) (1)
employment, (2) employment without exit to a bridge pension, (3) employment without exit to a statutory pension before the normal retirement
age and (4) employment without exit to other non-employment statuses. In the competing risk analyses (2-4), the exits from employment to
other destinations, apart from the one considered, are right censored. Reported estimates are pooled over the 2003 and 2004 samples. Year
eight only uses information from the 2003 sample. The pooled sample is composed of 1,227 (762) treated and 29,791 (9,658) control units
(men and women).
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Figure 3.8: ATT of Treated Men and Women in 50% (A, B) or 20% (C, D) TC Scheme - Competing Risk
(CR) and Baseline (non-CR) Framework
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Figure 3.8 (continued)
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ATT of treated in the 50% TC (A and B) or 20% TC (C and D) on the survival rate controlling for the dynamic selection on observables
(Vikström, 2014). The ATTs are differentiated by gender: Panel A for men and B for women. The estimates are expressed in percentage
points (pp) differences in the survival rate in (from left to right and top to bottom) (1) employment, (2) employment without exit to a bridge
pension, (3) employment without exit to a statutory pension before the normal retirement age and (4) employment without exit to other non-
employment statuses. In the competing risk analyses (2-4), the exits from employment to other destinations, apart from the one considered, are
right censored. Reported estimates are pooled over the 2003 and 2004 samples. Year eight only uses information from the 2003 sample. The
pooled sample is composed of 567 (375) treated and 29,791 (9,658) control units (men and women). Standard errors are obtained by a stratified
bootstrap (clustering by individual) with 500 repetitions and 95% confidence intervals (CI) by assuming normality.
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Chapter 4
Internet Appendix to Chapter 3
This Internet Appendix contains:
1. The sample selection mechanism
2. The details of the empirical strategy;
3. The cost-benefit analysis of the Time Credit (TC) scheme for the treated population
entering the treatment in 2003 or 2004;
Other estimation results are available from the authors upon request.
4.1 Sample Selection Mechanism
In order to enhance the comparability of treated and control groups, we impose that members of
both groups should satisfy criteria slightly stricter than those that determine eligibility to TC (cf.
Section 3.3 of the paper):
1. Being employed in a firm with at least 20 employees at the end of 2002 (2003);
2. Have at least 5 years of tenure in the same firm at the end of 2002 (2003);
3. Have at least 20 years of private sector labour market experience at the end of 2002 (2003);
4. Being full-time employed in all four quarters of 2002 (2003);
5. Being employed in the private sector at the end of 2003Q3 (2004Q3);
6. Not being on sick leave at the end of 2003Q3 (2004Q3).
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The fifth selection criterion is imposed at the end of each assignment period into treatment,
because it is automatically satisfied for the members of the treatment groups, so that it is natural
to impose it on the members of the control groups as well. The other criteria are slightly more
restrictive than the TC eligibility conditions, so that a few treated individuals are eliminated from
our initial selection. We are slightly more restrictive for the following reasons:
• Eligibility conditions 1-4 are uniformly imposed at the end of the year preceding the
contractual start of the TC so that the same conditions apply to all treated and control units;
• Because the data contain only basic information about firm characteristics, we aim at
restricting the analysis to sufficiently large firms in which the use of TC does not require
the consent of the employer (cf. Section 3.3 of the paper). If no consent is required, it is
less likely that the use of TC is selective in firm characteristics, which therefore enhances
the internal validity of the evaluation. However, according to the rules, no consent is
required in firms with more than 10 employees. Nevertheless, we include only firms that
employ at least 20 workers. This is because the available data on firm size are grouped in
intervals that do not allow identifying firms with strictly more than 10 employees;
• While regulations do not impose the labour market experience to be accumulated in the
private sector, we do because we lack information on early experience outside this sector;
• We impose full-time employment in the last year prior to contractual assignment into
treatment, although the 50% TC regime requirement is only to have worked at least 75% of
a full-time job. This is done to consider only individuals who are eligible to both regimes;
• Finally, we impose the last condition on sickness in 2003Q3 (2004Q3) because we want
to contrast the impact of the benchmark outcome, i.e. survival in employment, to a more
restrictive variant that considers survival in employment without being on sick leave. If
we would not impose this, some of the selected individuals would not be in the risk set
of this second outcome at the start of the evaluation period. Imposing this condition only
very marginally affects the sample selection. Finally, note that we do not impose the age
condition, because our sample only contains individuals than 50.
Our treated sample contains 1,227 men and 762 women, representing 5,124 individuals in the
Belgian population (weighted by Wcr,i). If we retain all individuals employed in 2002q3 (2003q3)
and do not impose the eligibility conditions, the comparison group contains 142,154 men and
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83,983 women. Adding the eligibility conditions, the size of the control group shrinks to 29,791
men and 9,658 women. Note that the control units in the two years of analysis partly consist of
same individuals, while treated units are always different.
4.2 The Empirical Strategy
4.2.1 Notation
Let t ∈ (1,2, ...T¯) denote the number of years since sample selection and l ∈ (1,2, ...L¯) the elapsed
number of years in employment at this start. T¯ and L¯ are the maximum number of years in
employment respectively, after and before selection. In the data l ≥ 5, because this is an eligibility
condition for the TC and a sample selection criterion (Section 3.4.2). The random time since
sample selection until the start of the treatment, i.e. entry in TC, is denoted by S and its realization
by s, where s ∈ (1,2, ...S¯) and S¯ ≤ T¯ . Yl+t(s) (s) is equal to one in case employment is left in year
l+t and treatment started in year l+s, and zero otherwise. Yl+t(∞) denotes the potential outcome
in year l+t if never treated and Yl+t the observed outcome. Y¯l+t(s)≡ {Y1(s),Y2(s), ...,Yl+t(s)} and
Y¯l+t ≡ {Y1,Y2, ...,Yl+t} denote, respectively, the sequence of potential and of observed outcomes.
Figure 4.1 provides a graphical representation of the introduced notation.
Figure 4.1: Graphical Representation of the Notation
 𝑳 . . . 𝒍 𝒕 . . .   𝑻𝟎
𝒍 𝒕
𝒔
Sample selection Treatment
We aim at identifying the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) of treatment starting
s years after sample selection against the counterfactual of never being treated on the residual
survival in employment until year t > s, given survival in employment until sample selection:
∀t > s ∶ AT Tt(s) ≡ EL{E[Y¯L+t(s) = 0∣S = s,Y¯L+s(s) = 0]−
E[Y¯L+t(∞) = 0∣S = s,Y¯L+s(s) = 0] ∣ L ≥ 5} (4.1)
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This extends the ATT as parameter of interest to evaluation of a stock sample. Since in a
stock sample individuals may have a different elapsed duration, the conditional expectation
is taken over these elapsed durations, conditional on being employed for at least 5 years to
take into account that one needs at least 5 years of tenure to be eligible for TC. Observe that
E[Y¯L+t(.) = 0∣S = .,Y¯L+s(.) = 0] =Pr[T >L+t ∣S = .,T >L+s] holds, i.e. the conditional probability
of surviving L+ t years in employment given survival until L+ s. In case L = 0, Equation 4.1
reduces to the corresponding expression in Vikström (2014) for a flow sample.
4.2.2 Identification
In order to identify AT Tt(s) we use two identifying assumptions: conditional independence
(CIA) and no anticipation (NAA). These assumptions can be formalised as follows:
CIA: ∀l > 5,∀t > s ∶ S ⊥Yl+t(s)∣X (4.2)
NAA: ∀l > 5,∀t <min(s′,s”) ∶ Pr(Yl+t(s′) = 1) = Pr(Yl+t(s”) = 1) (4.3)
The latter condition means that individuals do not alter their behaviour in response to a future
assignment to the treatment. Based on these assumptions Fredriksson and Johansson (2008),
Crépon et al. (2009), and Vikström (2014) prove that for l = 0 AT Tt(s) can be identified by
successively using the not yet treated at l+ t to estimate the exit rate under no treatment at l+ t
for those treated at l+ s. We follow Vikström (2014), who generalises by explicitly allowing for
selectivity on observables in subsequent assignments into treatment. Because the identification
proof is not affected for different values of l, we refer the reader to Vikström (2014).
4.2.3 Estimation and Inference
Vikström derives the Inverse Probability Weighting (IPW) estimator, introduced by Horvitz and
Thompson (1952) and Hirano et al. (2003), to estimate the AT Tt(s) defined in Equation 4.1.
We follow this approach for the following reasons: (i) Busso et al. (2014) find in their Monte
Carlo simulation that the normalised IPW estimator is one of the best performing matching
estimators in the presence of good overlap. Other Monte Carlo simulations of Huber et al. (2013)
and Frölich et al. (2015) confirm the good performance of the IPW estimator, although it does
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not outperform other Propensity Score-based and non-parametric estimators; (ii) It is easy to
integrate the endogenous sampling weights. This merely requires to include an additional weight
in the estimation; (iii) Compared to other matching estimators, the IPW estimator is simple and
computationally fast.
We provide the most general estimator that does not only allow to take into account selective
(on observables) right censoring as a consequence of not yet treated individuals getting treated
(Vikström, 2014), but also more general forms of selective right censoring that may involve both
treated and not yet treated individuals. For instance, we consider a competing risk framework,
with estimations of the treatment effect on different exit destinations when terminating employ-
ment. We distinguish between exits to bridge pensions, statutory early retirement and “other"
exit routes.
To write down the estimator, we denote the random censoring duration since sample selection for
individual i by Ci. Generalising Vikström’s formula (see his Appendix A.3) for the endogenous
sampling weights Wcr,i and taking the elapsed employment duration li into account, we obtain:
ÂT T t(s) = t∏
k=s+1
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣1−
∑iWcr,i∗WCl,k(s),i(s)Yk,i1(Y¯l+k−1,i = 0)1(Si = s)1(Ci > s)∑iWcr,i∗WCl,k(s),i(s)1(Y¯l+k−1,i = 0)1(Si = s)1(Ci > s)
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
= t∏
k=s+1
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣1−
∑iWcr,i∗WCl,k(∞),i(s)Yk,i1(Y¯l+k−1,i = 0)1(Si ≥ k)1(Ci ≥ k)∑iWcr,i∗WCl,k(∞),i(s)1(Y¯l+k−1,i = 0)1(Si ≥ k)1(Ci ≥ k)
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ (4.4)
where
WCl,k(s),i(s) = 1∏km=s+1 [1−cm(Xi, li)]
WCl,k(∞),i(s) = ps(Xi, li)1− ps(Xi, li) 1∏km=s+1 [1− pm(Xi, li)][1−cm(Xi, li)]
pt(Xi, li) = Pr(Si = t ∣Xi,Si ≥ li+ t,Y¯l+t−1,i = 0)
ct(Xi, li) = Pr(Ci = t ∣Xi,Si ≥ li+ t,Y¯l+t−1,i = 0)
where Xi denotes the vector of predetermined explanatory variables, WCl,k(s),i(s) and WCl,k(∞),i(s)
are the IPW weights in year li + k for individual i treated in year li + s and not yet treated in
year li+k, respectively. pt(Xi, li) and ct(Xi, li) denote the conditional probability of entering the
treatment, respectively censoring state after li+ t years conditional on still being employed in
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li+ t −1. In other words, they represent the discrete hazard of entering treatment, respectively
censoring in year li+ t.
To clarify the intuition of the estimator defined in Equation 4.4 consider first the case without
right censoring, i.e. Ci =∞, WCl,k(s),i(s) = 1 and WCl,k(∞),i(s) = ps(Xi,li)1−ps(Xi,li) 1∏km=s+1[1−pm(Xi,li)] . Apart
from the weights, the first sequence of products in (4.4) is the standard Kaplan Meier survivor
estimator for the treated group. This represents the conditional survival rate in employment until
year li+ t, conditional on treatment and survival in employment until year li+ s, i.e. the product
of one minus the discrete hazards from employment between li + s+1 and li + t. The second
sequence of products is a similar Kaplan Meier estimator for the control group (or not yet treated
individuals), which estimates the survival rate of the treated in the counterfactual of no treatment.
In order to make these control units comparable to the treated they are reweighted using the
standard IPW weights ps(Xi,li)1−ps(Xi,li) in a static evaluation approach, where ps(Xi, li) is the estimated
Propensity Score (PS) for an individual treated in year li+ s. However, to take into account that
not yet treated individuals gradually become treated, we must consider that this may change
the composition of the control group over time. Hence, Vikström (2014) shows that we must in
addition weigh the control units by 1∏km=s+1[1−pm(Xi,li)] , i.e. by the inverse of the probability of not
yet being treated in each period between li+ s+1 and li+ t.
If individuals are right censored before exiting to the destination of interest and this is selective
(i.e. depends on X), then this may similarly gradually change the composition of now not only
the control group, but also of the treatment group over time. We therefore need to weigh both
treated and control samples by 1∏km=s+1[1−cm(Xi,li)] , i.e. the probability of not yet being right
censored in each period between li+ s+1 and li+ t.
In contrast to Vikström (2014), the discrete hazards to treatment and censoring depend on the
elapsed employment duration li at sample selection. Observe that we can only proxy for this
elapsed employment duration, because prior to 1998 we only have annual (instead of quarterly)
information on private sector employment and no information on self-employment, neither on
employment as civil servant. Given that we selected individuals with at least 5 years of tenure
and 20 years of experience in the private sector, we believe that the bias induced by using this
proxy is negligible.
We estimate separate ATTs for individuals entering treatment in 2003 and 2004. Subsequently,
we pool, as Vikström, these analyses to have more precise estimates. This is done by averaging
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the estimated ATTs in each survival year, using the endogenous sampling weights to take into
account the size of the two different treated groups in the population.
AT Tt =∑
s
ns∑s ns AT Ts+t(s) (4.5)
where ns ≡∑iWcr,i∗1(Si = s).
As a lack of overlap of the PS can bias the estimator and increase the variance (Lechner
and Strittmatter, 2014), we trim treated units who, due to their very high PS, do not have a
correspondent control unit. In particular, we remove treated units with a PS above the 99.9th
percentile of the control units. After trimming, we remain with about 99% of the treated units,
counting 1,212 and 755 men and women. Huber et al. (2013) propose to remove the control
units with a weight higher than 4% of the total. However, because the sample of control units is
large, this additional trimming is not required. In the four analyses (2003 and 2004, men and
women) the highest relative weight is only 0.17% of the total sample.
To take into account that the PS in the weights WCl,k(.),i(s) are estimated, we bootstrap the standard
errors. As our data come from an endogenously stratified sample, we augment the standard
bootstrap method and implement a stratified bootstrap by randomly drawing for each replication
ncr individuals within each cohort-stratum cr. This is valid because the bootstrap randomly
samples individuals within each cohort-stratum (for a review on bootstrap and stratified data see
e.g. Shao, 2003). To take individual serial correlation into account we re-sample within each
replication the same individuals (i.e. clusters) in the two analyses (2003 and 2004 sample).
In general, once conditioned on the eligibility conditions, the selectivity into treatment on the
observables is low in 2003. The Pseudo R-squared of a standard logit model is 0.068 and 0.026
for men and women. The selectivity is slightly higher in 2004. The corresponding Pseudo
R-squared are 0.127 and 0.084. This indicates that, once the eligibility conditions are imposed,
the sample becomes relatively homogeneous. The IPW estimator performs well in balancing
the distribution of the covariates (see Tables 4.3 and 4.4 below). In our worst scenario (women
selected in 2004), after reweighting the control units by WCl,1(∞),i(s), the median Standardised
Bias (SB) is as low as 1.2%, the highest SB is 2.9%, the Pseudo R-squared of the reweighted
sample is 0 and the Wald test for the joint significance of the variables after the reweighting has
a p-value of 1.
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4.3 Cost-Benefit Analysis
To obtain an order of magnitude of the costs and benefits of the TC for the government budget
and for society, we perform a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) along the lines proposed by Staubli
and Zweimüller (2013). To that purpose we make use of the information available in the
administrative dataset on the benefits and gross wages that are paid out to participants and
non-participants in the TC. This information is then used to calculate for each individual and in
each of the 8 years of analysis after the year of (counterfactual) entry in TC the real costs (or
gains) in constant 2004 Euros for the government budget and for society. We weigh the control
group by the appropriate IPW to make them comparable to the treated group and calculate for
each of these years the average difference of these costs (gains). This provides an estimate of
the average net cost (gain) per participant in TC for the government and society in each of these
eight years (Staubli and Zweimüller, 2013; Albanese and Cockx, 2015). Differently from the
ATT on the survival in employment, these have to be interpreted as the instantaneous net costs
(gains) during those years.
Huber et al. (2016) mention that employers receive a supplement payment from Germany’s
federal employment if workers leaving the firm through the subsidised scheme were replaced
with unemployed or young job seekers. Whether this replacement occurs or not matters a lot for
the CBA. Our data do not allow to test this hypothesis though. Nevertheless, we consider two
scenarios in the CBA. One assumes that the part-time work is not replaced by another part-time
worker, the other assumes that this part-time work is replaced by another who earns an equivalent
wage and is equally productive as the part-time worker. In this second scenario we do not take
into account, however, the gains in terms of UB payments that would no longer have to be paid
if the replacing worker came from unemployment.
There are a number of reasons why we cannot perform a full-fledged CBA. First, as we will
explain more in detail below, not all required information at the individual level is available
in the administrative database. In these cases we substitute the individual level information
by aggregate information obtained from other sources or, if it refers to a very small share of
individuals, we ignore the information by setting it to zero. Second, the analysis ignores some
important dimensions. For instance, in Section 3.5.2.3 we found some limited evidence that
participation in the TC may have some small positive health effects. However, as we lack
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information on health costs, we cannot take this dimension into account. Moreover, we ignore
the impact of participation in TC on the distribution of welfare or on poverty. All this means that
the CBA should be taken as a crude approximation.
4.3.1 Methodology
We calculate, for each year t of the period of analysis above, the effect of the policy on two
indicators, the Net Budgetary Cost for the Government (NBC) and the Net Welfare Cost for
Society (NWC). Both indicators are expressed per treated individual and in monthly terms (2004
Euros).
(i) Net budgetary cost (gain) for the Government (NBC): This is the average cost (gain) of
the policy for the state, net of savings for the public budget:
NBCt = allowt − taxt ∗ remut −SSCt (4.6)
with:
• allowt : expenditures of the Government on allowances of the Social Security scheme, such
as unemployment benefits and the TC allowance. Because the database lacks information
on statutory pension, sickness and disability allowances, we impute these allowances as
follows:
– We assume that the worker has worked his entire career in the private sector and
assume that the individual is paid the average pension in the private sector according
to the age bracket to whom he belongs: 50-54, 55-59, 60-64, 65-69.
– For sickness and disability benefits we set the allowance equal to the theoretical level
of entitlement, i.e. to 60% of the individuals’ average monthly remuneration over the
last six quarters.
• taxt : The average personal income tax rate on the gross remuneration in every year
(OECD.stat, 2015).
• remut : the gross wage earnings. This is observed in the data for employees in the private
and public sector, but not for the self-employed, for whom we impute a zero value for
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both treated and control units. Since the share of self-employed individuals in the control
group is larger (4.6%/2.0% of men / women) than in the treated group (2.0%/0.7% of men
/ women), this slightly biases our cost estimate downwards.
• SSCt : employer and employee contributions to Social Security.
(ii) Net Welfare cost (gain) for Society (NWC): the efficiency cost (“excess burden" or “dead-
weight loss") of the net budgetary expenditures mentioned in (i) plus the opportunity cost of
working minus the production value of employment (PV):
NWCt = (MCF −1)∗NBCt +LEISt −PVt= (MCF −1)∗NBCt +LEISt −(1−PGt)∗LCt (4.7)
with
• MCF : the Marginal Cost of Public Funds.1 For Belgium a MCF equal to two is considered
to be appropriate (Kleven and Kreiner, 2006; Barrios et al., 2013).
• LEISt : the opportunity cost of working, which has to be between zero and the net wage
plus the SSC. In the latter we include both employee’s and employer’s Social Security
contributions as they can be seen as an insurance premium to entitlements to Social Security
benefits. Similarly to Greenberg and Robins (2008), we use the mid-point between the
two bounds as our benchmark estimate.
• PG: the age-related pay-productivity gap takes into account that the wage cost of older
workers exceeds their productivity. An estimate of the production value of labour (PV ) is
obtained by downward adjusting the labour costs (LC) by this gap. We use estimates of
this pay-productivity gap provided by Vandenberghe et al. (2013) for the Belgian case.
We consider a sensitivity analysis in two directions. First we consider two scenarios: one in
which the effect of reduced working time on labour costs is taken into account and one in which it
is not (i.e. full replacement of the reduced working hours for both treated and controls). Second,
we check the robustness of our results by varying three key parameters of our model:
1. Two personal income tax rates: for persons earning 100% (benchmark) or 133% of the
average wage.
1The net budgetary cost is in se not a cost to Society as it just involves transfers between individuals.
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2. Three marginal costs of public funds: 1.41, 2.14 (benchmark) and 3.23 (Kleven and
Kreiner, 2006).
3. Three values for the opportunity cost of working: the aforementioned lower and upper
bound, as well as the midpoint (benchmark).
In order to measure the impact of TC on these indicators, we proceed in the following way. We
run by gender a pooled weighted regression on all 8 years of analysis (t ∈ 1,2, ...8) separately for
s ∈ 0,1, i.e. the two samples of analysis:
√
W Rit Yit = 8∑
t=s+1(αt +βt1(Si = s))
√
W Rit Dt +√W Rit uit , (4.8)
with √
W Rit ≡Wcr,i⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣1+ ps(Xi, li)1− ps(Xi, li) 1∏tm=s+1 [1− pm(Xi, li)]1(Si > t)
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
where Yit measures the outcome of interest, i.e. NBC or NWC, for each individual i in year t
after treatment assignment, Dt is a year indicator equal to one in year t and zero otherwise, uit
is the error term of the regression. In this regression αt measures the average outcome for the
control units that have not yet been treated in year t, i.e. Si > t > s, so that 1(Si = s) = 0, while
βt measures the average treatment effect on the treated in year t (AT Tt), i.e. Si = s < t, so that
1(Si = s) = 0. The weights W Rit ensure that (i) the endogenous sampling is taken into account
by weighing all individual observations by Wcr,i, (ii) the control units that have not yet been
treated are made, respectively kept comparable to the treated units by weighing them by the
standard IPW ps(Xi,li)1−ps(Xi,li) and by 1∏tm=s+1[1−pm(Xi,li)] to take the selective assignment into treatment
over time into account. Note, in contrast to the analysis on the survival rate in employment,
individuals who leave employment are not dropped from the analysis. Only individuals in the
control group who become treated are dropped, but the weights avoid that this induces selectivity
in the comparison between treated and control units. For each time period (t ∈ 1,2, ...8) we can
then estimate the AT Tt on NBC or on NWC for each treatment group s ∈ 0,1 by βˆt−s, where the
hat denotes the estimate of the weighted regression in (4.8). Subsequently, we average over
treatment groups in a similar way as in (4.5).
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4.3.2 Results
The results of the benchmark cost-benefit analysis (CBA) can be found in Figure 4.2, which
shows the monthly cost per treated for the government budget and the welfare cost to society.
Both the scenarios with and without replacement of part-time workers are discussed.
Figure 4.2: Monthly Cost of Policy per Treated of 2003 (2004)
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Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) on the pooled sample of participants in TC of 2003 and 2004. CBA in monthly costs (benefits if
negative) in 2004 euros per treated individual (the size of the treated sample as defined in 2003/2004). The Net Budgetary Cost
(NBC) for the government is the average cost (gain) of the policy for the state, net of savings for the public budget. The Net
Welfare Cost (NWC) for society is the efficiency cost of the NBC minus the production value of employment (PV). Baseline
scenario: CBA without replacement of the part-time workers. Replacement scenario: baseline scenario with the additional
assumption that all hours reduced by part-time workers (treated and controls) are recovered by hiring extra workers with similar
characteristics. The CBA ignores potential substitution and anticipation effects. The NWC ignore the value of leisure and
potential distributional and health impacts of the measure. The CBA spans all eight years of the ATT analysis (Section 3.5.2.1).
Year 1 is the first year for which we calculate the ATT. Year 8 only contains information from the 2003 sample.
Without the replacement of part-time workers, the results indicate that the TC scheme is an
expensive policy that fails the cost-benefit test. Although in the first years we have estimated a
positive employment effect, the costs of the policy immediately dominate the benefits. In the first
year of the analysis the monthly costs to the government budget in the baseline case are e878
(e696) per treated person for men (women). That these budgetary costs for the government
already exist from the first years indicate that the positive effects on employment at the extensive
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margin are immediately dominated by the reduction of working hours and the allowance paid
to the TC participants. In particular, (i) treated people reduce their working hours, resulting in
less income for the government in the form of taxes; (ii) TC participants receive the TC benefit,
resulting in higher expenditures for the government. As a reduction in working hours also implies
lower production, the monthly total welfare costs per treated individual are even higher: e1,706
(e1,345) for men (women). The costs to society show a decreasing pattern, while near the end of
the analysis we observe a stronger decrease for both the costs to the government and the society.
As already mentioned, this convergence is induced by the fact that all individuals eventually
retire, irrespectively of treatment, so that costs converge to zero.
If full replacement of the reduced working hours is assumed, a small short-run positive welfare
gain for society emerges, but only for women. This is because in this scenario no working
hours are lost when a participant enters the TC scheme. To the extent that there are positive
employment effects as discussed in Section 3.5.2.1, this reduces the negative budgetary impact,
while the net gain for society also comes from the positive impact of the TC scheme on the value
of leisure. The largest potential benefits are obtained at the start of the analysis and are larger
and longer-lasting for women, as they have more favourable short-run employment effects.2
The welfare cost to Society is about zero in year two and four, respectively for men and women.
At those points the ATTs on the survival rate in employment was estimated to be about 3.5 pp.
This suggests that a positive ATT of about 3.5 percentage points is required to break-even in
terms of social welfare. However, this is measured for the most optimistic scenario. In reality it
is unlikely that employers could replace all reduced working time. We included two summary
tables (Table 4.1 and Table 4.2) containing the effects for our sensitivity analyses in which we
consider all possible scenarios. Though the magnitude of the estimates in the sensitivity analysis
changes, the qualitative results are in line with the findings of the baseline scenario. Our CBA
ignores distributional effects and effects on other channels such as health. However, it is clear
that without full replacement, the policy fails the cost-benefit test.
In line with our employment analysis we considered the heterogeneous effects of splitting the
sample by age, using the same cut-off as in the employment analysis (see Figure 4.3). This
2There are almost no benefits for the government budget, while the monthly welfare benefits for society are
larger in year one (two) for men (women), when they amount to e80 (231) per treated man (woman). Similar to the
ATT on survival in employment, the period with a welfare gain lasts only one year for men, while three years for
women.
88 4. Internet Appendix to Chapter 3
analysis shows that while the policy is more costly for younger workers when we do not consider
replacement, it also has the greatest scope for positive budgetary effects once the replacement is
taken into account. The potential benefits are greater and longer-lasting for (especially female)
younger workers, as they also have longer lasting positive employment effects (cf. Section
3.5.2.1).
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Figure 4.3: Monthly Cost of Policy per Treated by Age for Men (panel A) and Women (panel B)
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Panel A - men
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Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) on the pooled sample of participants in TC of 2003 and 2004. CBA in monthly costs (benefits if
negative) in 2004 euros per treated individual (the size of the treated sample as defined in 2003 / 2004). The Net Budgetary Cost
(NBC) for the government is the average cost (gain) of the policy for the state, net of savings for the public budget. The Net Welfare
Cost (NWC) for society is the efficiency cost of the NBC minus the production value of employment (PV). Baseline scenario:
CBA without replacement of the part-time workers. Replacement scenario: baseline scenario with additional assumption that all
hours reduced by part-time workers (treated and controls) are recovered by hiring extra workers with similar characteristics. At the
moment of sample selection (year 0), younger workers are aged strictly below age 56.5, older workers are aged 56.5 and above. The
CBA ignores potential substitution and anticipation effects. The NWC ignore the value of leisure and potential distributional and
health impacts of the measure. The CBA spans all eight years of the ATT analysis from Section 3.5.2.1. Year one is the first year
for which we calculate the ATT. Year eight only contains information from the 2003 sample.
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Table 4.1: Sensitivity analysis on Cost-Benefit Analysis - men
(A) (B) (C) (1) No replacement of part-time workers (2) Replacement of part-time workers
MCF Reserv.
Wage
Income
taxes
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8
(α) NET BUDGETARY COST (NBC) FOR THE GOVERNMENT
- - Medium 878.3 803.0 791.2 817.0 906.1 732.6 540.0 388.6 90.7 119.2 222.7 359.6 596.2 508.9 371.5 273.8
- - High 914.1 835.7 823.1 850.5 941.4 760.2 559.5 402.6 78.6 111.5 224.3 373.8 627.5 537.0 391.3 288.0
(β) NET WELFARE COST (NWC) FOR SOCIETY
1.41 Low Medium 1,505.2 1,306.4 1,185.0 1,142.1 1,123.5 817.1 530.7 371.0 -306.8 -170.3 126.0 494.0 992.0 839.2 544.8 373.1
1.41 Low High 1,519.8 1,319.8 1,198.1 1,155.9 1,138.0 828.4 538.7 376.7 -311.8 -173.5 126.7 499.8 1,004.8 850.7 552.9 378.9
1.41 Medium Medium 1,022.1 864.3 755.4 698.0 653.1 450.9 271.5 182.8 -143.7 -67.9 100.0 305.7 575.4 464.8 279.5 182.1
1.41 Medium High 1,054.7 894.1 784.4 728.4 685.3 475.9 289.2 195.5 -154.7 -74.9 101.5 318.7 603.9 490.4 297.6 195.0
1.41 High Medium 539.1 422.1 325.8 253.8 182.6 84.6 12.4 -5.5 19.3 34.6 74.0 117.4 158.9 90.5 14.2 -8.9
1.41 High High 589.6 468.3 370.7 300.9 232.5 123.4 39.7 14.3 2.3 23.6 76.3 137.5 203.0 130.1 42.2 11.0
2.14 Low Medium 2,189.4 1,906.3 1,723.1 1,644.4 1,602.2 1,176.1 786.7 560.6 -243.5 -85.9 285.4 753.1 1,421.1 1,206.5 807.4 566.6
2.14 Low High 2,230.2 1,943.6 1,759.5 1,682.5 1,642.6 1,207.6 808.8 576.5 -257.3 -94.7 287.3 769.4 1,456.8 1,238.6 830.0 582.8
2.14 Medium Medium 1,706.4 1,464.1 1,293.5 1,200.2 1,131.8 809.9 527.5 372.3 -80.4 16.5 259.4 564.9 1,004.6 832.2 542.1 375.6
2.14 Medium High 1,765.1 1,517.8 1,345.7 1,255.1 1,189.8 855.1 559.3 395.3 -100.3 3.8 262.1 588.3 1,055.9 878.3 574.6 398.8
2.14 High Medium 1,223.3 1,022.0 863.9 756.0 661.4 443.6 268.3 184.1 82.6 119.0 233.4 376.6 588.0 457.9 276.8 184.7
2.14 High High 1,299.9 1,092.1 932.0 827.6 737.1 502.6 309.9 214.1 56.8 102.4 236.9 407.1 654.9 518.1 319.3 214.9
3.23 Low Medium 3,211.1 2,801.9 2,526.6 2,394.4 2,317.1 1,712.2 1,168.9 843.7 -149.0 40.2 523.5 1,140.1 2,061.9 1,755.1 1,199.4 855.7
3.23 Low High 3,290.9 2,874.9 2,597.6 2,469.0 2,396.0 1,773.6 1,212.2 874.9 -176.0 22.9 527.0 1,171.9 2,131.6 1,817.8 1,243.7 887.2
3.23 Medium Medium 2,728.0 2,359.8 2,097.0 1,950.2 1,846.6 1,345.9 909.7 655.4 14.1 142.6 497.5 951.9 1,645.3 1,380.8 934.1 664.7
3.23 Medium High 2,825.8 2,449.2 2,183.9 2,041.5 1,943.2 1,421.1 962.7 693.6 -18.9 121.4 501.8 990.8 1,730.7 1,457.5 988.4 703.3
3.23 High Medium 2,245.0 1,917.6 1,667.3 1,506.0 1,376.2 979.7 650.5 467.2 177.2 245.0 471.5 763.6 1,228.8 1,006.4 668.8 473.7
3.23 High High 2,360.6 2,023.4 1,770.2 1,614.1 1,490.5 1,068.7 713.2 512.4 138.1 220.0 476.7 809.7 1,329.8 1,097.3 733.0 519.4
Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) on the pooled sample of male participants in TC of 2003 and 2004. Treated sample size defined in 2003-2004. CBA in monthly costs (benefits if negative) in 2004 euros per treated individual under different
scenarios. Scenario in bold denotes baseline scenario. (1) No replacement of part-time workers scenario; and (2) replacement scenario: baseline scenario with additional assumption that all hours reduced by part-time workers (treated and
controls) are recovered by hiring extra workers with similar characteristics. Additionally (A) Marginal Cost of public Funds (MCF) equal to 1.41, 2.14, or 3.23 (Kleven and Kreiner, 2006), (B) opportunity cost of working (Reservation Wage)
with a lower, medium and upper bound and (C) Income Tax Rate, variable over time: medium (average income) which is on average 28.26%, higher (133% average income) which is on average 32.36% (OECD.stat, 2015 for 2003-2011). The
first outcome variable is the Net Budgetary Cost (NBC) for the government (α), i.e. the average cost (gain) of the policy for the state, net of savings for the public budget. The second is the Net Welfare Cost (NWC) for society (β), i.e. the
efficiency cost of the NBC minus the production value of employment. The CBA ignores potential substitution and anticipation effects. The costs to society ignore potential distributional and health impacts of the measure. The CBA spans all
eight years of the ATT analysis from Section 3.5.2.1. Year one is the first year for which we calculate the ATT. Year eight only contains information from the 2003.
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Table 4.2: Sensitivity analysis on Cost-Benefit Analysis - women
(A) (B) (C) (1) No replacement of part-time workers (2) Replacement of part-time workers
MCF Reserv.
Wage
Income
taxes
Year
1
Year
2
Year
3
Year
4
Year
5
Year
6
Year
7
Year
8
Year
1
Year
2
Year
3
Year
4
Year
5
Year
6
Year
7
Year
8
(α) NET BUDGETARY COST (NBC) FOR THE GOVERNMENT
- - Medium 695.5 533.5 485.0 466.0 565.1 495.5 429.6 357.6 67.0 3.8 33.5 119.3 362.8 322.8 271.7 237.8
- - High 721.9 554.2 504.2 484.8 589.2 515.5 446.2 371.4 53.9 -11.5 22.3 115.9 379.7 339.2 286.0 250.7
(β) NET WELFARE COST (NWC) FOR SOCIETY
1.41 Low Medium 1,139.7 872.2 761.1 684.7 777.2 598.3 467.6 374.5 -366.8 -442.7 -302.2 -50.5 558.5 496.6 414.6 355.8
1.41 Low High 1,150.6 880.8 769.0 692.4 787.1 606.5 474.4 380.2 -372.2 -449.0 -306.8 -51.9 565.4 503.3 420.5 361.1
1.41 Medium Medium 790.1 601.2 511.0 439.7 461.9 335.8 248.9 192.9 -185.7 -228.9 -145.7 -2.8 336.2 281.3 224.9 186.6
1.41 Medium High 814.2 620.1 528.5 456.8 483.8 354.1 264.0 205.5 -197.6 -242.8 -155.8 -5.9 351.5 296.3 238.0 198.3
1.41 High Medium 440.5 330.1 261.0 194.7 146.6 73.3 30.1 11.3 -4.6 -15.0 10.9 44.9 113.9 66.1 35.1 17.3
1.41 High High 477.8 359.4 288.0 221.2 180.5 101.6 53.5 30.8 -23.1 -36.6 -4.9 40.1 137.7 89.2 55.4 35.5
2.14 Low Medium 1,694.9 1,324.0 1,156.3 1,032.4 1,125.8 876.3 692.4 559.0 -320.9 -445.0 -286.3 25.1 819.6 730.0 611.2 527.5
2.14 Low High 1,725.0 1,347.7 1,178.2 1,053.8 1,153.2 899.2 711.3 574.7 -335.8 -462.5 -299.1 21.3 838.9 748.7 627.6 542.2
2.14 Medium Medium 1,345.3 1,052.9 906.2 787.5 810.5 613.8 473.6 377.4 -139.8 -231.1 -129.8 72.9 597.3 514.7 421.4 358.3
2.14 Medium High 1,388.6 1,087.0 937.7 818.2 849.9 646.7 500.8 400.0 -161.3 -256.3 -148.2 67.3 625.0 541.6 445.0 379.4
2.14 High Medium 995.7 781.8 656.2 542.5 495.1 351.4 254.8 195.8 41.3 -17.3 26.7 120.6 375.0 299.5 231.6 189.1
2.14 High High 1,052.3 826.4 697.3 582.7 546.6 394.3 290.4 225.3 13.3 -50.1 2.8 113.3 411.2 334.6 262.4 216.7
3.23 Low Medium 2,523.8 1,998.5 1,746.4 1,551.7 1,646.3 1,291.5 1,027.9 834.5 -252.3 -448.4 -262.7 138.1 1,209.5 1,078.5 904.6 784.0
3.23 Low High 2,582.7 2,044.9 1,789.2 1,593.6 1,699.9 1,336.2 1,065.0 865.2 -281.6 -482.6 -287.6 130.6 1,247.2 1,115.0 936.7 812.7
3.23 Medium Medium 2,174.2 1,727.4 1,496.3 1,306.8 1,330.9 1,029.0 809.2 652.9 -71.2 -234.5 -106.1 185.8 987.2 863.2 714.8 614.8
3.23 Medium High 2,246.3 1,784.2 1,548.8 1,358.0 1,396.6 1,083.7 854.5 690.5 -107.0 -276.4 -136.7 176.6 1,033.3 908.0 754.1 649.9
3.23 High Medium 1,824.6 1,456.4 1,246.3 1,061.8 1,015.6 766.5 590.4 471.3 109.9 -20.7 50.4 233.5 765.0 648.0 525.1 445.6
3.23 High High 1,910.0 1,523.5 1,308.3 1,122.4 1,093.3 831.3 644.1 515.8 67.5 -70.2 14.3 222.7 819.5 700.9 571.5 487.2
Same comments as for Table 4.1
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Table 4.3: Balancing tests: Standardised Bias (SB) and p-value on mean equality
MEN 2003 sample MEN 2004 sample WOMEN 2003 sample WOMEN 2004 sample
mean T mean
C
SB P-
value
mean T mean
C
SB P-
value
mean T mean
C
SB P-
value
mean T mean
C
SB P-
value
Firm size: 20-99 21.2% 20.9% 0.6 0.891 15.7% 16.0% -0.8 0.852 26.7% 26.9% -0.4 0.934 26.2% 27.1% -1.9 0.744
Firm size: 100-999 33.3% 33.0% 0.6 0.893 28.0% 28.9% -1.9 0.711 31.5% 31.3% 0.5 0.924 23.5% 24.0% -1.0 0.864
Firm size: > 1000 45.5% 46.0% -1.1 0.821 56.3% 55.1% 2.6 0.655 41.7% 41.8% -0.1 0.986 50.2% 48.9% 2.7 0.679
Household: Other 11.3% 11.2% 0.3 0.950 11.4% 11.4% 0.1 0.979 36.3% 36.2% 0.2 0.977 35.2% 35.1% 0.3 0.955
Household: Couple with children 47.7% 46.8% 1.8 0.707 45.7% 45.2% 1.1 0.844 21.8% 21.7% 0.3 0.954 27.1% 27.4% -0.7 0.918
Household: Couple without children 41.0% 42.0% -2.0 0.673 42.8% 43.4% -1.3 0.829 41.8% 42.0% -0.4 0.940 37.6% 37.5% 0.3 0.967
Age 55.3 55.3 -0.4 0.924 55.7 55.7 0.1 0.978 55.1 55.1 0.6 0.902 55.8 55.8 -1.5 0.776
Blue collar 26.5% 26.3% 0.4 0.926 19.7% 20.7% -2.4 0.608 11.2% 11.1% 0.1 0.984 9.4% 9.8% -1.3 0.811
Status 1y Av. FT Hourly wage e20.4 e20.3 1.3 0.722 e21.1 e20.9 2.3 0.566 e17.3 e17.3 0.4 0.941 e17.6 e17.5 2.0 0.687< selection Belgian 97.9% 97.9% -0.1 0.972 98.0% 97.9% 0.5 0.905 97.7% 97.7% 0.1 0.991 96.5% 96.2% 2.0 0.749
(2002 or 2003) Household size 2.6 2.6 1.5 0.743 2.6 2.6 0.9 0.870 2.1 2.1 0.2 0.967 2.1 2.1 0.3 0.964
Region: Brussels 4.8% 4.7% 0.3 0.947 7.2% 7.0% 0.7 0.901 15.2% 15.1% 0.2 0.964 15.7% 15.5% 0.6 0.923
Region: Flanders 72.4% 73.0% -1.3 0.780 65.8% 66.3% -1.2 0.831 51.2% 51.2% 0.1 0.989 52.3% 52.8% -1.1 0.857
Region: Wallonia 22.8% 22.2% 1.2 0.791 27.1% 26.7% 0.9 0.875 33.5% 33.7% -0.3 0.963 32.0% 31.7% 0.8 0.905
Sector: Trade, transport, hotel 15.7% 15.5% 0.5 0.901 14.3% 14.9% -1.4 0.766 23.5% 23.5% -0.1 0.980 19.5% 20.0% -1.1 0.854
Sector: Bank, business services 39.1% 40.0% -2.1 0.697 51.5% 50.2% 2.9 0.654 34.4% 34.3% 0.2 0.970 45.7% 44.3% 2.9 0.671
Sector: Other services 4.1% 4.0% 0.4 0.921 4.1% 4.2% -0.5 0.907 22.6% 22.7% -0.2 0.970 20.4% 20.9% -1.3 0.821
Sector: Manufacturing, Agriculture,
Construction
36.9% 36.3% 1.2 0.798 24.8% 25.3% -1.1 0.830 19.6% 19.5% 0.1 0.985 14.4% 14.8% -0.9 0.863
Sector: Construction (men) 4.2% 4.2% 0.4 0.927 5.4% 5.5% -0.5 0.916
Early retirement propensity in
Industrial Committee*
-0.1% -0.2% 0.8 0.852 -2.2% -2.0% -2.5 0.593 -3.2% -3.2% -0.2 0.973 -4.1% -4.0% -2.2 0.702
5y < selection Av. FT Hourly wage e19.8 e19.7 1.3 0.709 e20.9 e20.7 2.4 0.561 e16.9 e16.9 0.4 0.940 e17.2 e17.1 2.2 0.661
13y < selection Years with the same employers 10.6 10.5 3.8 0.475 10.9 10.9 -0.3 0.954 11.0 11.0 -0.2 0.975 11.2 11.2 -1.5 0.820
1990-1997 Av. Working time (%) 97.9 97.9 0.1 0.983 98.1 98.0 1.5 0.714 96.0 95.8 1.7 0.774 95.7 95.6 1.1 0.863
1957-1990 Experience in years 31.4 31.5 -0.8 0.857 30.8 30.8 -0.4 0.937 30.5 30.5 0.3 0.944 29.6 29.6 0.7 0.897
Av. Earnings in the year e28.60 e28.45 1.3 0.721 e29.74 e29.46 2.6 0.548 e23.51 e23.46 0.7 0.903 e24.20 e23.99 2.6 0.648
N individuals Sample Size (Unweighted) 754 17.876 473 11.915 421 5.353 341 4.305
Represented Population Size (i.e.
weighted by Wcr,i)
2.012 41.33 1.851 34.448 669 7.829 592 6.78
Balancing tests after reweighting the individuals by using the weights of the year of selection (2003 or 2004). The table reports the mean of the covariates by treatment status with Standardised Bias and p-value of the t-test.
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Table 4.4: Other balancing tests
2003 2004
Sample Pseudo-
R2
Wald test:
pvalue
Mean
Standardised
Bias
Median
Standardised
Bias
Max
Standardised
Bias
Pseudo-
R2
Wald test:
pvalue
Mean
Standardised
Bias
Median
Standardised
Bias
Max
Standardised
Bias
Raw Men 0.068 0.000 15.6% 11.5% 48.0% 0.127 0.000 20.9% 15.1% 74.2%
Reweighted Men 0.000 1,000 1.0% 0.8% 3.8% 0.000 1,000 1.3% 1.1% 2.9%
Raw Women 0.026 0.000 9.5% 8.2% 22.5% 0.083 0.000 15.9% 11.8% 50.0%
Reweighted Women 0.000 1,000 0.3% 0.2% 1.7% 0.000 1,000 1.4% 1.2% 2.9%
Balancing tests after reweighting the individuals by using the weights of the year of selection (2003 or 2004). The table reports the results of other balancing tests before and after reweighting the individuals by such weights.
Bibliography
Albanese, A. and B. Cockx (2015). Permanent Wage Cost Subsidies for Older Workers: An
Effective Tool for Increasing Working Time and Postponing Early Retirement? Working Paper
8988. Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
Barrios, S., J. Pycroft, and B. Saveyn (2013). The marginal cost of public funds in the eu: The
case of labour vs. Working paper 35-2013. Green taxes. Brussels: European Commission.
Busso, M., J. DiNardo, and J. McCrary (2014). “New evidence on the finite sample properties of
propensity score reweighting and matching estimators”. In: Review of Economics and Statistics
96(5), pp. 885–897.
Crépon, B., M. Ferracci, G. Jolivet, and G. J. Berg (2009). “Active labor market policy effects in
a dynamic setting”. In: Journal of the European Economic Association 7(2-3), pp. 595–605.
Fredriksson, P. and P. Johansson (2008). “Dynamic treatment assignment: the consequences for
evaluations using observational data”. In: Journal of Business & Economic Statistics 26(4),
pp. 435–445.
Frölich, M., M. Huber, and M. Wiesenfarth (2015). The finite sample performance of semi-and
nonparametric estimators for treatment effects and policy evaluation. Discussion Paper 8756.
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn.
Greenberg, D. H. and P. K. Robins (2008). “Incorporating nonmarket time into benefit–cost
analyses of social programs: An application to the self-sufficiency project”. In: Journal of
Public Economics 92(3), pp. 766–794.
Hirano, K., G. W. Imbens, and G. Ridder (2003). “Efficient estimation of average treatment
effects using the estimated propensity score”. In: Econometrica 71(4), pp. 1161–1189.
Horvitz, D. G. and D. J. Thompson (1952). “A generalization of sampling without replacement
from a finite universe”. In: Journal of the American statistical Association 47(260), pp. 663–
685.
94
BIBLIOGRAPHY 95
Huber, M., M. Lechner, and C. Wunsch (2013). “The performance of estimators based on the
propensity score”. In: Journal of Econometrics 175(1), pp. 1–21.
Huber, M., M. Lechner, and C. Wunsch (2016). “The Effect of Firms Phased Retirement Policies
on the Labor Market Outcomes of Their Employees”. In: ILR Review, forthcoming.
Kleven, H. J. and C. T. Kreiner (2006). “The marginal cost of public funds: Hours of work versus
labor force participation”. In: Journal of Public Economics 90(10), pp. 1955–1973.
Lechner, M. and A. Strittmatter (2014). Practical Procedures to Deal with Common Support
Problems in Matching Estimation. Discussion Paper 1410. University of St. Gallen, School of
Economics and Political Science.
OECD.stat (2015). OECD.StatExtracts. URL: www.stats.oecd.org (visited on 02/04/2015).
Shao, J. (2003). “Impact of the bootstrap on sample surveys”. In: Statistical Science 18(2),
pp. 191–198.
Staubli, S. and J. Zweimüller (2013). “Does raising the early retirement age increase employment
of older workers?” In: Journal of public economics 108, pp. 17–32.
Vandenberghe, V., F. Waltenberg, and M. Rigo (2013). “Ageing and employability. Evidence
from Belgian firm-level data”. In: Journal of Productivity Analysis 40(1), pp. 111–136.
Vikström, J. (2014). IPW estimation and related estimators for evaluation of active labor market
policies in a dynamic setting. Working Paper 2014:1. IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour
Market and Education Policy.
Chapter 5
Should older workers be able to reduce
their working hours?
96

98 5. Should older workers be able to reduce their working hours?
5.1 Motivation
More flexible, shorter working weeks for older workers can help reduce some of the current
burdens posed by the ageing populations in many Western countries. Increasing the number
of active years is crucial, especially since many workers exit the labour market well before the
legal retirement age. This not only lengthens the inactive period, increasing the pension benefits
paid by society, it also reduces the contributions paid to the government. As not all workers
are willing or able to continue full-time work up to the normal retirement age, more flexible,
part-time working arrangements have the potential to solve this problem.
Flexibility in the form of reduced working hours can be introduced in many ways. Some
countries, mostly European countries such as Austria, Belgium, Germany, and Sweden, have
subsidised part-time schemes for older workers. Although the specificities differ greatly, in
general participants reduce their working hours and receive a partial compensation for their
income loss from the government. The main differences between these subsidised schemes are
the amount of working hours reductions, the income replacement rate and the age of earliest
entry. Other countries, such as the UK, US, and Australia, typically do not have country-wide
schemes but rather leave the initiative at the sectoral or firm level. Flexible working hours can be
encouraged, but in general much depends on workers’ bargaining power and firms’ willingness
to provide this flexibility. As a result, some workers are able to reduce their working hours with
their current employer, while others have to move to a different job to do so. Part-time jobs in
the latter case are also called “bridge jobs".
In this study we focus on working hours reductions with the same employer, as this improves
comparability between the subsidised old age part-time schemes and regular working hours
reductions (at the same job).1 Moreover, bridge jobs do not appear to be very common in
continental Europe compared to the US and Japan (Brunello and Langella, 2013). Additionally,
we focus on two aspects of reducing working hours at the end of the career, on the one hand
individual well-being and on the other hand effects of such gradual transitions on labour market
outcomes such as employment and unemployment. We do not focus on macro-economic effects
or productivity.
Whether policy initiatives regarding old age part-time work succeed depends on many factors,
1Bridge jobs are also situated in a very different setting, introducing additional factors such as potential effects
on the wage due to the job change itself, effects on human capital or hiring discrimination.
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not the least on the implicit incentives within the schemes and in the other old age institutions.
First, participants often do not participate for the same reasons policy makers would like them
to. Instead of aiming at longer careers, many workers want to reduce hours in order to spent
more time on care giving or to increase leisure time. Second, in many cases participants are
implicitly encouraged to exit early. For example, firms can use it as a way to get rid of older
employees, while the blocking option in some subsidised schemes are a disguised form of early
labour market exit. Last, incentives in other old age (early retirement) schemes counteract the
benefits of the reduced working hours, while some pension rules even make flexibility itself
difficult. Introducing shorter working weeks for older workers without taking the surrounding
policies into account will thus result in sub-optimal results.
5.2 Discussion
5.2.1 Barriers to Reduced Working Hours
Reduced working hours are not yet a possibility for all workers. There exist various barriers
that make it hard or even impossible for workers to reduce their hours or have hour flexibility in
general. First, formalised working hours reducing policies often impose eligibility conditions.
For eligible workers the schemes offer an easy transition from full-time to part-time work.
However, the imposed conditions are often too restrictive for workers with a weak labour market
attachment. As for example Gielen (2009) shows, this means that men and women have different
levels of access to flexible working hours. While eligible workers keep control over their working
hours, non-eligible workers are restricted to either continuing full-time work or quitting their job.
Second, firms (perhaps unknowingly) impose additional barriers to hours reductions. Examples
of this behaviour are: (1) not adapting the job tasks and general working conditions (Mooney
et al., 2002), (2) having few regular part-time workers and hence lacking the experience of
organising work in an environment of both full-time and part-time workers (Bloemen et al.,
2016; Hutchens and Grace-Martin, 2006), or (3) only granting hours reductions to a specific set
of workers. Hutchens (2010) shows that personal characteristics matter: older, better performing
workers (i.e. workers who require less supervision and make extra efforts to finish their tasks)
have a higher probability to get phased retirement. Workers who perform less well are thus more
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vulnerable to these additional barriers to working hours reductions.
Lastly, current institutionalised part-time schemes often contain perverse incentives that prevent
their successful implementation, such as the blocking possibility, pension benefit calculations,
and easy access to early retirement. Such incentives, discussed in more detail in the following
paragraphs, exist both within the scheme and in other (early) retirement policies. On the one
hand these perverse incentives could prevent some workers who are willing to reduce working
hours to do so. On the other hand many workers who would have stayed in full-time employment
without the part-time opportunity could be attracted.
(1) The first perverse incentive is the blocking possibility that exists for example in Germany
and Austria. Users of the blocking option continue to work full-time in the first phase of the
scheme and then reduce their working hours to zero in the second period. The blocking option is
perverse in the sense that its users do not have a part-time working period and de facto leave
the labour market early. Note that users of the blocking mechanism reduce their total number
of working hours by the same amount as someone who worked the entire period in a half-time
regime. Furthermore, the blocking mechanism can also have an artificially positive effect on
unemployment. Following Graf et al. (2011), this can be explained by the fact that the second
period is generally not considered as inactivity, workers are not working but still under contract.
Therefore measured unemployment does not increase when workers enter this second period.
(2) Second, pension regulations, related to pension benefit calculations or access to partial
retirement, form another barrier towards easy access to reduced working hours at an older age.
Some pension schemes calculate the pension benefit on the last wage (Even and Macpherson,
2004; Wadensjö, 2006). Naturally, this means that gradually reducing working hours before
retirement will have a considerable impact on future pension benefits. In many other pension
schemes it is not possible to combine pension benefits with income from work (Even and
Macpherson, 2004; Kantarci and Van Soest, 2008; Pagán, 2009). Hence, in countries where the
part-time wage is not complemented by an anticipated pension benefit (or in general, by any
benefit), such as in the US, this part-time income could be too low to sustain some households.
Related, as some firms do not allow partial work arrangements for (some of) their workers,
working hours reductions can only be obtained by changing employer. These employer changes
at later ages likely have adverse wage effects, as workers lose their firm specific human capital
(Even and Macpherson, 2004).
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(3) The third perverse incentive towards working hours reductions is the easy access to early
retirement in many countries (Chapter 3 of the dissertation and Bloemen et al., 2016). If the
incentives are such that retirement can be anticipated very early at favourable conditions, many
workers will choose this path rather than continuing to work (part-time). Reduced working hours
could be especially beneficial if those workers are attracted who would otherwise have left the
labour market. This is only possible if the incentives in the other (early) retirement schemes are
adjusted to this goal.
5.2.2 Theoretical Consideration Regarding Part-Time Work
Before we move to an overview of empirical findings on part-time work at an older age in
later sections we first provide a concise theoretical labour supply framework. Our discussion
is based on the static neoclassical model of labour-leisure choice (see also Chapter 1 in Cahuc
and Zylberberg (2004) or Chapter 2 in Borjas (2013)). In the model, individuals make decisions
based on preferences regarding leisure and consumption, both of which contribute to their utility.
They maximise their utility under a budget constraint. Note that this model is very stylised and
does not consider any macro-economic effects or effects on productivity. However, its stylised
nature allows us to give an intuitive introduction to several of the concepts discussed in our later
sections. We first show how hours-constrained individuals can increase their utility by being
able to work part-time. Then we introduce a subsidy for part-time work to our framework. We
demonstrate that this subsidy can encourage individuals to take up part-time work, but can also
provide more incentives to full-time workers to reduce their number of hours worked. For both
scenarios the final impact on labour supply depends on individual preferences, and can only be
estimated empirically.
In standard textbooks, it is assumed that employers are indifferent to the number of hours worked
by an individual. Workers could then freely choose the number of hours worked, given the
wage, their non-labour income, and their preferences regarding consumption and leisure (Graf
et al., 2011). However, in practice there can be barriers to part-time work, as we have shown in
the previous section. Suppose that because of these barriers workers can only choose between
working full-time and not working at all. Figure 5.1 depicts this baseline situation (ignore the
parts in blue for now). We put consumption on the vertical axis and leisure on the horizontal axis.
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The number of hours worked per week is then measured from right to left, with L0 zero hours
worked and L40 40 hours worked (a full-time job). Given the budget constraint through points A
and C, the individual will prefer not to work, as not working (point C) gives a higher level of
utility than working full-time (point A) in our setting.2 We could have drawn the indifference
curves with a different ordering (point A lying on a higher indifference curve than point C, as
shown in Figure 5.2). Which situation dominates is an empirical question and depends on the
preferences of the individuals. In general, the more flat the indifference curves are, the more the
individual prefers to work. Note that the current format in Figure 5.1 is in line with Böheim and
Taylor (2004), Charles and DeCicca (2007), and Gielen (2009), who find that hours-constrained
older workers are more likely than their unconstrained peers to leave the labour market, likely
related to more steep indifference curves at a later age due to changed preferences.
Figure 5.1: Decision to work part-time with and without hours constraints
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Given the worker’s preference for part-time work -here assumed as working 20 hours per
week- he or she would prefer to work L20 hours, given by point B. Lowering the working hours
2Note that we implicitly assume that when an individual does not work, he or she does not receive unemployment
benefits. Graphically, this boils down to a lower “non-labour income" as soon as the individual works a positive
number of hours.
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constraints, the individual would experience an increase in utility, as point B is situated at a higher
indifference curve than point C.3 Less hours constraints, either by increasing firms’ willingness
to provide part-time work opportunities or by introducing a subsidised old age part-time scheme,
could thus decrease the number of labour market exits and hence lead to more labour supply of
older workers (Graf et al., 2011). However, as we mentioned earlier, by reversing the ordering of
the indifference curves (A > C) individuals would move from full-time work to part-time work.
From the viewpoint of the individual both transitions are utility-enhancing. However, from a
policy perspective the first scenario (from not working to working part-time) is more appealing,
as it constitutes an increase in labour supply.4 Which effect dominates is however an empirical
question (Graf et al., 2011), which we review in the section on effects of old age part-time work
on labour market outcomes.
In several countries older workers are encouraged to reduce working hours through subsidised
part-time schemes. Participants in these schemes receive either a lump sum subsidy or a subsidy
relative to their previous full-time wage (cf. Table 3.2 in Chapter 3). As reduced working hours
are usually accompanied by a reduction in labour income the subsidies can compensate for
this income loss, although they normally do not cover the full wage loss (cf. Chapter 3 of the
dissertation). In Figure 5.2 we show a similar setting to the previous scenario above (ignore the
parts in yellow and blue for now). The main difference is that under hours constraints the worker
now chooses full-time work (point A), as we are focussing on a scenario where those workers
can enter a subsidised old age part-time scheme at some point.5 If the hours constraints would
be abolished (blue), the worker would not reduce his or her working hours, as this would imply a
utility loss (point B lies on a lower utility curve than point A).
We can now introduce a subsidy for part-time work to this scenario. In line with existing
subsidised old age part-time schemes the subsidy is only available to workers who reduce their
working hours. As a result the budget constraint is only affected for those individuals. We
assume that part-time work is only possible at a half-time basis (L20), which is again in line
3Having the option to work part-time per se could increase utility as well, as Calvo et al. (2009) and De Vaus
et al. (2007) find that having control over your career path and moment of retirement is key. Note that this implies
that while some workers will choose to reduce their working hours, others will opt not to work or to work full-time.
Note that this is not depicted in the figure.
4Note that total labour supply (in number of hours worked) could also increase in the second scenario, if the
individual would continue to work part-time much longer than he or she would have worked full-time.
5The reverse scenario is also possible here, and would lead to similar results. However, as most subsidised
schemes are exclusively for workers who reduce their working hours we focus on that scenario in Figure 5.2.
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Figure 5.2: Decision to work part-time, lump sum subsidy for part-time work
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with how many old age part-time schemes function (cf. Table 3.2 in Chapter 3). In this case
the budget constraint only shifts upwards for individuals at point B. Note that in this scenario
it does not matter whether the subsidy is lump sum or relative to the previous full-time wage.
If the subsidy is sufficiently high, the budget constraint will shift to some point D above the
indifference curve through point A. Due to the subsidy the individual can obtain a higher level of
utility than when working full-time (yellow). The subsidy might thus encourage individuals to
transition to part-time work. As already mentioned above, the effect of this transition on total
lifetime labour supply can not be measured in this simple static framework.6
Note that when we would introduce the subsidy in our framework of Figure 5.1, this would not
change the decision to work part-time as the worker already prefers to work part-time. While the
worker would be better off due to the subsidy, the government would be spending the subsidy
6Although we did not include this in our analysis, in principle it would be possible to look at intertemporal
labour supply as well, where we put the present value of consumption and number of years worked at the axes. The
analysis would need strong assumptions to remain in our stylised framework, such as perfect substitutability of
leisure over time, or that consumption in year t has the same value as the discounted value of consumption in year
t +1.
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inefficiently. In Figure 5.7 in Appendix A we depict an additional situation, similar to the
baseline model in Figure 5.1, but where individuals have steeper indifference curves related to
a higher preference for leisure (and thus C > A). In that scenario, a sufficiently high subsidy is
needed to convince workers to work part-time instead of not participating in the labour market.
Again, which scenario dominates is an empirical question and depends on the distribution of
preferences within the population.
5.2.3 Motives to Transition to Part-Time Work at an Older Age
Older workers can have a large variety of motives to transition to part-time work. In this section
we take a closer look at these motives. These reasons can be linked to, among others, obligations
within the family (care giving), personal health, working longer, or not finding a full-time job. As
this list shows, the source of the motive can be linked to the individual or to external factors, and
can be voluntary as well as involuntary. Most factors come from the supply side, while the last
(not finding a full-time job) has an important demand side aspect, as firms could have a variety
of motives to push some of their older full-time workers into part-time work. Figure 5.3 shows
the main reasons for part-time employment of individuals aged 50-64 in the EU-15 and Belgium
in 2012 (source: Eurostat Labour Force Survey). Below we discuss each of these categories in
more detail.
First, a better work-family life balance appears to be an important driver of part-time work,
which can be derived from the variables linked to care giving to relatives or other responsibilities
in the family. For the EU-15 this factor accounts for 35% of the reasons to work part-time at
an older age and even 42% for Belgian part-time workers. This factor is important for men
as well as women, although women appear to cite it more than men.7 Mooney et al. (2002)
moreover note that in their study for the UK, care giving of women was more intensive than
that of men, as women provided more hours of care or had more care giving responsibilities.
Part-time employment provides individuals with a more flexible option to take care of a relative
than combining full-time work with care giving (Mooney et al., 2002). Moreover, as some of
these older workers are the primary care giver, without the possibility to reduce hours they might
be forced to leave the labour market altogether.
722.2% of men in the EU-15 and 38.4% in Belgium state care giving as a reason to work part-time at an older
age, compared to 35.9% of women in the EU-15 and 44.1% in Belgium.
106 5. Should older workers be able to reduce their working hours?
Figure 5.3: Main reasons for part-time employment among workers aged 50-64 (percentage)
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Author calculations based on EU Labour Force Statistics variable “Main reason for part-time employment" for 2012. Total
number of individuals aged 50-64 (men + women). Source: Eurostat, extracted on July 10, 2016 from http://ec.europa.eu/
eurostat/data/database.
Second, a non-negligible number of older workers cites own illness or disability as a driver of
part-time employment. As workers age, declining health might lead to a lower work capacity.
This could limit their ability to continue their current job on a full-time scale. Part-time work
could then offer a means to continue working while lowering the pressure of working (too much)
on the health of these older workers (Gannon and Roberts, 2011; Kim and DeVaney, 2005;
Mooney et al., 2002; Wadensjö, 2006). Additionally, note that many older disabled workers use
part-time employment to improve the balance between their health needs and work (Schur, 2003;
Pagán, 2009). Moreover, Schur (2003) find that work places are catering more to workers with
disabilities, further increasing the incidence of part-time work among people with disabilities.
Finally, note that health can also be influenced as a result of part-time work. For a discussion of
the empirical results, see the discussion in the section on the effects of old age part-time work on
health outcomes.
Third, training and education are almost absent as driver for part-time work at older ages, as they
account for less than 0.5% of all responses among 50 to 64 year old part-time workers. Training
is more often cited by younger workers (4.5% of 25 to 49 year old part-time workers).
Fourth, for both the EU-15 and Belgium there is a big rest category, comprising other drivers of
part-time employment at older ages. One possible motive within the rest category, which can
also comprise some of the drivers above, is the need for part-time work to extend the career.
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16.2% of employed persons in the EU15 and 13.6% in Belgium state that more flexible working
hours would allow them to stay employed longer.8 Likewise, Hermansen (2015) refer to several
Norwegian studies which also find that many older workers emphasise that working hours
reductions are a decisive factor in the decision to continue working. The descriptive evidence
in Vendramin and Valenduc (2014) points in the same direction. They find that there is a much
higher share of workers who have reduced their working hours prior to full retirement among
individuals who are still working after age 60 than among those who had already left the labour
market at that age. In the section on effects of old age part-time work on labour market outcome
we discuss whether working hours reductions indeed contribute to longer careers or not.
It should be noted that working part-time to extend the career also depends on financial wealth
of the individual and the household. In general, survey evidence indicates that working time
reductions are taken by individuals with more income or wealth. In our labour supply model in
Section 5.2.2, an increase in non-labour income would result in an income effect, shifting the
budget curve upwards. Because of the increase in financial wealth, individuals need to work
less hours to obtain the consumption-leisure bundle they prefer and as such they will be inclined
to work less hours (if leisure is a normal good). As Eurobarometer (2012) shows, especially
better off individuals (in terms of being able to pay the bills) favour the combination of part-time
work and a partial pension compared to full retirement. Chen and Scott (2006) find for the US
that phased retirees (i.e. older workers who reduce their working hours with the same employer)
have greater household wealth and income. Salonen and Takala (2011) find that individuals
with a part-time pension have 30% higher pre-retirement income levels than other individuals.
One of the reasons that less well off older individuals have less working hours reductions is
thus linked to financial reasons. The drop in labour income due to the move from full-time to
part-time work might be too severe for some individuals. However, this might be compensated
by measures in several schemes (see also Table 3.2 in Chapter 3). By giving workers a higher
percentage of their previous (full-time) labour income than their remaining share of working
hours, workers with lower earnings might be able to “afford" the working hours reduction.9
8Percentage based on own calculations on the Eurostat Labour Force Survey question “Number of employed
persons who would stay longer at work (or not) if more flexible working time arrangements were available" for
2006.
9The effect of this subsidy is similar to the discussion on high-income workers. Due to the subsidy workers
experience a positive income effect, which shifts their budget constraints upwards and allows workers to reduce
their working hours and still obtain the consumption-leisure bundle they desire.
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For example, in the Belgian scheme participating workers receive a top-up subsidy from the
government and moreover generate pension rights and career years as if they were working
full-time. Given that the top-up is a lump-sum payment, it could be more beneficial to lower
wage workers (cf. Chapter 3 of the dissertation). Similarly, in the German old age part-time
scheme retirees received at least 70% of their pre-partial retirement earnings and accumulated
pension benefits at 90% of full-time workers (Berg et al., 2015; Huber et al., 2016).
Another motive for older workers to transition to part-time work before full retirement could be
that they experience a shift in their taste for leisure over time. This corresponds to a more gradual
evolution of the working hours over the career (Drago et al., 2009; Gielen, 2009; Machado and
Portela, 2014). While this change in preferences could be linked to any of the motives above, it
could also be that the individual prefers a gradual reduction of working hours per se, favouring
smooth transitions over abrupt changes. In our labour supply model of Section 5.2.2 this shift in
preferences could for example correspond to a shift of the indifference curves as in Figure 5.2
(favouring full-time work), to a situation as in Figure 5.1 (favouring part-time work) or even as
in Figure 5.7 in Appendix A (favouring no work).
Lastly, some workers could also work part-time at an older age without an explicit motive as the
ones mentioned above. They could be forced to reduce their working hours for lack of a full-time
job. Alternatively, employers could try to push some of their full-time workers into part-time
work for various reasons, such as the relatively high labour costs of older workers, or to avoid
the costs of lay-offs or early retirement buyouts (Ghent et al., 2001). Older workers’ presence in
part-time work could then be interpreted as a preference for work, avoiding non-employment
as their most preferred option (full-time work) was not available. This situation corresponds to
Figure 5.2 (ignore the parts in yellow). In case the individual would not be able to reach point A,
he or she would work part-time as this results in a higher level of utility (B >C).
5.2.4 Descriptive evidence on worker preferences for old age part-time
work
Survey evidence suggests that a substantial number of older workers prefer to gradually reduce
their working hours as they age, rather than moving directly from full-time work to retirement.
Not surprisingly, many older workers do so. This can be seen in Figure 5.4, which depicts
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the share of workers in part-time employment relative to the total number of workers for all
EU-15 countries, by age and gender. This share is always larger for women than for men,
and mostly so for older workers (aged 50-64) than for younger workers (aged 25-49). The
higher share of part-time employment among women is likely related to the more intensive
care giving responsibilities relative to those of men (see among others Mooney et al., 2002;
Gielen, 2009; Been and van Vliet, 2014). The higher share of part-time employment among
older workers might suggest that part-time work is used as a way to reduce time worked prior to
retirement (Vendramin and Valenduc, 2014). While these general patterns are clear, there are
large differences between the countries. One potential cause are differences in barriers towards
working hours reductions between the various countries, as discussed above.
Figure 5.4: Incidence of part-time employment as percentage of total employment, by gender
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Author calculations based on EU Labour Force Statistics variable “Part-time employment as percentage of the total employment,
by sex and age" for 2015. Source: Eurostat, extracted on August 11, 2016 from http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/
database.
Based on data from the European Working Conditions Survey, Vandenbrande et al. (2013) find
that 26% of the employees aged at least 50 would like to reduce their working hours. Next,
Eurostat’s Labour Force Survey (LFS) database allows us to look at the number of full-time
employed persons who reduce their working hours in a move to full retirement, or plan to do
so. In the EU-15, 11.5% of those workers aged 50-59 would do so or have already done so. In
Belgium, this number is slightly higher, at 13.5%. When we consider full-time workers aged
60-69 the numbers are considerably higher, with 24.2% (47.6%) of EU-15 (Belgian) workers
planning to reduce their working hours or having effectively done so. Lastly, the LEVO dataset
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of 201510 shows that among salaried workers aged at least 50, 20,1% would like to reduce their
working time, and this on average 25.5%. Note that this desire is stronger among older (mainly)
part-time salaried workers. The stronger desire among older workers is also present in the LFS
data.
Finally, it should be noted that most older workers working part-time do so on a voluntary basis.
In Figure 5.3 we see that in the EU-15 less than a quarter of the individuals in old age part-time
employment state that they work in this regime for lack of a full-time alternative. For Belgium
this share is much lower (4.4%). We investigate this matter further in Figure 5.5, which shows the
fraction of part-time workers that is working involuntarily in part-time work by age and gender
(note that this is for a different year - 2015). In line with our discussion above, the fraction
of older workers (aged 50-64) that works part-time without wanting to is usually very small.
Moreover, it is almost always below that of the workers at prime working age (ages 25-49),
which suggests that especially older workers reduce their working hours because they want to,
and not because they have to. This is positive, as De Vaus et al. (2007) and Calvo et al. (2009)
show that it is crucial for workers to have control over their working hours and labour market
transitions. The figure can also explain why the EU-15 average differs so much from the Belgian
share. In southern European countries there is a high frequency of involuntary part-time workers,
both among younger and older workers. As the data cover 2015, this is likely due to the adverse
economic state of those economies and the lack of sufficient full-time jobs. This is confirmed
by looking at earlier data points. From 2004 to 2015, the average share of involuntary old age
part-time workers rose from 14.2% to 24.8% in the EU-15. For Italy (29.9 to 60.0%), Greece
(32.7 to 60.3%) and especially Spain (12.2 to 60.1%) the increase has been even more dramatic.
5.2.5 Effects of working fewer hours on labour market outcomes
There is mixed causal evidence on the effects of working hours reductions at older ages on
labour market outcomes. This is especially the case for the institutionalised schemes. A possible
explanation for this finding is the large variety of schemes, with different aims and incentives.
Countries with formalised schemes have received most attention in the literature, so more can be
10LEVO is a dataset based on yearly surveys in Flanders (Belgium), focusing on the measurement of subjective
well-being and its determinants. The data is collected by quota sampling (quota for life situation, gender and
educational level in 2015) and then weighted to reflect the Flemish population (using Labour Force Survey
information from the previous year).
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Figure 5.5: Involuntary part-time employment as percentage of total part-time employment, by gender
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Author calculations based on EU Labour Force Statistics variable “Involuntary part-time employment as percentage of the total
part-time employment" for 2015. Luxembourg excluded due to unavailability of data. Source: Eurostat, extracted on July 10,
2016 from http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database.
said on the various labour market outcomes there. For the other countries, only the effects of
working hours reductions on career length and age of exit have been studied intensively. For an
overview of the main studies that evaluate the effects of working hours reductions at older ages
on labour market outcomes, see Appendix B. In general it appears that the effects of participation
are very sensitive to incentives within and outside of the schemes. This has a big impact on
who reduces his or her working hours: those taking it as a means to adapt their career in order
to continue work (i.e. those who would have retired otherwise)11, or those who see it as an
anticipated early retirement scheme (i.e. those who would have continued working full-time
without the scheme).
The effects on the extensive margin or, in other words, on career length and the timing of exit,
are qualitatively different for the institutionalised schemes than for non-institutionalised working
hours reductions. For the former, there is no uniform causal evidence, although the majority
of studies finds no or negative effects of reducing working hours on the effective age of exit
from the labour market. First, while Berg et al. (2015) find that participants in the German old
age part-time (OAPT) scheme have longer careers, Huber et al. (2016) find no effect on time
spent out of the labour force for this same scheme for East Germany and a negative effect for
West Germany. Note that the two German studies should not be compared as such, given their
11Note that this can also include workers who start a part-time job for care taking reasons. Without the possibility
of working part-time these workers could have left the labour market.
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different approach and sample (cf. Appendix B). However, the more negative effects in Huber
et al. (2016) might be related to the fact that they focus on a period with more intensive use of
the block model. As Berg et al. (2015) and Graf et al. (2011) show, this block model seems to
lead to worse results. Berg et al. (2015) distinguish a period of more intensive use of the block
model and a period in which it was less used. Although their results for both periods indicate
positive effects on career length, they find that this effect was considerably smaller in the period
with more intensive use of the block model (they consider the second “inactive" phase of the
block model not as employment). The worse results for the type of scheme in which workers
do not effectively reduce their working hours and rather completely stop working in the second
phase could indicate that this type of scheme is used to some extent by workers as a means to
leave employment earlier than when they would have worked part-time for the full period of
OAPT participation.
Graf et al. (2011) for Austria and our own study for Belgium in Chapter 3 of the dissertation
find negative effects on career length. Both studies find that participants are more attached
to employment in the first years after entering the scheme, as opposed to those who did not
participate in the scheme. However, after some years this completely changes. This can also
be seen in Figure 5.6, which shows the evolution of the effect on survival in employment of
participation in the Belgian OAPT scheme for men and women. For Austria the evolution is
qualitatively the same. In Chapter 3 of the dissertation we offer a potential explanation for
the particular evolution of the effect. Initially, participants in the OAPT scheme who have
not yet reached the early retirement age have the incentive to remain at work, as they keep
accumulating full-time pension rights.12 Moreover, in the absence of the part-time work option
some participants in the scheme would likely have completely stopped working to improve
their work-life balance (Gielen, 2009; Van Looy et al., 2014). However, by working part-time
individuals may decrease labour market attachment and/or signal to employers a preference for
early retirement (Chapter 3 of the dissertation and Machado and Portela, 2014) As such, once
they reach the early retirement age, transferring towards early retirement becomes relatively
attractive compared to non-participants. When OAPT participants enter statutory early retirement
they keep accumulating pension benefits of a full-time worker. Hence their replacement income
12This feature also exists in the German OAPT scheme, where OAPT participants accrue at least 90% of the
pension benefits obtained under full-time work (Berg et al., 2015, p. 6).
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is relatively higher than for non-participating full-time workers, as the former move from a
part-time income to pension benefits instead of from a full-time income, while accumulating
the same full-time based pension benefits. The more favourable long run employment survival
effects for women that can also be found in Graf et al. (2011) can then likely be explained by
lower opportunities to enter early retirement for women. See Appendix B for a more thorough
discussion. At least for the schemes in their format discussed above, it appears that participants
use them as a way to accelerate their transition to early retirement. Note that this is not necessarily
due to initial preferences but can also have been induced by changing incentives over time as
explained above.
Figure 5.6: Survival in employment - average treatment effect on the treated - Belgium, by gender
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Author calculations based on the “eligible-Vikström" line in Figure 3.2 of Chapter 3 of the dissertation. CI denotes 95% confi-
dence interval.
The effects for regular working hours reductions are more aligned. Gielen (2009) shows for
the UK that over-employed workers (i.e. workers who would prefer to reduce their number of
working hours and can thus be considered as hours-constrained) exit up to 12 months earlier
than their non-hours-constrained counterparts. Being able to reduce your working hours might
thus lead to longer careers. Most other studies on regular working hours reductions, such as
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Drago et al. (2009) and Been and van Vliet (2014), come to the same conclusion. As it is in
general harder to reduce working hours without a formalised scheme, this result is perhaps to be
expected, because part-time work might less easily be chosen by those who see it as an early
retirement opportunity. 13This result is corroborated by the finding that general working hours
reductions work especially well to extend careers if the reductions are voluntary (see De Vaus
et al. (2007) and Calvo et al. (2009) above).
At the intensive margin, i.e. regarding the total number of working hours, there is only evidence
for the institutionalised schemes. The results generally complement the findings at the extensive
margin. This should not be surprising for the schemes with negative effects on career length.
For such schemes there will, by definition, be a negative effect on total labour supply. Graf
et al. (2011) find for example for Austria that abolishing the national scheme in its current form
would lead to an increase in full-time equivalent employment of 1.5pp. However, the statement
is not necessarily true in the other direction. The career has to be extended sufficiently long in
order to have a positive effect on total working hours. For example, if a full-time worker at 60
would continue to work full-time until 61 before retiring (so without a reduction in working
hours), that same worker would have to work at least until age 62 at a half-time basis in order to
work as many hours. For Germany, Berg et al. (2015) find increased lifetime working hours for
men, implying that the positive effect on career length discussed above is sufficiently large to
compensate for the lower working hours.
Also for Germany, Huber et al. (2016) find positive effects on the time spent employed, but only
for East Germany. Note that this effect is obtained by considering the time spent in employment
and unemployment (which are both “active" periods, where workers are part of the labour force)
and not working hours as such. For East Germany, the authors find a shift of the composition
in the time spent in the labour force due to the OAPT scheme. Treated workers spent more
time employed (+7 months) and less time unemployed (-6 months). For West Germany the
decrease in the time spent in unemployment (-4 to 5 months) is not compensated by the small
and insignificant increase in the time spent in employment, leading to the negative effect on
career length discussed above. The regional difference is attributed, like in Machado and Portela
(2014), to differences in labour market conditions. Undesired effects seem to be more likely
13Note that working hours reductions outside a formalised scheme might not be accompanied by the favourable
pension assimilation met in several institutionalised OAPT schemes (i.e. working part-time but generating full-time
pension rights).
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when an economy works well and when earnings and pension wealth accumulations are good,
such as in West Germany.
Evidence on other outcomes, such as earnings, unemployment or government budget is limited.
Moreover, it is only available for countries with institutionalised old age part-time schemes.
First, Huber et al. (2016) find positive effects on cumulated labour earnings in both regions of
Germany. For East Germany this can be explained by the clear positive effect on employment
discussed above. The authors link the positive effect for West Germany to the considerably
higher labour earnings in that region. Second, the few studies that look at unemployment find
positive effects on this outcome (Graf et al., 2011; Huber et al., 2016). This is not very surprising,
as unemployment is potentially reduced twofold: once because people in part-time employment
are employed (longer), and hence spend less time in unemployment, and once because some of
the hours lost because of the part-time work are given to unemployed people. In some countries
or schemes, such as the German scheme studied by Huber et al. (2016), this is even mandatory.
Note that the unemployment effect might be estimated overly optimistic in schemes with a
blocking component. As the second blocking period, in which the worker is basically inactive, is
seen as employment, it is not considered in those analyses. Lastly, effects on the government
budget are in line with the effects on the intensive and extensive margin of employment, with
Berg et al. (2015) and Huber et al. (2016) finding favourable effects, and Graf et al. (2011)
and our own findings in Chapter 3 of the dissertation finding negative effects. Working hours
reducing schemes that lead to longer careers and/or a higher lifetime labour supply accumulate
more tax revenues and less (pension) benefits. Hence they result in a net positive effect on the
government budget, while the opposite is true for schemes with a negative effect on employment.
When there is a subsidy for part-time workers, there is more pressure on the government budget.
5.2.6 Effects of working fewer hours on individual well-being
Reducing full-time working hours at an older age can help to increase individual well-being,
for example through a better health, less stress, or more happiness. These effects can be due to
the reduced workload itself, but can also be linked to an increase in leisure time. Moreover, if
working hours reductions at the end of the career were not previously available to the worker, their
introduction could have an indirect positive well-being effect as the worker gains more control
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over his or her career path. The empirical studies on this aspect of working hours reductions
thereby complement the intuitive setting of our theoretical exposition above. Although the
empirical literature on the effects of working hours reductions at an older age on well-being is
limited, there are several studies that should be mentioned here.
First, Ahn (2015) focuses on the causal effect of working hours reductions on health-related
behaviour such as smoking and exercising. Using detailed survey information on a representative
sample of urban South-Korean households, the author selects workers with long working hours
who reduce their working hours (note that this study thus focusses on working hours reductions
and not on a subsidised part-time scheme). The effects of a reduction in working hours on
health-related behaviour are estimated with a fixed effect instrumental variable approach. More
specifically, the exogenous variation in the time when the policy was implemented is used as an
instrument for working hours. A first finding is that the working hours reduction induces older
workers to exercise more. The author attributes this to the increased leisure time that can be
allocated to this activity. Second, the author finds a negative effect of reduced working hours on
cigarette consumption. Finally, while younger workers drink more as a result of the reduction in
working hours, older workers apparently do not change their drinking behaviour. Overall, these
results indicate a positive effect of working hours reductions on health-related behaviour for
older workers.
Second, Nikolova and Graham (2014) study the relationship between well-being and labour
market status. They consider annual survey data from the Gallup World Poll for a selection of
European countries and the US. In their estimations, they compare individuals in different labour
market states (such as full-time and part-time employment, retirement, and self-employment)
using one-to-one nearest neighbour matching with a maximum distance between the propensity
scores of 0.001. Their propensity score matching procedure could reduce issues regarding
self-selection and endogeneity, but it should be noted that the number of covariates used is
rather low.14 First, in comparison to other employees they find a positive effect of voluntary
part-time work on happiness, stress, anger, and job satisfaction. They also find that voluntary
employees (full-time or part-time) have higher levels of well-being than retirees. Involuntary
employment on the other hand did not lead to more well-being than retirees. Their results thus
14They use age, gender, marital status, an interaction term for marriage and gender, education, religiosity, country,
and year as covariates (Nikolova and Graham, 2014).
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seem to indicate that voluntary employment -especially flexible part-time work arrangements-
could have beneficial effects on well-being.
Two further studies consider the level of control workers have over their retirement decision.
They come with similar results on well-being. First, De Vaus et al. (2007) study whether gradual
retirement (a reduction of working hours) leads to a higher level of well-being than abrupt
retirement, and how these results are influenced by the level of control individuals have over
their career paths.15 While they find that the type of retirement path does not affect well-being,
the sense of control over the retirement path and the timing appears to be crucial. In other words,
the actual transition is less important for well-being than the ability to choose the type and the
timing of this transition.
Calvo et al. (2009) come to the same conclusion in their study on US data from the Health and
Retirement Study. Their sample consists of individuals for whom they could observe a transition
from work to retirement. They study whether there is a difference in the change of their happiness
indicators between gradual and abrupt retirement, and whether the sense of control has an impact
on these happiness indicators.16 In line with De Vaus et al. (2007) they find that while there does
not appear to be a difference between the effect of gradual versus abrupt retirement, the sense
of control workers have over their retirement transition is key. It should be noted though that
their initial sample could suffer from selection bias. They select workers who transition from
full employment to full retirement, possibly through gradual retirement. As such, workers with a
more incidental career (sickness, disability), appear to be left out. Nevertheless, both De Vaus
et al. (2007) and Calvo et al. (2009) appear to find that individual well-being is affected more by
the possibility to choose the career path than the career path itself.
5.3 Limitations and Gaps
Given the plethora of working hours reducing schemes, each in their unique institutional setting,
it is hard to come up with one formulation of an ideal old age part-time scheme. Rather, policy
makers must take the setting in their country into account and adapt the scheme accordingly.
15The authors estimate hierarchical ordinary least-squares multivariate regression models for each outcome, where
they evaluate the impact of the retirement path or the sense of control over this path on well-being in retirement.
16The effect of the type of retirement on the change in happiness is estimated with an ordered logit model. The
authors thus incorporate the panel nature of their dataset. Likewise, they also consider the effect of the sense of
control workers have over their retirement transition.
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Ideally, this is done by having some general idea of which incentives matter most. However,
more research is needed to correctly assess this, especially for the non-institutionalised schemes.
A first limitation is the relatively small number of studies that deal with endogeneity issues when
it comes to evaluating the effects of reduced working hours on labour market outcomes. The
main studies that do so are listed in Appendix B. One potential endogeneity issue is for example
that, instead of a positive effect of working hours reductions on the age of exit from employment,
it may well be that the reductions are taken by workers who would have continued to work
longer than their non-participating counterparts even without the policy. Likewise, it may well
be that the reductions are mainly taken by happier and better-off workers to begin with, putting a
potential positive well-being effect in a different perspective. Being able to control for this is key
to understand which factors matter to determine the effects of working hours reductions at the
end of the career.
Another limitation is related to the availability and quality of the data. First, some datasets only
contain partial information on hours worked or well-being. While limited information on the
amount of working hours still allows to look at the extensive margin, it is no longer possible to
study effects at the intensive margin. Second, to assess the effects of old age part-time work
on individual well-being, studies often use self-reported stated preference data, for example in
vignette studies. On the one hand these studies have the advantage that they allow to study the
effects of schemes that cannot be evaluated using more traditional ex-post evaluations, either
because the schemes do not exist, still have to be implemented, or because workers do not have
access to these schemes (yet). On the other hand, it is unclear to what extent stated preferences
are predictive of actual behaviour.
Next, it should be clear that as some of the institutionalised schemes are not open to all workers,
the results are not necessarily representative for the entire population of older workers. Addi-
tionally, the studies discussed here only consider a selective number of mostly well-developed
European and Anglo-Saxon countries. It is unclear whether our results would hold for other, less
developed, countries. However, the study of Huber et al. (2016) could give us some indication of
the direction of the effect, as they find more favourable effects on employment for the poorer
Eastern part of Germany than for the richer Western part.
Lastly, in our study we only focus on a specific set of effects, such as well-being and employment.
This does by no means imply that there cannot be any other effects. Most notably, we do not zoom
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in on the macro-economic effects of reduced working hours or their effects on productivity. Such
topics definitely merit a more in-depth discussion but are not included in this paper, although
they could definitely serve as an avenue for future research.
5.4 Summary and Policy Advice
Working hours reductions towards the end of the career can be an important tool to alleviate some
of the unwanted effects of an ageing society. While it will not solve all problems, it has potential
to limit the early exit of many older workers, simultaneously improving their well-being. This
policy initiative meets worker preferences, as a substantial number of workers have a preference
to work fewer hours as they age (see Section 5.2.4). However, as not everyone wants or needs
this, policy makers should investigate other possible solutions to the early exit problem.
Flexible working hour arrangements for older workers are not always able to provide beneficial
effects to the individual workers and society as a whole, as the discussion in Section 5.2.1 shows.
Several factors play a key role in their success. First, there are still important barriers to entry for
many workers, ranging from stringent eligibility conditions and restrictive pension regulations to
competition from early retirement schemes. If many workers are unable to enter (easily) into
part-time work, participation will be limited to a selective group of workers. Second, perverse
incentives, embedded in other old age schemes or in the working hour scheme itself, could lead
to unwanted effects. If they are strong enough, they could lead to adverse selection, attracting
workers who would have stayed in full-time employment without the scheme. Lastly, much
depends on the level of control individual workers have over their career trajectory. Research
mentioned in Section 5.2.6 suggests that voluntary part-time workers do better in terms of
well-being and exit later than their involuntary counterparts.
The results in Section 5.2.5 suggest that especially non-formalised working hours reductions
seem to lead to longer careers. For the institutionalised schemes, evidence from Austria, Belgium,
and Germany shows that there is potential for positive employment effects. However, those
studies also show that incentives in -among others- early retirement schemes play an important
role. When workers are (implicitly) incentivised financially to leave the labour force prematurely,
they appear to do so. It is thus important for policy makers to ensure that workers who gradually
reduce their working hours before retirement receive incentives to remain in the labour market.
120 5. Should older workers be able to reduce their working hours?
Concerning well-being, the empirical evidence appears to point in the same direction, namely
that workers not only benefit from working part-time, but also from having the choice to do so
(Section 5.2.6).
These findings suggest some general guidelines for policy makers interested in working hours
reductions at older ages. First, workers should have a (limited) set of realistic choices, giving
them control over their career planning and selecting a path that is suited best to them. This
implies lower barriers to reduced hours, without limiting the possibility to continue full-time
work. Second, policy makers should ask themselves how the old age part-time work possibility
can be best achieved: via a formal scheme as in for example Austria, Belgium or Germany, or
via more flexibility in working hours as in for example the UK. As our stylised theoretical model
in Section 5.2.2 shows, much depends on which type of workers there are. If many older workers
are intrinsically motivated to reduce working hours at the end of their career, increased flexibility
might be sufficient (such as in Figure 5.1). Conversely, if older workers rather not work part-time
(due to preferences or financial reasons), a subsidy for part-time work might activate them (such
as in Figure 5.2 or Figure 5.7 in Appendix A). Third, whichever option is chosen, it is key to
make sure that a holistic approach is followed, taking other institutions and (early) retirement
schemes into account. The incentives should be such that participants are those workers who,
without the scheme, would have retired, instead of those who would have continued full-time
work.
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5.A Additional graphical representation of static labour sup-
ply model
Figure 5.7: Decision to work part-time - lump sum subsidy for part-time work with steep indifference
curves
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5.B Overview main studies with labour market outcomes
In the list below we shortly discuss the most important studies we consider in our discussion of
the effects of working hours reductions on labour market outcomes (e.g. employment, unem-
ployment). All studies consider the causal impact of reduced or more flexible working hours on
several labour market outcomes, be it through a move to non-institutionalised part-time work or
through an institutionalised “old age part-time (OAPT) scheme". As can be seen in the list, most
studies evaluate the latter type of schemes. An overview of the main OAPT schemes in Europe
can be found in Table 3.2 in Chapter 3.
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Gielen (2009) “Working hours flexibility and older workers labor supply”
Gielen (2009) studies labour market transitions of hours-constrained older workers, i.e.
workers who would prefer to reduce their number of working hours and are thus “over-
employed". To do so she looks at individuals aged between 50 and the statutory retirement
age of 65 for men and 60 for women, who are employed at age 50. She models their
employment durations with a discrete time competing risk model, with corrections for left
and right censoring, and then estimates it with a non-parametric mass points approach to
account for unobserved components.
She finds that in contrast to over-employed women, over-employed men do not appear to
be hours constrained. They can reduce their working hours with their employer before
transitioning to retirement. The author mentions two potential sources of this difference,
either men have more bargaining power against their employer or they are less hours
constrained, having a small difference between actual and desired hours. Of course other
reasons are also possible, such as mentioned below in the discussion of Berg et al. (2015).
As they are not hours-constrained, over-employed men do not exit employment later or
earlier than under-employed men. However, over-employed women exit employment
up to twelve months earlier than non-over-employed women. This suggests that hours
constraints only affect the retirement decision of those workers who are unable to change
their working hours. Consequently, more working hour flexibility has the potential to limit
early exit for some older workers.
Graf et al. (2011) “Labor supply effects of a subsidized old-age part-time scheme in
Austria”
Graf et al. (2011) study the Austrian OAPT scheme based on the conditional independence
assumption using propensity score methods (see e.g. Imbens and Wooldridge (2009)).
Their treated group consists of workers who participated in the OAPT scheme between
2000 and 2003. These individuals are compared to a control group, to whom a hypothetical
start date was assigned following the simulation procedure in Wunsch and Lechner (2008).
They find that OAPT participants are on average employed 30 days more than non-
participants during each of the first two years after entrance. However, this reverses in the
fourth and fifth year when male (female) OAPT participants are employed by about 50
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(35) days less than non-participants, and leads to a cumulatively negative effect over the
full five year period. Additionally, as OAPT participants work part-time, their full-time
equivalent time worked decreased by 26 (23) percentage points for men (women) over
the five year period. Nevertheless, male (female) OAPT participants spent on average 37
(43) days less in unemployment during this period. The reason is that participants were
spending time in the inactive phase of the “block model" instead and did not have to be
made redundant.17
Chapter 2 of this Dissertation, “Working Time Reductions at the End of the Career:
Do They Prolong the Time Spent in Employment?"
In Chapter 2 of this dissertation evaluates the effect of the Belgian OAPT scheme on
survival in employment. We compare eligible individuals older than 50 who started
participation in the OAPT scheme in 2003 or 2004 to eligible workers who did not do
so, but could participate later. Identification is based on the conditional independence
assumption. We evaluate the scheme via a propensity score matching method that explicitly
takes the dynamic treatment assignment of individuals who did not initially participate
into account using a method described in Vikström (2014). Although Belgian workers can
make use of a sort of block model (through full-time career break), this study does not
consider this type of career break and instead only focuses on “genuine" part-time workers,
considering the block period as inactivity.
Our findings indicate a positive short run effect of the OAPT scheme on survival in
employment, which becomes negative after two years for men and four years for women
(in line with Graf et al. (2011) for Austria). We show that the evolution of the effect
likely follows from the incentives surrounding the OAPT scheme. The initial positive
effect is likely because in the absence of the part-time work option some participants in
the scheme would likely have completely stopped working to improve their work-life
balance (Gielen, 2009; Van Looy et al., 2014). However, by working part-time individuals
may decrease labour market attachment and/or signal to employers a preference for early
retirement (Chapter 3 of the dissertation and Machado and Portela, 2014) Consequently,
17In the block model workers can “block" their working time. Instead of working part-time throughout the whole
period of participation in the OAPT scheme they work full-time for half of the time and enter an inactive phase in
the second half, while still being attached to the employer.
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as the option of early retirement becomes available these workers choose or are induced
by their employers to choose this pathway to withdraw from the labour force. The latter
process is reinforced by the specific accumulation of social security rights. When OAPT
participants enter statutory early retirement they keep accumulating pension benefits of a
full-time worker. Hence this early retirement scheme is relatively more attractive to treated
workers as opposed to normal full-time workers. This is because the replacement income
for OAPT participants is relatively higher than for full-time workers, as the former move
from a part-time income to pension benefits instead of from a full-time income. Recall that
the pension benefits are similar for both individuals, as both have accumulated pension
rights of a full-time worker.
We strengthen the above explanation by estimating a competing risks model with different
(possibly selective) pathways to early retirement. When we right censor individuals who
leave employment to enter statutory early retirement, we estimate a substantially more
(significantly) negative effect of OAPT participation on survival in employment. The
adverse incentives are stronger the more the working time is reduced. Moreover, the more
favourable effect on survival in employment for women can likely be explained by their
lower opportunities to enter early retirement. Finally, the Belgian OAPT scheme does not
pass the cost-benefit test.
Berg et al. (2015) “Can Policy Facilitate Partial Retirement? Evidence from Germany"
Berg et al. (2015) evaluate the German partial retirement scheme (Altersteilzeit) based
on a difference-in-differences strategy. They contrast a younger control group of 50-54
year olds to a treatment group of 55-65 year olds in the pre-treatment period (1993-
1998) and two post-treatment periods (1999-2001 and 2002-2004), respectively a period
in which the block-model was less and more intensively used. The blocking option
appears to play an important role regarding the impact of the partial retirement scheme
on career length. During the period of less (more) intensive use of the block-model, male
participants remained 1.8 (1.2) years longer employed than non-participants (if the time
not worked during the second phase of the block model is not considered as employment).
It appears that the ATZ was taken mostly by men who would have retired otherwise. The
employment of female participants was, however, not affected in the former period, while
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it even declined by 0.2 years in the latter. The authors propose several reasons for this
gender difference, such as differences in prior part-time work, sectoral implementation
(cf. differences in bargaining power mentioned in Gielen (2009)), and pension rules or
preferences.
Huber et al. (2016) “The Effect of Firms Phased Retirement Policies on the Labor
Market Outcomes of Their Employees”
Huber et al. (2016) study the effect of introducing partial retirement in Germany. Although
they study the same scheme as Berg et al. (2015), a comparison of the two studies is
not straightforward. First, Huber et al. (2016) only study the first period of the ATZ,
which has a more intensive use of the block-model. Second, they stratify their analysis
between West- and East-Germany, and finally, they only consider men. They estimate the
intention-to-treat effects of the scheme by contrasting the labour market outcomes of male
employees in firms that started offering partial retirement between 2000 and 2002 to those
in firms that did not offer this opportunity in this period.
The authors find in general more positive effects for East Germany than for West Germany.
In line with Machado and Portela (2014), they attribute this difference to the difficult
labour market conditions in the latter region. Undesired effects such as those found in
West Germany seem to be more likely when an economy works well and when earnings
and pension wealth accumulations are good. More specifically, for East-Germany the
partial retirement option did not significantly impact the timing of labour market exit.
However, it did change the pathway to retirement. Rather than transiting to unemployment
prior to retirement, participants entered the non-employment block period of the scheme
(as the period covered in this study is more block model intensive). Employment was
lengthened by seven months and unemployment reduced by six. Additionally, the authors
find a positive earnings effect for firms offering OAPT work. For West-Germany the
effects are only similar in the first two years, with a small (insignificant) positive effect on
employment and a larger (significant) negative effect on unemployment, which results in a
significant increase in time spent out of the labour force of around two months. Somewhat
surprising there is a significant positive earnings effects despite the weak employment
effects, which is attributed to high earnings in West Germany.
Bibliography
Ahn, T. (2015). “Reduction of working time, does it lead to a healthy lifestyle?” In: Health
Economics 25(8), pp. 969–983.
Albanese, A., B. Cockx, and Y. Thuy (2015). Working Time Reductions at the End of the Career:
Do They Prolong the Time Spent in Employment? Discussion Paper 9619. Institute for the
Study of Labor (IZA).
Been, J. and O. van Vliet (2014). Early Retirement Across Europe. Does Non-Standard Employ-
ment Increase Participation of Older Workers? Discussion Paper 10/2014-044. Network for
Studies on Pension, Aging and Retirement (Netspar).
Berg, P., M. Hamman, M. Piszczek, and C. Ruhm (2015). Can Policy Facilitate Partial Retire-
ment? Evidence from Germany. Working Paper 21478. National Bureau of Economic Research
(NBER).
Bloemen, H., S. Hochguertel, and J. Zweerink (2016). “Gradual Retirement in the Netherlands
An Analysis Using Administrative Data”. In: Research on aging 38(2), pp. 202–233.
Böheim, R. and M. Taylor (2004). “Actual and preferred working hours”. In: British Journal of
Industrial Relations 42(1), pp. 149–166.
Borjas, G. J. (2013). Labor economics, sixth edition. McGraw-Hill.
Brunello, G. and M. Langella (2013). “Bridge jobs in Europe”. In: IZA Journal of Labor Policy
2(1), pp. 1–18.
Cahuc, P. and A. Zylberberg (2004). Labor economics. MIT press.
Calvo, E., K. Haverstick, and S. A. Sass (2009). “Gradual retirement, sense of control, and
retirees’ happiness”. In: Research on Aging 31(1), pp. 112–135.
Charles, K. K. and P. DeCicca (2007). “Hours flexibility and retirement”. In: Economic Inquiry
45(2), pp. 251–267.
126
BIBLIOGRAPHY 127
Chen, Y.-P. and J. C. Scott (2006). “Phased retirement: Who opts for it and toward what end”. In:
European Papers on the New Welfare 6, pp. 16–28.
De Vaus, D., Y. Wells, H. Kendig, and S. Quine (2007). “Does gradual retirement have better
outcomes than abrupt retirement? Results from an Australian panel study”. In: Ageing and
Society 27(5), pp. 667–682.
Drago, R., M. Wooden, and D. Black (2009). “Who wants and gets flexibility? Changing work
hours preferences and life events”. In: Industrial & Labor Relations Review 62(3), pp. 394–
414.
Eurobarometer (2012). Active Ageing Report. Eurobarometer, Special report 378. European
Commission.
Even, W. E. and D. A. Macpherson (2004). Do Pensions Impede Phased Retirement? Discussion
Paper 1353. Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
Gannon, B. and J. Roberts (2011). “Part-time work and health among older workers in Ireland
and Britain”. In: Applied Economics 43(30), pp. 4749–4757.
Ghent, L. S., S. G. Allen, and R. L. Clark (2001). “The impact of a new phased retirement option
on faculty retirement decisions”. In: Research on Aging 23(6), pp. 671–693.
Gielen, A. C. (2009). “Working hours flexibility and older workers labor supply”. In: Oxford
Economic Papers 61(2), pp. 240–274.
Graf, N., H. Hofer, and R. Winter-Ebmer (2011). “Labor supply effects of a subsidized old-age
part-time scheme in Austria”. In: Zeitschrift für ArbeitsmarktForschung 44(3), pp. 217–229.
Hermansen, Å. (2015). “Retaining older workers: the effect of phased retirement on delaying
early retirement”. In: Nordic Journal of Social Research 6.
Huber, M., M. Lechner, and C. Wunsch (2016). “The Effect of Firms Phased Retirement Policies
on the Labor Market Outcomes of Their Employees”. In: ILR Review, forthcoming.
Hutchens, R. (2010). “Worker characteristics, job characteristics, and opportunities for phased
retirement”. In: Labour Economics 17(6), pp. 1010–1021.
Hutchens, R. and K. Grace-Martin (2006). “Employer willingness to permit phased retirement:
why are some more willing than others?” In: Industrial & Labor Relations Review 59(4),
pp. 525–546.
Imbens, G. W. and J. M. Wooldridge (2009). “Recent developments in the econometrics of
program evaluation”. In: Journal of economic literature 47(1), pp. 5–86.
128 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Kantarci, T. and A. Van Soest (2008). “Gradual retirement: Preferences and limitations”. In: De
Economist 156(2), pp. 113–144.
Kim, H. and S. A. DeVaney (2005). “The selection of partial or full retirement by older workers”.
In: Journal of Family and Economic Issues 26(3), pp. 371–394.
Machado, C. S. and M. Portela (2014). “Hours of work and retirement behaviour”. In: IZA
Journal of European Labor Studies 3(1), pp. 1–22.
Mooney, A., J. Statham, and A. Simon (2002). The pivot generation. Informal care and work
after fifty. Policy Press, Bristol.
Nikolova, M. and C. Graham (2014). “Employment, late-life work, retirement, and well-being in
Europe and the United States”. In: IZA Journal of European Labor Studies 3(1), pp. 1–30.
Pagán, R. (2009). “Part-time work among older workers with disabilities in Europe”. In: Public
Health 123(5), pp. 378–383.
Salonen, J. and M. Takala (2011). Working career and income of part-time pensioners in Finland.
Working Paper 2011:2. Finnish Centre for Pensions.
Schur, L. A. (2003). “Barriers or opportunities? The causes of contingent and part-time work
among people with disabilities”. In: Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society
42(4), pp. 589–622.
Van Looy, D., M. Kovalenko, D. Mortelmans, and H. De Preter (2014). “Working hours-reduction
in the move to full retirement: How does this affect retirement preferences of 50+ individuals
in Flanders”. In: Leuven: Steunpunt WSE/Antwerpen: CELLO, Universiteit Antwerpen.
Vandenbrande, T., S. Vandekerckhove, P. Vendramin, G. Valenduc, R. Huys, G. Van Hootegem,
I. Hansez, C. Vanroelen, V. Puig-Barrachina, K. Bosmans, and H. De Witte (2013). Quality of
work and employment in Belgium. Tech. rep. KU Leuven, Research Institute for Work and
Society.
Vendramin, P. and G. Valenduc (2014). A gender perspective on older workers’ employment and
working conditions. Working Paper 2014.03. ETUI - European Trade Union Institute.
Vikström, J. (2014). IPW estimation and related estimators for evaluation of active labor market
policies in a dynamic setting. Working Paper 2014:1. IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour
Market and Education Policy.
Wadensjö, E. (2006). Part-time pensions and part-time work in Sweden. Discussion Paper 2273.
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
BIBLIOGRAPHY 129
Wunsch, C. and M. Lechner (2008). “What did all the money do? On the general ineffectiveness
of recent West German labour market programmes”. In: Kyklos 61(1), pp. 134–174.
Chapter 6
How does a higher Full Retirement Age
affect Careers?
Evidence from an Increase in the Female Full Retirement Age
in Belgium1
6.1 Introduction
Many developed countries face enormous pressure on their Social Security provisions due to
ageing populations. An important contributing factor to this problem is the low labour force
participation of older workers, especially women, and the corresponding low effective retirement
ages. In the EU-15, the average effective retirement age over the period 2009-2014 was 62.6
for men and 61.7 for women, while most countries have their normal full retirement age set at
65 (OECD, 2015). In Belgium, the country analysed in this paper, the difference between the
full retirement age and the average effective retirement age is even bigger. Since the 1980’s the
average effective retirement age has not been above 60, and was in 2013 59.8 for men and 59.1
for women (OECD, 2015). Part of the explanation for this can be found in the abundance of
early retirement options available to older workers in Belgium.
One strategy that has been introduced by governments to cope with this challenge posed by
1In collaboration with Bart Cockx, Muriel Dejemeppe, Corinna Ghirelli, and Bruno Van der Linden
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population ageing has been to prolong the working career by means of an increase in the official
retirement age. The idea behind this is that if people have to work more years before obtaining
full pension rights, they would do so in order to keep the same pension allowances (OECD,
2006). As workers in most countries do not have many options to retire early, this is a strong
incentive. However, as Belgian workers do have these options, the efficiency of an increase in
just the normal full retirement age might not be sufficient.
In this paper we focus on an increase in the full retirement age (FRA) for Belgian women in
the private sector or in self-employment, more specifically whether there was an impact on
employment. This reform, starting on January 1, 2006, brought the female FRA from 63 to 64
and the necessary full career from 43 to 44. This increase was part of a bigger pension reform
between 1997 and 2009, which brought the female full retirement from 60 to 65 with increases
every two to three years. This reform aimed both at increasing the average effective retirement
age of women and at removing gender discrimination in the Belgian pension system for private
sector and self-employed workers, as the FRA for men in these sectors was already at 65.2 Note
that this reform did not alter any of the early retirement schemes.
A growing literature conducts ex post evaluations of pension system reforms on the labour supply
decision of older workers. We identify two strands of literature, the first studies pension system
reforms in a quasi-experimental setting, using an exogenous change in the eligibility conditions
to (early) retirement to identify the effects of the pension treatment. The second type of studies
evaluates the effects by means of structural models and simulation techniques. Our study belongs
to the first group. We exploit a quasi-experimental setting with an exogenous increase in the
retirement age of Belgian women from 63 to 64 in 2006. The results in the literature suggest
that increasing the eligibility age to (early) retirement can be successful in prolonging careers.
Comparable studies to our own by Lalive and Staubli (2015) for Switzerland and Manoli and
Weber (2016) for Austria show that a one-year-increase in the normal (early) retirement age can
postpone labour market exit by 7.9 months and 4.9 months respectively. Other counterfactual
impact evaluations come to similar results, although 7.9 months appears to be somewhat of an
upper bound of the estimates. The specific institutional context of Belgium, with its many early
retirement schemes, might lead to different results, although the policy reform itself is very
similar to the Swiss one. For Belgium we only know about the counterfactual impact study of
2For public sector workers there were no changes as the female FRA was already at 65.
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Tarantchenko (2016), which finds rather small employment effects and strong spillover effects
on other social security programs. Simulation studies for Belgium, such as Lefebvre and Orsini
(2011) and Jousten, Sigismondi, et al. (2012), suggest that partial reforms that only modify the
access to some retirement routes have limited effects.
We exploit very rich administrative data on labour market histories (for private sector employment
from as early as 1957), sick leave, exit destinations out of employment, and some essential firm
and household characteristics. Based on these data we can estimate the impact of the pension
reform on the employment rate, (early) retirement rate and the age of exit from employment.
The pension reform creates a sharp discontinuity in the pension treatment: women born before
December 1, 1942 are not faced with the exogenous change in the eligibility conditions to
full retirement as they reach the old retirement age before 2006. In contrast, women born
afterwards are affected and have to wait an additional year before they can claim their full
pension. Similar to the study of Lalive and Staubli (2015), we identify the treatment effect
with a regression discontinuity design.3 The treatment effects are obtained by comparing the
outcomes of women born just before and after the birth date threshold of December 1, 1942. We
argue that this is a credible identification strategy leading to unbiased estimates of the treatment
effect as the identification assumptions seem to be satisfied: we do not observe any manipulation
of the assignment variable (the birth date), the women in our sample have similar observable
characteristics and there are no other relevant policy changes around the cut-off. Any difference
in outcome can thus be attributed to the policy.
We contribute to the literature in the following ways: first, we complement a very recent line
of empirical research on the Belgian pension reform. This reform is of particular interest as
it takes place in a country with a wide range of early retirement options. Previous studies
focused on countries where workers have more incentives to remain in the labour market until
the full retirement age, as the range of early retirement options is mostly limited to an anticipated
pension and sickness/disability insurance. As these workers have few options to retire early, their
employment rate is quite high. Instead, we focus on Belgium, where workers can benefit from
a generous early retirement system. This results in a low employment rate at older ages and a
very low, especially female, retirement age. Given these differences, we expect the impact of the
3Montizaan et al. (2010) and de Grip, Lindeboom, et al. (2012) used the same approach to evaluate the impact of
increasing the retirement age in the Netherlands.
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reform to be different and, in fact, smaller in Belgium than in the countries mentioned above
because the incentives created by the policy change are counteracted by the availability of the
early exit options. Second, the results for our baseline analysis are obtained without restricting
our sample. By using our sampling weights we can measure the effects for the full population
of Belgian women in the affected age ranges. Finally, there is a relatively long period between
the moment that the policy was first announced in 1996 and the moment it was implemented
in 2006. As a result, affected women had time to anticipate this change and adjust their labour
supply if necessary. Moreover, the policy was announced while most affected women could not
yet enter in the early retirement schemes.
Our findings can be summarised as follows. It appears that, in general, treated women simply
substitute the period in full retirement they could take before the policy change with a period
of early retirement or other inactivity after the policy change. At the moment of the increase
in the full retirement age most women had already left employment, which limits the potential
effectiveness of the policy. Possibly as a result of this, we do not find substantial effects on
employment. This could imply that the population of treated Belgian women did not actively
anticipate the policy change, although it was announced ten years before its actual implementation.
Given that periods in most early exit schemes are assimilated to time spent in employment, treated
women did not have very strong incentives to continue employment longer than non-treated
women. The partial nature of the policy change (affecting only the full retirement age and not
the early exit schemes) appears to have limited the effects it could have had.
The paper is structured as follows. We start with a literature review in Section 6.2. In Section 6.3
we describe the institutional context, while in Section 6.4 we describe the sampling scheme and
the data we used. Section 6.5 outlines the identification strategy and the descriptive evidence. In
Section 6.6 we present our empirical findings and in the final section we summarise the results
and conclude.
6.2 Literature Overview
There is a large literature on the effects of pension system reforms on the labour supply decision
of older workers. In this chapter we especially focus on those pension reforms that increase the
normal (early) retirement age. There is a rich literature on other reforms as well (e.g. adjusting
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the pension benefits or removing a pathway towards early exit) but we do not focus on those.
Moreover, we focus on Western countries with similar labour market institutions to improve
comparability with our study and since most studies involve this type of countries to begin with.
We distinguish two strands of international literature on pension reforms. One type studies
pension system reforms in a quasi-experimental setting, exploiting exogenous changes in the
eligibility conditions to (early) retirement. The other type of studies has attempted to quantify
the effects by means of structural models and (micro-)simulation techniques. Our study belongs
to the first strand, as we exploit a quasi-experimental setting due to the exogenous increase in the
retirement age.
We first discuss the international literature using a quasi-experimental approach in Section 6.2.1.
Of particular interest are the studies of Lalive and Staubli (2015) and Manoli and Weber (2016),
as they study comparable reforms using a similar methodology, especially the former study on
Switzerland. Most studies, with the exception of Hernæs et al. (2015), find a positive impact of
the pension age reform on employment and age of labour market exit. A one-year-increase in
the (early) retirement age can postpone labour market exit by several months, from one month
(Cribb et al., 2013) up to 7.9 months (Lalive and Staubli, 2015). Note that most studies apply
some sample restrictions, such that the measured effect only applies to relatively labour market
attached individuals and not to the full population. In our study, we start from the full population
before restricting our sample.
Next we comment on the international literature on pension reforms based on structural models
and (micro-)simulation techniques in Section 6.2.2. In contrast to the counterfactual impact
studies, these studies estimate reform effects through a structural model, or simulate effects
of hypothetical policies. The evidence in this section can complement the previous section as
simulation studies can consider the impact of policies that have not (yet) been introduced, or
compare different types of policies such as increases in the eligibility age versus changes to
the benefit calculation. Overall, the evidence in this section suggests a positive impact of an
increased eligibility age, but this finding is complemented by the observation that such a policy
change would not necessarily have the biggest impact on employment or retirement ages. Fehr
et al. (2012) suggest that a higher actuarial adjustment factor could work better. In contrast,
Manoli, Mullen, et al. (2015) argue that individuals’ retirement decisions are more sensitive to
changes in their effective wages that arise through changes in benefit eligibility (i.e. an increased
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retirement age) rather than to changes in benefits conditional on being eligible (i.e. benefit
calculations).
Finally, we discuss the existing Belgian evidence in Section 6.2.3. For Belgium, results using the
quasi-experimental approach are scarce, as we know of only one study that follows this approach,
Tarantchenko (2016), which finds rather small employment effects and strong spillover effects
on other social security programs. However, several studies have studied (aspects of) the Belgian
pension system using structural models or micro-simulation techniques. More structural reforms
(e.g. an increased retirement age) are more likely to impact retirement behaviour than partial
reforms (e.g. benefit generosity), as partial reforms are likely to be offset by other channels
unaffected by the reform (Lefebvre and Orsini, 2011; Jousten, Sigismondi, et al., 2012).
6.2.1 Results from Impact Evaluations
6.2.1.1 Switzerland
We begin our discussion with two studies on a reform of the Swiss pension system. This reform is
very similar to the Belgian reform, as it considers similar ages (the studies consider the increases
in the female retirement age from 62 to 63 in 2001 and from 63 to 64 in 2005), only affects
women, and is also partial. As Hanel and Riphahn (2012) discuss, it is partial in the sense that
the reform only affects the first pillar of the retirement insurance system, leaving the other pillars
unchanged. This could imply that results for both the Belgian and Swiss reform form a lower
bound, as one could expect stronger effects if the reform would address all funding sources for
retirement (Hanel and Riphahn, 2012, pp.726).
Lalive and Staubli (2015) exploit the sharp discontinuity introduced by the policy change and use
a regression discontinuity design (RDD) based on administrative data. They explore the causal
impact of the higher eligibility age on the pension claiming age and on the participation in other
social security programs (e.g. disability or unemployment insurance) of older women. They
find that a higher full retirement age of one year delays labour market exit by 7.9 months and
claiming of retirement benefits by 6.6 months. Social security benefit levels are not affected, but
social security wealth is lowered. The labour market behaviour of their spouses does not seem to
be affected, as their labour supply or benefit claiming is not affected. In contrast to our study,
Lalive and Staubli (2015) limit their sample and do not consider the entire population. Instead,
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they focus on labour market attached women and thus obtain a result more closely related to an
average treatment effect on the treated instead of an average treatment effect4. In this light, the
seemingly strong results have to be interpreted with care, as they only refer to the sub-population
most affected by the reform. Other (less) affected women are not considered. The effect for the
full population could therefore be less strong.
The same reform has been evaluated by Hanel and Riphahn (2012) by means of a difference-
in-differences (DiD) type approach. They study the hazard rate of retirement in a duration
model and estimate a logit model with random effects in which they control for age, calendar
year, and interactions of the two former variables (as well as adding several control variables).
Robustness checks, comparing estimators using normally distributed errors with those using
a non-parametric discrete-factor error term distribution (Heckman and Singer, 1984). Using
Swiss Labour Force Survey data,5 the authors compare the retirement behaviour before and after
the policy change of the age group affected by the reform and the age group not affected by
the reform.6 The effects of the reform are identified both by a comparison of given age groups
(treated or control) over time as well as by year effects across different age groups, hence the
name DiD type approach. They find that a one year increase in the retirement age (corresponding
to a permanent reduction of retirement benefits by 3.4%) induces a decline in the age-specific
annual retirement probability by over 50%. More specifically, the retirement probability at age
62 declines from 46 to 22%, and from 40 to 30% at age 63. Additionally, they find that the
response to changes in financial retirement benefits varies with educational background. Women
with less education respond more strongly to the reform. They appear to be most reluctant to
incur a decline in benefit payments, potentially due to (social security) wealth constraints. In line
with Lalive and Staubli (2015), and again in contrast to our study, Hanel and Riphahn (2012)
only consider a subsample of the full population and thus only obtain a sort of average treatment
effect on the treated. They restrict the sample to women at risk of retirement, i.e. all women
aged 60 through 65 who were members of the labour force when they were first interviewed.
4They restrict their sample by not considering women never employed between ages 50 and 53, women claiming
a disability pension before age 53, and women never claiming an old-age pension
5The data does not contain information on characteristics of the spouse, occupational pensions or work history.
6They consider three treatment and control group pairs: (i) women aged 62 before vs. after (2001-2004) the
reform of 2001, (ii) women aged 62 before (2001-2004) vs. after the reform of 2004, (iii) women aged 63 before vs.
after the reform of 2004.
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6.2.1.2 Austria
Next, we focus on Austria, where the early retirement age (ERA) was reformed in 2000 and
2004 for men and women. In Austria, male (female) workers could either early retire at 60 (55),
take a disability pension at 57 or fully retire at 65 (60). These ages are all coupled to eligibility
requirements in terms of contribution or insurance years.7 In 2000 the ERA was increased by 1.5
years from 60 (55) to 61.5 (56.5) using incremental two month increases for each quarterly birth
cohort, beginning with men born in the last quarter of 1940 and women born in the last quarter
of 1945 (Manoli and Weber, 2016). In 2004 the ERA was again increased, by two months for
each male (female) birth quarter born in the first two quarters of 1943 (1948). Afterwards, the
ERAs were further increased by one month for each subsequent birth quarter (until the early
retirement option will be eliminated in 2017, when the ERA will equal the normal retirement age
of 65 (60) for men (women)). Important exemptions were put in place, mostly granting workers
with very long careers the possibility to keep retiring at a slightly lower age then other workers.
Therefore the reform of the ERA mostly affected workers with short contribution years.
The reforms were paired to changes in financial incentives as well, introducing capped penalties
for early exit and rewards for late exit. However, these incentives were very complex and did not
follow the kinked form of the increase in the ERA. As the ERA schedule is only based on birth
cohort and financial benefits depend on multiple factors (making it hard to optimally respond to
any changes in one of those factors), it can be argued that the ERA schedule is more transparent.
This presumably prompts workers to mainly act on the changes in the ERA rather than the
financial incentives (Manoli and Weber, 2016). Finally, note that the reforms were announced
right before the actual reform.8 This implies that workers, especially those affected first, did not
have much time to respond to the reform. This is very different to the Belgian reforms of 2006
and 2009 studied in this paper, which were announced at least ten years before they took place.
The two main studies on the Austrian reform are by Manoli and Weber (2016) and Staubli and
Zweimüller (2013). We start our discussion with the former study, as the methodology most
closely resembles ours. The authors use a regression kink design. In this design, the kinks
7Contribution years refer to the years employed subject to pension contributions, assimilating sick leave,
maternity leave, and times of compulsory military service to employment. Insurance years refer additionally to
years in unemployment and secondary education
8The 2000 reform was announced in July 2000 and started in October 2000. The 2004 reform was announced in
June 2003 and started in January 2004.
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that originate from the quarterly linked birth cohorts and ERA are compared to kinks in the
relationship between exit or claiming ages and birth cohorts. The resulting slope changes can
then be measured to find the causal effect of the policy. The effect is causal as the ERA increases
are exogenous and thus create a quasi-experimental setting. Following Card et al. (2015), they
estimate their model with local polynomial estimators for the slope changes using alternative
bandwidths. Their sample does not cover the full population but is restricted, within the male
(female) birth cohorts born between 1930-1948 (1935-1952), to workers who are still employed
at age 53.5. Workers are followed from age 53 until they exit the labour market, start claiming
pension benefits, or reach age 70. To distinguish the presumably most affected group, workers
with a short career are also considered separately from the total sample.
The study’s main finding is that a one year increase in the ERA leads to a 0.4 year increase in
the exit age and a 0.5 year increase in the claiming age. This impact is comparable in size to
the effects found for the Swiss NRA reform discussed above. Other findings are that (1) job
exits shifted almost parallel with the pension claiming ages. This suggests that affected workers
do not substitute pension with other social insurance programs such as unemployment or sick
leave. (2) The increased employment is obtained because workers keep their pre-retirement jobs
longer. (3) There is no evidence of anticipation. While the oldest cohorts were affected almost
immediately after the policy change was announced, younger cohorts had more time to prepare.
However, the rate of increases in the average exiting ages is very similar between the two groups.
In our study we can see whether this finding holds when individuals have much more time to
anticipate a similar policy change. (4) There appear to be important spillover effects to men
who were exempt from the ERA increases. Those men adjusted their labour supply in a similar
way as non-exempted men. The authors argue that this finding could be driven by employers
changing retirement policies or by unawareness among workers about their exemption status.
The second main study on the Austrian reform, Staubli and Zweimüller (2013), focuses on
the employment rate of older workers and on the participation to disability or unemployment
schemes. Like the first Austrian study, it also uses the Austrian Social Security database to
exploit the quasi-experimental setting created by the reform. However, the set-up in Staubli and
Zweimüller (2013) differs on several key points from the previous study. (1) The authors use a
Difference-in-Differences (DiD) approach, comparing the outcomes of younger, affected, birth
cohorts and older, non-affected, birth cohorts. (2) Their sample does not contain individuals
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with a full career of insurance years: they select men aged 57-64, born January 1932-December
1953 (women aged 52-59, born January 1937-December 1958) with less 45 (40) insurance years
over the period 1997-2010.9 This selection implies that all individuals should have been directly
affected by the reform. However, the disadvantage of this selection is that some individuals
could have exited the labour force already. This can lower the estimated effect. Moreover, in
contrast to the first Austrian study, they are not able to look at exempted (full career) workers
to study spillovers. Thus, while both Austrian studies do not consider the full population, the
second study still focuses slightly more on a specific group of treated individuals, which has to
be taken into account when reviewing the empirical evidence.
The findings can be summarised as follows. First, a one year increase in the ERA led to an
increase in employment of 9.75pp among affected men and 11pp among affected women. This
effect is lower than the one in Manoli and Weber (2016), likely because of the difference in
sample selection. Second, the authors find large spillover effects on the unemployment insurance
program (+12.5pp for men, +11.8pp for women) but small effects on disability insurance claims.
Finally, the effects were separated by wage and health status. Healthy high-wage workers
responded by working longer until they reach the new ERA. Low-wage workers in bad health
responded differently and retire through the disability insurance or left the labour market through
unemployment. This finding suggests that these most vulnerable workers are in a way protected
by the ERA increases as they substitute time with a full pension for time with some other social
security benefit.
6.2.1.3 Netherlands
Two Dutch studies should be mentioned here as well. In de Grip, Lindeboom, et al. (2012), an
alternative outcome is considered, namely mental health. The applied methodology (RDD) is
however comparable to the ones studied in our paper. The other study, by de Grip, Fouarge, et al.
(2013), focuses on an announced reform of the Dutch pension system, increasing the statutory
pension age from 65 to 66 in 2020 and consequently to 67 in 2025. The reform and methodology
(RDD) are again comparable to our study.
First, de Grip, Lindeboom, et al. (2012) assess the mental health effects of the Dutch pension
reform in 2006, when the government abolished the favourable tax treatment of early retirement
9Public sector workers and heavy labour workers are also excluded because they are affected differently
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schemes in the second pension pillar for all workers born after 1949. They use matched survey
data and administrative data for male full-time employees in the public sector who were born in
1949 or 1950. The analysis is based on a sharp RDD in which the mental health of workers under
the old pension system (born in 1949) are compared with the mental health of workers under
the new pension system (born in 1950) in 2008, i.e. two years after the policy change. Mental
health is derived from survey data and refers to showing signs of a clinical depression. They
find a strong deterioration in mental health for workers affected by the reform. These effects
are stronger for workers who experience a larger income loss due to the reform, and for married
men whose partner has no pension income. As in Austria, this reform was announced relatively
late (July 2005, implemented January 2006). The authors note that this late announcement,
which takes away some control from the worker, and the perceived unfairness of the reform for
people born around 1950, could have influenced the workers’ mental health as well. It is unclear
whether this aspect played a role in the other reforms as well, so it should be kept in mind when
interpreting these findings.
Second, de Grip, Fouarge, et al. (2013) analyse the effects of an announced increase in the
eligibility age for the Dutch public old age pension on individuals’ retirement expectations.
10 The causal ex-ante impact of the announcement is identified by means of a sharp RDD
using matched administrative and survey data on Dutch public sector employees. The survey
information does not include individuals born before 1950 to avoid bias from a previous reform
of the pension system, nor individuals born after 1964 due to low response rates. They find a
positive impact of the announced reform on the expected retirement age. Affected employees
born between 1954-1959 expect to retire 3.6 months later, those born after 1959 expect to retire
10.8 months later. The size of the effect is comparable to the effects found in the previous
studies, which could indicate that expectations on retirement are a relatively good indicator
for actual retirement behaviour. Further findings in the study are that the response is smaller
for men. Moreover, retirement expectations of one spouse are not affected by the potential
increase in the statutory retirement age of the other spouse. Lastly, the effects are bigger for more
highly educated workers and lower for workers with physically demanding jobs or intensive
managerial tasks. This finding complements the analysis of Staubli and Zweimüller (2013)
10The reform was announced by the Dutch government in June 2010, increasing the statutory pension age from
65 to 66 in 2020 for all inhabitants born after 1954 and consequently to 67 in 2025 for all inhabitants born after 1959
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discussed above, who find bigger effects for healthy high-wage workers. However, it is in
contrast to Hanel and Riphahn (2012), who find that less educated women respond more strongly
to avoid a decline in their benefit payments. Finally, note that under the assumption that expected
behaviour is predictive of actual behaviour, the study of de Grip, Fouarge, et al. (2013) suggests
that (employed) workers anticipate policy reforms when announced well in advance. However,
the study is not informative on whether this anticipation will be noticeable before the actual
reform, as it might be that only affected individuals still at work at the reform will prolong their
employment, and not those who anyway plan to leave before.
6.2.1.4 United States
Next to the above Western European countries, the US has also reformed its pension system.
In the context of this study, the 1983 reform of the normal retirement age (NRA) from 65 to
67 is most interesting. From 2000 onwards, a higher normal retirement age is phased in for
birth cohorts born in 1938 or later. In a first phase the NRA is increased for individuals born in
1938-1943, by two months in every calendar year, from 65 to 66. A second phase affects cohorts
born 1955 and later in a similar way, such that cohorts born 1960 and later are all subject to the
NRA of 67. In each year of the reform, the benefits received at the early retirement age of 62
were cut by 0.833 percentage points. The social security disability insurance (SSDI) was not
affected. Below, we discuss two studies that focus on the first phase of the NRA reform of 1983.
As both studies were conducted before the reform was fully finalised, long run effects were not
available yet.
First, Mastrobuoni (2009) uses CPS monthly data from January 1989 to January 2007 to compare
younger (treated) cohorts born 1938-1941 to older (non-treated) cohorts born 1928-1937 over
ages 61-65 with a difference-in-differences approach. The evidence suggests an increase in the
average retirement age of treated individuals of half of the increase in the NRA, or one month
every calendar year. This finding is comparable in size to those in the studies mentioned above.
Second, Duggan et al. (2007) studies whether there are spillover effects of the NRA increase
on participation in the disability insurance program. As the 1983 reform in se lowered pension
benefits and the SSDI program did not change, the SSDI program became relative more generous.
The authors use age and gender-specific population data from the US Census Bureau and from
the National Center for Health Statistics. Their main sample covers individuals born 1934-1946
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and is followed over ages 45-64 (data from 1983-2005). Each cohort is used as control and
treated group, as participation in either group changes over time (cf. Table 2 in Duggan et al.
(2007)). They estimate first difference models that control for age-specific trends in SSDI
enrolment and for common changes in each year in SSDI enrollment. They find an increase
in SSDI participation. More specifically, the reform can explain one-third (one-fourth) of the
increase in SSDI enrolments of men (women) since 1983. This shows that there were important
spillover effects of the 1983 reform on SSDI participation.
6.2.1.5 Other countries
Finally, there are several other studies that have consider pension reforms in other Western
countries using a quasi-experimental approach. First, Cribb et al. (2013) analyse an increase
in the female UK state pension age from 60 to 61 between April 2010 and March 201111 on
a number of labour market outcomes of older women and of their partners, by means of a
difference-in-differences approach. Using UK Labour Force Survey data, they compare the
outcomes of interest between 2010q2 (before) and 2012q2 (after) the reform of unaffected
individuals born, 1949-1950, and affected individuals, born later until 1952-1953. They find an
increase in the female employment rate at age 60 of 7.3 percentage points, which corresponds
to about one month. Additionally, they find a positive effect on unemployment (+1.3pp) and
employment of their male partners (+4.2pp). Through robustness checks, they can argue that
the results are driven by a shock or a signalling effect (social norm) of the policy, rather than by
credit constraints. The evidence is generally in line with the evidence discussed above, although
the magnitude of the employment effect appears to be somewhat lower.
Second, Atalay and Barrett (2015) evaluate the effects of increasing the female retirement age in
Australia. The 1993 Australian pension reform increased the social security benefit eligibility
age for women from 60 to 65 (the retirement age of men). Between July 1995 and July 2013,
this age was increased by six months every 18 months for women born between July 1935 and
December 1948. The study draws its data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics Income and
Housing Costs Surveys, which cover ten cross sections (1994-2008). Their sample consists of
individuals aged 60-64 who are born between 1929 and 1948.12 They estimate the impact on
11The reform was announced in 1995 and increased the earliest claiming age with one month every two months
from 60 to 65 over the period 2010-2020.
12Note that the authors can only approximate the moment of birth by subtracting the self-reported age at the date
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the reform with a difference-in-differences approach, comparing female (treated) cohorts with
male (control) cohorts before and after the reform (using the cohorts born before July 1935 as
the “before" group).13 The findings can be summarised as follows: the authors find that a one
year increase in the eligibility age increased the labour force participation of affected women
by approximately 10 percentage points. Additionally, there are spillover effects, as there is an
increased enrolment in other social insurance programs, such as the Disability Support Pension.
Again, these results complement the above evidence in other countries.
Finally, Hernæs et al. (2015) consider a reform of the Norwegian early retirement system in 2011.
The reform took place in two forms, for some people there was an increase in the earliest access
age, leaving pension benefits untouched (the “prescription approach", similar to the reforms
in the other countries discussed above), for some other people all disincentives to work while
claiming pension benefits were removed when the earnings test was replaced by an actuarially
fair system (the “flexibility" approach). Some people were affected by both forms of the reform.
The study gathers its individual data from merged administrative registers containing the entire
Norwegian population. The sample only contains workers employed at age 60 and not receiving
any form of disability payment. The control group consists of individuals born 1946-1947, who
reach age 63 in 2009-2010 and thus before the reform. The treated group consists of individuals
born in 1949, who reach age 63 after the reform, in 2012.14
Comparing the outcomes of those two groups before and after the reform, they find that the
flexibility approach appears to be more successful. The treated flexibility approach cohort
experiences a 25% increase in annual average earnings at age 63 (conditional on employment at
age 60), while the cohorts treated by the prescription approach experiences a slightly negative
earnings effect (likely since they tend to move to part-time work). In terms of employment,
if the individual continues employment at similar earnings than at age 60, there are positive
employment effects of +12.1 (16.2) pp for men (women) in the flexibility case, but negative
employment effect for the prescription case. This finding is very different than what we found
of the interview from the quarter of the interview.
13The authors take great care in trying to prove that men can be used as a credible control group. (1) They control
for year-specific effects, interacting them with the treatment indicator to capture gender and time specific shocks, (2)
they verify the parallel time trend assumption on labour force participation, (3) they perform a placebo test with a
male-only sample to confirm there is no different social security disability insurance take-up. Nonetheless, it could
well be that other (un)observed characteristics differ between men and women, which could invalidate the set-up.
14The cohort born in 1948 is not considered as it is affected by a mix of incentives.
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in other countries. Additionally, the prescription approach leads to increased disability inflow,
which is in line with the findings of Staubli and Zweimüller (2013), Duggan et al. (2007) and
Atalay and Barrett (2015). Finally, workers with low education, long work careers (> 40 years),
or low previous earnings have slightly worse employment effects conditional on having earnings
similar to those at age 60. This is in line with Staubli and Zweimüller (2013) de Grip, Fouarge,
et al. (2013), who also found that low educated workers respond less to similar reforms, but
contrasting the evidence in Hanel and Riphahn (2012), who find that less educated workers
respond more.
6.2.2 Results from Structural Models
Based on administrative data, Bernal and Vermeulen (2014) estimate a structural model of
retirement and simulate the impact of increasing the retirement age from 65 to 67 on the effective
retirement age in the Netherlands. They use administrative data from Statistics Netherlands
(CBS) to estimate a structural model of retirement with a dynamic programming approach. This
approach is based on a recursive method for solving sequential decision problems, such that they
can evaluate the decision on when to retire. They simulate two reforms, in the first reform the
retirement age is gradually increased from 65 to 67 (in line with a real reform approved in July
2012), the second reform considers an immediate increase in the retirement age from 65 to 67.
Their sample consists of older single employees (excluding self-employed and non-employed
individuals), aged between 58 and 70 in 2005, and having a defined benefit plan.15 The rationale
to focus on singles is to avoid the complex decision making process within couples and to
consider agents as individual decision makers. The selected individuals are then followed until
2007 and can remain employed or retire through complete disability, early retirement or normal
retirement. The results show a small impact on the effective retirement age. Under the first -
gradual - reform, individuals only postpone their retirement by less than one month on average.
The second reform results in bigger effects, with individuals postponing their retirement by seven
months. The results differ by gender (stronger effect for men) and health status (stronger effect
for healthy individuals).
Fehr et al. (2012) evaluate the impact of increasing the normal retirement age from 65 to 67 in
15The final sample contains 441 individuals and 1,323 observations.
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Germany. They do so by means of a general equilibrium model with overlapping generations,
taking demographic changes and endogenous retirement choices into account. The model
considers three skill classes, each with its own life expectancy within generations. Individuals in
the model can choose their effective retirement age by determining the optimal moment of labour
market exit and the start of their pension benefit claim. The benchmark reform is based on the
2007 pension reform in Germany, which gradually increased the normal retirement age from 65
to 67 starting in 2012 for cohorts born in 1947.16 The authors consider three additional reforms,
either increasing the actuarial adjustment factor from 3.6 to 6%, making the adjusting factor
dependent on life expectancy, or reduce the contribution rates for older workers. Regarding the
impact on employment and retirement, they find that the benchmark reform would increase the
effective retirement age by 12 months and employment by 0.4 percent. They note that increasing
the actuarial adjustment factor would likely achieve a stronger retirement effect. The results in
this study are in line with the findings in the previous sections, notably with Mastrobuoni (2009),
but a simple comparison is difficult as the previous results are derived in a different context.
Finally, a disadvantage of the method in this paper is that it is a very stylised model, making a
few unrealistic assumptions, such as a perfect (positive) correlation between life expectancy and
skill-level, having no income uncertainty (which the simulation study of Bernal and Vermeulen
(2014) discussed above took into account), and not considering disability retirement as an exit
possibility. Nevertheless, the results are a useful complement to the other (empirical) evidence.
Next, Manoli, Mullen, et al. (2015) simulate the effects of several social security reforms in
Austria. They use a similar approach as Bernal and Vermeulen (2014) and estimate a structural
model on retirement decisions with a dynamic programming approach. Their analysis consists
of two steps. In the first step they use a proportional hazard specification and policy variation
from five pension reforms in Austria between 1984 and 2003 to measure income and price
elasticities (measured, respectively, by present discounted social security wealth and the year-
on-year accrual in social security wealth from delaying retirement by one year). In the second
step they estimate the structural model of retirement decisions using the elasticities obtained
in the first step. Afterwards, they can look at the effects on labour supply and welfare of three
hypothetical pension reforms. The first reform reduces pension benefits at all ages by 20%, the
16In 2012 the NRA increases by one month for individuals born in 1947, by two months for the 1948 cohort and
so forth, until cohorts born in and after 1964 all face a two year increase in their normal retirement age.
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second reduces benefits before age 65 and increases them afterwards, and the third is a one-year
increase in the early retirement age from age 60 to 61. Their administrative data comes from
the Austrian Social Security Database and consists of a sample of 250,000 Austrian private
sector employees over the years 1984-2003. Using their first step, they find that individuals’
retirement decisions are more sensitive to changes in their effective wages that arise through
changes in benefit eligibility (price effect) rather than to changes in benefits conditional on being
eligible (income effect). In other words, the largest effect is obtained for the increase in the early
retirement eligibility age. The authors argue that this is not very surprising, given the generosity
and benefit structure of the Austrian pension system and the desire of many individuals to retire
as early as possible. In line with the other simulation studies, the model relies on several rather
strict assumptions.17
6.2.3 Results for Belgium
First, Jousten, Desmet, et al. (2007) consider a series of hypothetical pension reforms to study
their effect on the present discounted value of benefits and distributional aspects. These outcomes
are different than the ones we consider in our study, but are nonetheless of interest. They use
administrative data from the fiscal revenue statistics, the individual pension accounts and census
data on education. They select all 50-year-old men (and their spouses) and 50-year-old single
women in 1993, 1994, or 1995. They follow the approach of Dellis et al. (2004) and perform a
microsimulation in a steady state model, in which they first estimate the retirement (mortality)
probability at every age up to 65. These probabilities are used in the second step to calculate the
present discounted value of the in- and outflows from the government budget. They consider
four reforms, (1) a three year increase in the early retirement age, the normal retirement age, and
the career requirement (60 to 63, 65 to 68 and 45 to 48), (2) set retirement benefits to 60% of
average real lifetime earnings at the normal retirement age of 65, (3) a 6% actuarial adjustment
for each year retired below 65 (worked afterwards), (4) abolish the assimilation of any period
in unemployment or inactivity to employment for the pension calculation. In terms of their
main outcome (present discounted benefit value), the second and third reform perform best. The
17The main assumptions/restrictions are that workers can only choose to work or retire, that they have complete
knowledge of pension calculations, that they to not anticipate the reforms and that they immediately update their
calculations based on the new rules.
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authors argue that this can be expected, as these two reforms fully hit the Belgian workers who
exit relatively early - as regularly happens in Belgium. The fourth reform does not have a big
effect, as it only hits wage earners and involves only one type of retirement income. The first
reform has an important distributional impact. Inequality is increased, which can be explained
by the fact that the reform mostly benefits high-income households. However, the reform is only
partial, as it does not consider the additional revenue generated by the reform, which could be
used to reduce inequality. As with the other simulation studies above, this study relies on rather
strict assumptions, such as the steady-state assumption and the restriction to 50-year-olds.
Lefebvre and Orsini (2011) estimate a structural model on the labour supply of older workers in
Belgium to simulate the impact of a number of pension policy reforms. They use data from the
micro-simulation model MIMOSIS for 2001.18 Their sample contains men aged 50-64 who were
employed exclusively as private sector wage earners in the first quarter of 2001, with residence
in Belgium on January 1, 2002, as well as their household members. They estimate a dynamic
discrete choice model, an extension of the standard option value model where the inter-temporal
budget constraint is fully modelled. They simulate four reforms: (1) Introducing a 5% actuarial
reduction of pension benefits for every year of pension anticipation before age 65 (this is a return
to the pre-1991 situation), (2) increase all early claiming ages by 3 years19, (3) introduce the
“Pension Bonus", where employees working beyond age 62 receive a e2 supplement for each
day worked beyond age 62, (4) implement a unique early retirement age at 60. Their findings
are in line with Manoli, Mullen, et al. (2015), as they find that a reform of the eligibility rules
towards (early) retirement has a larger impact on the retirement decision than a reform of the
benefit generosity.
Next, Jousten, Sigismondi, et al. (2012) simulate different hypothetical reforms of the Belgian
pension system using a micro-simulation approach. As our study, they use data from the
Datawarehouse Labour Market and Social Protection, administered by the Crossroads Bank for
Social Security. Their sample is based on the MIMOSIS project, like Lefebvre and Orsini (2011)
above. While Jousten, Sigismondi, et al. (2012) do not study an increase in the (early) retirement
age, the nature of their results is of interest for this paper.20 Their results suggest that only
18MIMOSIS is a static simulation model based on administrative information that allows the reconstruction of
the individual inter-temporal budget constraint of wage-earners.
19An increase in the earliest claiming age pensions from 60 to 63, from 58 to 61 in the conventional early
retirement scheme and from 50 to 53 for unemployed exempted from job search.
20They focus on five reforms. The first four reforms lead to a more contribution based pension system, where
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structural or cumulative parametric changes have strong effects, and that partial reforms have
limited effects. They argue that partial reforms do not have enough “power", as those changes
will be offset in the complex interplay of the other numerous parameters in the pension formulas
Jousten, Sigismondi, et al. (2012, pp.38).
Finally, a recent study by Tarantchenko (2016) is the only study that uses a quasi-experimental
approach on a Belgian pension reform we are aware of. The reforms studied are the same as the
ones we consider in our study, namely the increases in the female normal retirement age from 63
to 64 in 2006 and from 64 to 65 in 2009. Data comes from administrative sources, collected by
the Crossroads Bank for Social Security and consists of an initial sample of 150,000 individuals
born between January 1941 and December 1953. From this sample, only women in salaried
(private sector) employment are retained. Women with time spent working as civil servant or
as self-employed are excluded. The period analysed covers the years 2005-2006 (2008-2009)
for the 2006 (2009) reform. The study uses a Difference-in-Differences approach, comparing
the outcomes of treated and non-treated women before and after the reform. For the 2006
reform women born December 1941-November 1942 form the before treated group, women
born December 1942-November 1943 form the before control group, women born December
1942-November 1943 form the after treated group, women born December 1943-November
1944 form the after control group. The before treated group is eligible for normal retirement
at age 63 in 2005, the after treated group is eligible for normal retirement at age 64 in 2007
(instead of 63 in 2006 had the reforms not taken place). All individuals are followed from the
first quarter in which they reach the age of 63 until the end of that calendar year, which implies
that some women are observed only one quarter while others are observed the full year. For the
2009 reform all cohorts are shifted three years.
The study finds that pension claims were reduced due to the reform. To see which activity these
women undertook in the additional time until retirement, the study considers a range of states.21
There is no significant effect on early pension claims, likely since not many women satisfy its
eligibility criteria. There is only a modest impact on employment, generated by the relatively
pension benefits are calculated more directly on past earnings only. These reforms are not fundamental by nature.
The fifth reform is more fundamental, as it calculates full pension benefits on the best 35 years of the career, instead
of imputing inactive periods or imposing minima on years with very low earnings.
21Normal pension, early pension, employment, unemployment, other early leave schemes (e.g. conventional
pre-retirement - unemployment with employer supplement - or time credit and career break schemes), sickness and
disability insurance, and a rest category.
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small fraction of women still employed at that time. The biggest effects are found for the other
social security programs, as many women are already inactive at the time of the reform and
simply prolong their time in one of these schemes. Relevant for Belgium, the study considers
the effect separately by marital status. Married women appear to be affected considerably less.
The author argues that this is likely because couples can choose to depend on the pension of one
partner augmented by a household supplement, instead of relying on their own pensions. Several
remarks should be made regarding the set-up of this study though. (1) The before control group
becomes the after treated group. If there are any anticipation effects, this could bias the results.
(2) The before treated group has already reached age 63 in 2005 (right before 2006 reform) while
the before control group has not yet reached this age. This implies that, before the reform, the
treated group has a lower employment rate than the control group. The positive employment
effect obtained in the analysis is thus almost mechanical, as the employment rate after the reform
will be very similar, as neither control or treated group after the reform has reached the (new)
retirement age.22 The same remarks apply to the 2009 reform.
6.3 Institutional Context
In this section we discuss the institutional setting in which the 2006 reform of the Belgian female
full retirement age (FRA) took place. The reform was part of a broader reform package starting
in 1997 and going on until 2009. In this study we do not focus on the earlier reforms as our
data does not allow us to do so. Neither do we focus on the later reform. As mentioned below,
the 2009 reform takes place when the pension bonus policy has an effect, which could bias the
results. Conditional on being able to control for this policy, the 2009 reform could be studied
as part of future research. The 2006 reform brought the FRA from 63 to 64 for women in
self-employment and in salaried private sector employment. We start by introducing the pension
reform of 2006 and situate it in the broader Belgian pension system around that time. Then
we look at other policies for older workers that existed in that period, such as the early exit
possibilities or the measures implemented to prevent them. It is important to note that the reform
of the female FRA was announced several years before it was actually implemented. Note that
22The employment rate will be similar but not identical, as the employment rate for the after control group will
be likely higher as those women are one year younger on average.
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in this paper we do not focus on the reform within the self-employment pension component,
and more so on the private sector pension reform. We do so mainly because we do not have
information on self-employment histories and because we do not have much information on
individuals registered as self-employed.
6.3.1 Belgium’s Pension System
Until 1997 the female full retirement age for self-employed and salaried private sector workers
was 60, as opposed to 65 for men. To obtain a full pension, men had to work 45 years whereas
women only had to work 40 years. As this was deemed discriminatory according to the European
Court and the European Commission, the Belgian government decided to increase the female
FRA to the level of men. From July 1997 until January 2009 the female FRA was increased
stepwise every two to three years from 60 to 65, as can be seen in Table 6.1. Note that for public
sector workers the female FRA was already at 65 so there were no changes in that sector. In
this paper we focus on the reform of January 1, 2006, which brought the female FRA from 63
to 64 and the necessary full career from 43 to 44. It is important to note that for individuals
with a career length equal to or above the career eligibility threshold it is possible to claim a
full pension before the FRA. However, many older women do not meet this threshold and thus
have to wait until reaching the FRA. Moreover, individuals who have left the labour market
early (e.g. early retirement, unemployment, or bridge pension) are forced to remain in that state
until they are transferred automatically to the full pension scheme at the FRA. Note that these
changes were all announced in 1997 and thus several years before they actually took place, with
the exception of the reform of July 1997.
At each moment in the left column of Table 6.1, the increase in the FRA determined an exogenous
change in eligibility to old age pension benefits which affected specific birth cohorts. For the
2006 reform, women born December 1942 are the youngest to be affected. As individuals with a
career length below the career eligibility threshold can only claim a full pension one month after
reaching the FRA, the first women to be affected by a change of the rules in January 2006 are
those born in December 1942. While older women could still retire at the (previously increased)
FRA of 63, the affected younger women (with a career length below 44 years) had to wait until
64. This translates to retiring one calendar year later, from January 2007 under the new rules
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Table 6.1: Exogenous Changes in the Full Retirement Age for Women working in the private sector or as
self-employed
FRA
Career Affected
requirement birth cohorts
Until June 30, 1997 60 40 Born before June 1, 1937
From July 1, 1997 61 41 Born June 1, 1937 or later
From January 1, 2000 62 42 Born December 1, 1938 or later
From January 1, 2003 63 43 Born December 1, 1940 or later
From January 1, 2006 64 44 Born December 1, 1942 or later
From January 1, 2009 65 45 Born December 1, 1944 or later
Pensions can only be claimed one month after reaching the FRA. Therefore women born in (for example) December
1942 become 63 in December 2005. As their full retirement can thus only start in January 2006, they are affected by the
policy and need to wait until January 2007 to claim their full retirement at the new FRA of 64. This table does not contain
the changes to this scheme introduced since 2012, such as the decision to increase the FRA further to 66 in 2025 and 67
in 2030.
instead of January 2006 under the old rules. Women born before June 1937 are the only cohorts
unaffected by any of these reforms, as they reached the FRA of 60 in June 1997, before the first
increase in the pension age.
The FRA mentioned above refers to the age at which women obtain full pension rights in the
“normal" old age pension component. This is one type of pensions in the first pillar of Belgium’s
three pillar pension system (see below). Until the 2006 reform women could claim a full pension
in the normal old-age pension component either the month after reaching age 63 or after reaching
a career duration of 43 years. The calculation of pension benefits in this scheme is shown in the
formula 6.1 below; it shows that for shorter contribution histories the pension is proportionally
reduced. However, annual benefits cannot go below a certain minimum, to allow women with a
sufficiently long contribution period (15 years) but very low earnings to have a sufficiently high
pension.
Benefitt = ∑pa=1 (Earna∗Za)Full Career Length ∗RRt ∗ It , (6.1)
with
• t calendar time after retirement;
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• a years with pension contributions, 1 ≤ a ≤ p < t, and p the last year with pension contribu-
tions;
• benefitt the pension benefits received in year t;
• earna the labour earnings23 in year a, subject to certain minima and maxima;
• Za a reweighting factor that adjusts the yearly earnings earna for inflation and welfare
increases between year a and year p;
• the Full Career Length set at 43 years before the reform;
• RRt the replacement rate, 60% for single women and 75% for women with a dependent
spouse;
• It a reweighting factor that allows for further inflation and welfare adjustments once the
pension has been determined in year p.
The reform of 2006 adjusts Equation 6.1 by increasing the Full Career Length from 43 to 44.
This implies that the same career before and after the reform (i.e. the same number of years
with pension contributions) results in a lower monthly pension benefit after the reform, as the
lifetime earnings are divided by a higher number. When in later sections we refer to the pension
benefits of a woman, we refer to this specific scheme. In what follows we will give a short
overview of Belgium’s three pillar system, limited to the regulations available to private sector
and self-employed workers. Unless mentioned differently, the pension system described below
refers to the situation right before the reform of January 1, 2006.
Pillar I is the state pension, available to all workers and organised as a pay-as-you-go system.
This means that today’s workers finance today’s pensions via social security contributions on
their wages. The height of a pension depends on career duration and earned income. The first
pillar is further composed of three types of pension, the normal old age pension component,
the survivor pension and the guaranteed minimum income for older persons. The first type, the
normal old age pension, has been discussed above as this is the scheme affected by the pension
reform. The second component, the survivor pension, is granted under certain conditions to the
spouse of a deceased person. The allowance is equal to 80% of the pension paid or accrued to
the deceased. Finally, the third component, the guaranteed minimum income for older persons, is
23Some types of inactivity, such as (pseudo) early retirement, sickness or unemployment are assimilated to
employment. See Table 6.11 for more information.
6.3. Institutional Context 153
a means-tested safety-net income financed by general taxation instead of contributions, making
it a social assistance benefit and not a security benefit. It covers elderly people above the full
retirement age who have no pension rights based on a professional activity or whose pension
rights are very low. The allowance is indexed to the health index.24
Pillars II and III instead provide complementary pensions on a voluntarily basis at the firm or
individual level. In contrast to the pay-as-you-go structure of Pillar I, they are fully-funded
schemes, where today’s workers finance their own future pension benefits. More specifically,
Pillar II is a supplementary pension for private sector workers organised at the company or sector
level. Self-employed workers can also set up a pillar II pension. It is financed by contributions
paid by employers, self-employed or employees to a pension institution. Sectoral pension
systems are built up by collective agreements between the management and the workforce of a
sector of activity. Pillar III consists of personal pension savings which qualify for tax reductions.
6.3.2 Other policies aimed at older workers
Next to the three pillar pension system discussed above, there exists a wide range of early
retirement programs for older workers. In Table 6.11 in the Appendix we summarise the most
important programs existing around the moment of the policy change in 2006, such as the
anticipated pension where workers can retire early by taking up their pension before the FRA or
the conventional early retirement scheme (the so-called bridge pension scheme), where workers
pass through unemployment with a supplementary allowance from their last employer.25 In
general, these schemes provide generous allowances to participants and, except for the anticipated
pension, keep accumulating (assimilated) career years for the pension calculation. This results in
high participation rates in these schemes and a low average effective retirement age.
Next to the policies that facilitate early retirement, the government also has several mechanisms
that aim to keep workers employed until the FRA. Table 6.10 in the Appendix gives a summary
of the most important programs around the moment of the policy change in 2006, such as the
pension bonus that grants workers who stay employed longer a lump sum increase in their
pension; a structural wage subsidy that lowers employer social security contributions for older
24The health index is based on the consumer price index, excluding “unhealthy" goods such as alcoholic beverages,
tobacco, and motor fuel. It is used to index rent prices, pensions, and certain social security allowances and wages.
25Given that by 2007 everybody in our sample has reached the full retirement age, we do not focus on early
retirement policies after this moment.
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workers, thereby making these older workers more employable and an outplacement mechanism
designed to give laid-off older workers better employability prospects. In general the incentives
provided by these mechanisms are not very strong.26 In more recent years, beyond the scope
of our analysis, the government has tried to make early retirement less appealing and working
longer more so.
Anticipating our estimation strategy, where we compare women just (not) affected by the 2006
reform, we should ensure that the increase in the FRA is the only factor that plays a role. It is
important to rule out the possibility that other factors do not simultaneously affect the treated
group differently than the non-treated group. In the absence of such policies, any difference
in the outcomes between the women treated by the policy and the women not treated by the
policy can be attributed more credibly to the increase in the FRA. As Tables 6.10 and 6.11 in the
Appendix show, there were not many other reforms around 2006. The most important reform
was the Pension Bonus starting in January 2007. This reform is aimed at the same women as
those affected by the reform, as it only concerns pensions started in January 2007 or later and
refers to periods worked since January 2006. However, the incentives given by this policy are
rather weak, as working one day extra after age 62 results in e2 extra pension benefits per year.
Working a full additional year (around 200 working days) then results in a e400 pension increase
per year or e33 per month. Other reforms tried to discourage early exits through levying social
security contributions on employer-paid allowances in the (pseudo) early retirement and time
credit schemes. All these reforms aim at keeping older workers employed longer, either by
promoting employment or by making early labour market exits less profitable. Although most of
these reforms are small in terms of incentives, they could have a minor impact on the effects,
favouring positive employment effects.
6.4 Data and Sample Selection
6.4.1 Database and Final Sample
In this study we evaluate the impact of an increase in the legal retirement age for women from
63 to 64 in January 1, 2006. The pension reform creates a quasi-experimental setting to which
26The pension bonus was only clearly announced late 2005 and workers thus had not much time to anticipate it.
Moreover, Smith et al. (2014) shows that the pension bonus has no impact before 2008.
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we apply a Regression Discontinuity (RD) design (Lalive and Staubli, 2015; Montizaan et al.,
2010; de Grip, Lindeboom, et al., 2012) exploiting the sharp discontinuity in the eligibility
conditions to full retirement; for women eligible to a pension before January 1, 2006 nothing
changes, while the younger women face a change in the eligibility criteria. We then obtain our
results by comparing women just below and above this eligibility threshold. As mentioned in the
institutional review, in this study we do not focus on earlier reforms as our data does not allow us
to do so. Neither do we focus on the 2009 reform, although this could be part of future research.
We use the same administrative data as in Chapter 3, accompanied by the same endogenous
sampling mechanism. We refer the reader to that chapter for more information.27 Note that in
the remainder of this chapter we refer to the endogenous sampling weight Wcr,i as Wi.
Our main analysis is based on a sample representing the full population of women born between
April 1941 and July 1944.28 Women born before the cut-off birth date form our control group,
whereas women born afterwards form the treated group. We focus in our analysis on outcomes in
2006, the year of the reform. We pool the information of all four quarters of that year to increase
sample size. This results in a sample of 98,284 observations of 24.571 women, representing
661,712 observations of 165,428 women in the Belgian population. Columns “Full Sample"
in Table 6.2 report the sample size by birth month for the full sample, where control units are
reported in the top half of the table and treated units in the lower half.
Next to the full unrestricted sample, we also consider a restricted sample consisting of women
more directly exposed to the reform. This approach is similar to the sample selection by Lalive
and Staubli (2015) and Manoli and Weber (2016). The idea is to select women who were still
employed in the private sector right before the reform in 2005q4. From this group, treated
women are confronted with the policy change in the next quarter, while non-treated women are
not. Comparing the employment rate in the private sector then allows us to zoom in on the, in
principal, most affected group. To this end, we select women who were employed in the private
sector or who were employed in the public sector as contractual workers (and hence subject to the
private sector pension regime) in the last quarter of 2005. In other words, we exclude the women
who were in 2005q4 (1) employed as statutory public sector workers (as those women are subject
27More specifically, the description of the database can be found in Section 3.4.1, the endogenous sample in
Section 3.4.2 and the endogenous stratification mechanism in Section 3.B.
28The resulting 40 birth month cohorts are likely sufficient to avoid an underestimation of the standard errors
when we cluster those standard errors by birth month (Lee and Card, 2008).
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to the public sector pension regime which was not affected by the reform), or had been employed
as such before 2006 (up to 1998q2), (2) self-employed, or (3) not employed. This restricted
sample contains 17,316 observations of 4,329 women, representing 24,102 observations of 6,025
women in the Belgian population. The sample size is thus much smaller than the one in our
main analysis, which could lead to a loss in statistical power. Columns “Restricted Sample" in
Table 6.2 report the sample size by birth month for the restricted sample, where control units are
reported in the top half of the table and treated units in the lower half.
6.4.2 Outcome Variables
With our main sample containing the full population of women born between April 1941 and
July 1944 we can calculate the effect of the pension reform on a number of outcomes. More
specifically, we start with a calculation of the effects on participation rates in four broad labour
market categories: employment, pension, early retirement, and a rest category containing all
other labour market states. The categories do not overlap by definition, meaning that when a
woman is observed in one state, she cannot be observed in one of the other states. Hence, the
sum of the participation rates in the four states equals 100%. Additionally, we also include the
private sector employment rate (including contractual public sector workers) and consider this
outcome variable for both the full and restricted sample. All outcome variables are defined at
the last day of each quarter. Table 6.3 contains summary statistics for each of these variables.
Note that, as in our further analysis, these are the summary statistics for the four quarters of 2006
pooled together. We will now discuss the outcome variables in more detail:
(1) Overall employment rate, defined as the share of employed women compared to the total
number of women in our sample. It includes all types of employment we observe in our dataset,
namely salaried private sector employment, salaried public sector employment (both statutory
and contractual workers), and self-employment.
(2) Pension take-up rate, defined as the share of women receiving a full pension compared to
the total number of women in our sample. Note that a full pension can in principle be claimed
before the normal retirement age, either the full amount if the career requirement is met, or a
lower amount if it is not (cf.Section 6.3. A full pension is therefore not necessarily equal to a
pension obtained with full pension rights, but just the term with which we refer to the normal old
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Table 6.2: Sample size by birth month
Full sample Restricted sample1
unweighted weighted2 unweighted weighted
apr/41 1,792 13,955.7 208 208.0
may/41 2,040 18,293.3 260 260.0
jun/41 1,812 14,395.2 216 530.6
jul/41 1,976 15,607.8 220 324.9
aug/41 1,768 14,560.9 200 304.9
sep/41 1,696 14,384.0 200 304.9
oct/41 1,676 13,210.6 216 320.9
nov/41 1,696 12,811.1 224 433.7
dec/41 1,776 13,520.3 184 288.9
jan/42 2,416 18,879.0 296 505.7
feb/42 1,964 14,022.9 256 360.9
mar/42 1,952 16,003.2 216 320.9
apr/42 1,900 13,321.8 240 240.1
may/42 2,092 14,622.7 300 632.8
jun/42 1,988 16,847.2 292 624.8
jul/42 1,984 14,514.6 284 616.8
aug/42 2,000 13,976.2 224 335.0
sep/42 2,144 16,005.3 228 449.9
oct/42 2,056 14,364.9 280 391.0
nov/42 2,108 16,523.7 276 276.1
dec/42 2,320 16,403.2 484 816.8
jan/43 2,664 18,521.4 548 880.9
feb/43 2,304 16,941.6 452 895.7
mar/43 2,820 20,673.4 488 599.1
apr/43 2,940 20,131.6 564 564.1
may/43 3,044 17,951.4 616 736.3
jun/43 2,768 15,751.9 556 556.1
jul/43 2,688 17,114.6 492 612.3
aug/43 2,904 17,931.7 612 972.8
sep/43 2,952 16,176.4 576 696.3
oct/43 3,116 19,466.1 728 968.5
nov/43 3,000 18,147.9 628 1,229.2
dec/43 2,952 14,012.4 632 752.3
jan/44 3,384 20,215.0 704 704.1
feb/44 3,224 18,131.5 728 968.5
mar/44 3,552 21,825.6 680 800.3
apr/44 3,192 17,959.5 760 882.0
may/44 3,552 19,906.1 808 1,052.1
jun/44 2,912 14,506.3 668 668.0
jul/44 3,160 20,124.3 772 1,016.1
Total 98,284 661,712.2 17,316 24,101.7
1 In the Restricted Sample only those women who were employed in the private sector
or as contractual public servant in 2005q4 are retained.
2 Weighted using the endogenous sampling weights Wi.
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age pension.
(3) Early retirement rate, defined as the share of women in a de facto early retirement regime
compared to the total number of women in our sample. We consider bridge pension, unemploy-
ment29, and full-time time credit. We combine these states in one indicator as they, in se, all
allow women to prematurely leave the labour market without having to claim an anticipated
pension. Disability is not included in this indicator, although it would be interesting to consider
it as well in future research (see Table 6.11 in the Appendix). In the remainder of this paper we
refer to all the above regimes when we use the term “early retirement".
(4) Participation rate in other states (“rest category"), which includes all observations that have
not been included in the variables above. It contains observations of women with for example a
registered sickness, a disability benefit, or who are deceased. This indicator ensures that the sum
of participation in all main indicators equals 100%.
(5) Private sector employment rate, which only considers employment in the private sector
and employment of women working as contractual public servants. By construction this rate is
smaller than the overall employment rate. We calculate this rate both for the full sample and the
restricted sample.
6.4.3 Covariates
In our analysis, we include a set of covariates to improve identification. As described above, our
sample consists of women born within a three year period (April 1941-July1944). Consequently,
we expect that these women are relatively homogeneous in their characteristics. Moreover, while
characteristics could gradually change over the birth cohorts, we do not expect a discontinuity at
the threshold birth month of December 1942. We consider two subsets of covariates, namely
personal characteristics and labour market characteristics. A summary of the descriptive statistics
can be found in Table 6.4 below and in Figures 6.3 and 6.4 in Appendix 6.B. As expected (and
more formally measured in Section 6.5.3), there is little difference in the covariate values. For
the dummy variables we consider the biggest category as the reference category.
First, the list of personal characteristics includes the region of residence (Flanders, Brussels,
29Unemployment can be with or without job search requirement, but given that our sample consists of older
women, in practise they did not have to meet this requirement. See Section 6.3 for more details on the institutional
context of these labour market states.
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Table 6.3: Summary statistics for the outcomes, pooling all quarters of 2006
Observations Statistics (weighted by Wi)
Unweighted Weighted1 Mean SD Min Max
Main Outcome Variables, full sample2
Employment 98,284 661,712.2 0.0863 0.2809 0 1
Pension 98,284 661,712.2 0.4688 0.4990 0 1
Early Retirement 98,284 661,712.2 0.0782 0.2685 0 1
Other Status 98,284 661,712.2 0.3666 0.4819 0 1
Private Sector Employment Rate
Full Sample 98,284 661,712.2 0.0350 0.1837 0 1
Restricted Sample3 17,316 24,101.7 0.8747 0.3311 0 1
1 Weighted using the endogenous sampling weights Wi.
2 The sum of the participation rates in each of these categories equals 100%. In other words, being
present in one category precludes individuals to be present in another.
3 In the Restricted Sample only those women who were employed in the private sector or as
contractual public servant in 2005q4 are retained.
or Wallonia), nationality (Belgian or not), marital state (married or not) and the presence of
children in the household (at least one or none). In our database, these variables are available
on a yearly basis from 1998q4 onwards. We use the values at the earliest moment, or the
first moment thereafter at which information is available for the individual.30 Note that as
we define the variables after the announcement of the reform, there is a potential endogeneity
issue. However, we still define the covariates (which are relatively stable over the lifetime and
not directly linked to the reform) eight years before the actual reform and we do not find any
evidence for a discontinuity at the cut-off. An overview of the summary statistics for the personal
characteristics by treatment group can be found in the top half of Table 6.4 below and in Figure
6.3 in Appendix 6.B.
Second, the list of labour market characteristics includes indicators for blue collar work, part-time
work, the full-time equivalent time worked, the number of jobs, the number of years experience
30We impute 3.11-3.26% of the observations, which corresponds to around 10% of the population due to
oversampling of inactive individuals in our database - who have less information. Once the imputation is done, there
are no more missing covariate values.
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and the average monthly earnings. All variables refer to periods before the policy was announced
to avoid endogeneity issues. Most variables are defined for the period 1990-1996, with the
exception of the number of years experience, which refers to all years between age 14 and 1996.
The data is obtained from yearly indicators and only refers to the private sector. Individuals
who did not work in the private sector in that period (other type of employment, unemployment
or inactivity) have a zero indication and not a missing value. More specifically, the blue collar
indicator reports whether the woman has, within the period considered, worked at least one
working day in a blue collar job. The part-time indicator reports whether the woman has, within
the period considered, worked at least one working day on a part-time basis. The full-time
equivalent working time indicator reports the percentage of time the woman has worked on a
full-time equivalent basis within the considered period. The number of jobs indicator reports the
number of firms the woman has been affiliated with in the period considered. The number of
years experience indicator reports the number of years in which the woman had a positive number
of working days and salary from age 14 until 1996.31 Lastly, the average monthly earnings
indicator reports the average monthly salary within the considered period. Only periods with
positive working days and remuneration are considered. An overview of the summary statistics
for the labour market characteristics by treatment group can be found in the bottom half of Table
6.4 below and in Figure 6.4 in Appendix 6.B.
6.5 Empirical Strategy
6.5.1 Identification
We estimate whether women change their labour market behaviour when their full retirement
age (FRA) is increased. This quasi-experimental increase in female FRA is the source of
identification. For women born December 1, 1942 or later the FRA increased from 63 to 64,
while it remained at 63 for women born before this date. In our analysis we estimate the causal
effects of interest by comparing women born within 20 months before this cut-off birth date of
December 1, 1942 (control group) with women born within 20 months after the cut-off (treated
group). Such a comparison results in unbiased estimates of the treatment effect if the women on
31Note that while we define the variable from age 14, most women are only observed from ages 17-18 onwards.
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Table 6.4: Descriptive Statistics of Selected Treated and Control Groups (weighted by Wi)
Controls Treated
Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max
Personal Characteristics
Region of Residence
Brussels 0.0855 0.2797 0 1 0.0869 0.2817 0 1
Flanders 0.6091 0.4880 0 1 0.6092 0.4879 0 1
Wallonia 0.3053 0.4606 0 1 0.3039 0.4599 0 1
Nationality
Belgian 0.9353 0.2459 0 1 0.9352 0.2463 0 1
Non-Belgian 0.0647 0.2459 0 1 0.0648 0.2463 0 1
Marital status
Spouse 0.7627 0.4255 0 1 0.7459 0.4353 0 1
No spouse 0.2373 0.4255 0 1 0.2541 0.4353 0 1
Children in household
Children 0.3443 0.4751 0 1 0.3899 0.4877 0 1
No children 0.6557 0.4751 0 1 0.6101 0.4877 0 1
Labour Market Characteristics1
Worked as blue collar
Yes 0.1368 0.3436 0 1 0.1548 0.3617 0 1
No 0.8632 0.3436 0 1 0.8452 0.3617 0 1
Worked part-time
Yes 0.1785 0.3829 0 1 0.1967 0.3975 0 1
No 0.8215 0.3829 0 1 0.8033 0.3975 0 1
FT-equiv. time worked
Percentage 13.889 28.589 0 100 16.179 30.652 0 100
# Jobs
Number 0.4567 0.9243 0 23 0.5567 1.0449 0 26
# Years experience
Years 11.602 11.570 0 39 12.686 11.622 0 39
Av. monthly earnings
Euro 363.84 811.56 0 12,956 417.56 858.12 0 13,396
Sample size (no Wi) 9,709 14,862
Represented pop. size 74,955 90,473
1 Each variable refers to periods worked in the private sector between 1990-1996, except for #years experience,
which refers to all years worked in the private sector between labour market entry and 1996.
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both sides of the cut-off exhibit similar observable and unobservable characteristics (Lalive and
Staubli, 2015, p. 17-18). A Regression Discontinuity approach with a discontinuity in age is a
special case though:
• Treatment groups are defined using the birth date as assignment variable. We argue that it
is highly unlikely that the parents of the women manipulated the assignment, for similar
reasons as in Lalive and Staubli (2015, p. 19). Moreover, we are not aware of explicit
incentives to give birth between December 1, 1942 and November 30, 1943 as opposed to
the year before. As seasonal effects or effects related to World War II could have driven
birth dates we still control for this in the next section.
• The age-activated treatment studied here might interfere with other policy initiatives using
the same age, which could affect the outcome. However, as shown in Section 6.3, at the
exact moment of the policy change there are no other policy changes. There are a few
minor policy changes around this moment though, but we do not expect them to influence
the results much as the incentives provided in them are rather weak.
• Because treatment is inevitable over time, all women born after the cut-off birth date will
eventually age into the program. Therefore they may anticipate the policy change and
adjust their behaviour accordingly. In our current analysis we focus on 2006 and thus do
not consider this period. However, descriptive plots of the effect over time (not shown
here) do not suggest treated women anticipated the policy change.
6.5.2 Estimation
We evaluate the impact of the change in pension eligibility on our outcomes in 2006. Although
the outcome variables are measured quarterly, we pool all quarters of 2006 by assuming that the
policy has the same impact over the four quarters, thereby measuring the mean impact of the
policy in 2006. We do this for two reasons: (1) this allows to increase the number of observations
in each bin. It amounts to assume that the four quarterly observations measured over 2006 for
the same individual correspond to four different individuals sharing the same birth date. (2) This
makes it easier to interpret the results since they can be generalised to the calendar year rather
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than being quarter-specific.32 Equation 6.2 below shows the main equation we estimate. Observe
that the endogenous sampling weights Wi are taken into account.
√
Wi yi = √Wi ∗ (α+β Di+γ f (Zi)+δ Di∗ f (Zi) +τq+X ′i ζ+εi), (6.2)
with:
• i the individual;
• yi the realisation of the outcome of interest measured at the end of each quarter of 2006;
• Di the treatment dummy, i.e. equal to one if a woman is born between the 1st of December
1942 and the 31st of July 1944, and zero if she is born between the 1st of April 1941 and
the 30th of November 1942. β is then the effect of interest;
• Zi the date of birth (defined at the monthly level), i.e. the forcing variable. We have
normalised this variable at the cut-off (December 1942), such that it ranges between [-20,
19], with -20 corresponding to the birth month April 1941, 0 corresponding to the cut-off
and 19 corresponding to the birth month July 1944. f (⋅) is a polynomial function in Zi of
first, second or third order;
• Di ∗ f (Zi) the interaction(s) between the treatment indicator and the term(s) describing
the function in the forcing variable. In particular, Di ∗Zi is the interaction between the
treatment indicator and the linear term in Zi and it allows the polynomial f (Zi) to have
different slopes at both sides of the cut-off.33
• τq quarterly-specific effects for q = 2,3,4, that are centered at their mean computed over the
calendar year 2006. We show in each last row of the tables containing the regression results
of the global parametric regressions whether the coefficients of the three quarter-specific
effects are jointly non-significant (Tables 6.6 - 6.9). We also tested whether the coefficient
of the policy variable Di can be assumed to be the same for all quarters in 2006. To do so,
we add the interactions between Di and the quarter-specific effects to each specification
and test for every outcome whether these interactions are jointly significant. We report
the P-values of these tests in Table 6.12 in Appendix 6.C. The table shows that for most
32Note that the formal test for pooling is sometimes rejected, suggesting that the outcomes are not always constant
over teh four quarters of 2006.
33In a simpler specification, the interaction is dropped so that the polynomial in Zi is restricted to have the same
slope at both sides of the cut-off.
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variables the coefficients of the quarter-specific policy variable in the second, third and
fourth quarter are not significantly different from the coefficient of the policy variable of
the first quarter. Only for the pension variable there is a slight significant difference over
the quarters (significant at 4.48%).
• Xi a set of covariates (cf. Section 6.4.3) centered at their mean value within the sample;
• εi the individual error terms that are clustered by birth month (40 clusters when the entire
window width is considered), to account for the correlation in the outcomes of different
individuals born in the same month.
For each outcome we estimate the following parametric specifications on the entire window
width:
• Linear specification without spline: it amounts to Eq. 6.2 where f (Zi) is linear and
Di∗ f (Zi) is omitted; here we assume that the relationship between the forcing variable
and the outcome is linear and we impose that the slope of the linear function is the same to
the left and to the right of the cut-off.
• Linear specification with spline: Eq. 6.2 with linear f (Zi) and including Di ∗ f (Zi): the
slope of the linear function is allowed to be different to the left and right of the cut-off.
• Quadratic specification without spline: Eq. 6.2 with quadratic f (Zi) omitting Di∗ f (Zi)
• Quadratic specification with spline: Eq. 6.2 with quadratic f (Zi) including Di∗ f (Zi)
• Cubic specification without spline: Eq. 6.2 with cubic f (Zi) omitting Di∗ f (Zi)
• Cubic specification with spline: Eq. 6.2 with cubic f (Zi) including Di∗ f (Zi)
6.5.3 Validity tests
Validity of an RD design crucially depends on whether individuals can manipulate the assignment
variable Di (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). Manipulation means that individuals are able to sort
themselves around the cut-off and thus that there is no local randomization of the treatment. As
we use the birth date as assignment variable, we argue that manipulation is unlikely to happen.
First, it is highly unlikely that the parents of the women in our sample anticipated the reform
studied here, with the particular birth date cut-off chosen. Moreover, Lee (2008) formally
shows that even when individuals have some control over the assignment variable, as long as
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this control is imprecise - that is, the ex-ante density of the assignment variable is continuous
- the consequence will be local randomization of the treatment. However, while intentional
manipulation appears to be unlikely, seasonal effects, events during World War II or other
policies affecting these particular birth cohorts could have had an impact on the birth dates.
Regarding the latter potential cause for manipulation, we do not know of any formal policies
impacting these particular birth cohorts. To make sure also the former potential causes do not
play a role in our setting, we discuss a graphical and more formal test to rule out manipulation of
the assignment variable. Graphically, we plot the distribution of the assignment variable over the
different birth months. Figure 6.1 shows that there is an upward trend in births over the cohorts
in our sample, but that there does not seem to be a discontinuity at the cut-off, as expected.
Figure 6.1: Density of assignment variable around birth month cut-off
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B: Weighted Data, by Wi
A more formal, indirect, test is proposed by McCrary (2008) and considers the density of the
forcing variable.34 With manipulation, one would expect the density of the forcing variable to be
zero on one side of the cut-off and positive on the other side. Without manipulation, one would
expect that the density of the forcing variable is continuous around the cut-off. McCrary (2008)
uses a two-step procedure to test for such lack of discontinuity. In the first step, the assignment
variable is partitioned into bins and frequencies are computed within those bins. In the second
step these frequency counts are regressed on the forcing variable and the treatment dummy. A
discontinuity in the assignment variable would then suggest that there is some manipulation of
34A direct test is not possible as we observe the assignment status of each individual only once at a given point in
time.
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the assignment variable around the cut-off. The test is not a sufficient indicator for manipulation,
as there could also be manipulators who move in the opposite directions, leading to an overall
continuous outcome (cf. (McCrary, 2008, p.701)). In Table 6.5 we report the results of the
manipulation test. According to the results, there might be a significant discontinuity in the
number of individuals by month of birth at the cut-off of December 1942. However, and in
line with what Figure 6.1 suggests, this is likely driven by the parametric function that is fitted
to the data. The discontinuity is only significant for the linear specification and the quadratic
specification without spline. For the quadratic specification with spline and the cubic specification
there does not appear to be a discontinuity.
Table 6.5: Manipulation test - global parametric estimation - full sample
Linear Quadratic Cubic
No Spline Spline No Spline Spline No Spline Spline
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Di 638.3** 641.1** 638.3** 495.3 550.6 573.1
(300.5) (304.8) (304.0) (471.4) (411.4) (668.9)
Zi 6.9 4.1 7.1 61.5 17.0 10.5
(13.0) (18.7) (13.2) (80.0) (33.4) (221.9)
Zi ∗Di 5.6 -73.5 -6.4
(26.4) (108.2) (283.9)
Z2i 0.3 2.7 0.2 -3.2
(0.6) (3.7) (0.7) (24.2)
Z2i ∗Di -1.6 2.2
(5.2) (32.7)
Z3i -0.0 -0.2
(0.1) (0.8)
Z3i ∗Di 0.3
(1.1)
Constant 3,820.0*** 3,790.5*** 3,786.5*** 4,001.2*** 3,835.3*** 3,901.2***
(173.1) (223.4) (194.5) (364.8) (248.7) (551.5)
Obs. 40 40 40 40 40 40
R-squared 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable is the weighted frequency count of individuals in
each bin.
Second, if the RD design is valid and the no-manipulation assumption holds, adding covariates
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will improve the precision of the estimator without affecting the treatment effect. However, a
discontinuity in one or more of the baseline covariates could change the estimates in an important
way as it might reflect a potential sorting of the assignment variable. We check whether the
observed baseline covariates are locally balanced on either side of the threshold with a graphical
RD analysis, where we replace the dependent variable with each of the observed baseline
covariates (cf. Figure A.1. in Lalive and Staubli (2015)). As discussed in Section 6.4.3, ideally
all covariates are measured before the policy was introduced in 1997 to avoid endogenous effects
from the policy. Due to data limitations part of our covariates are measured in 1998. As this is
still far away from the actual policy change in 2006, we argue that it is unlikely that the affected
women already anticipated this. Indeed, our graphical analysis on the covariates in Figures 6.3
and 6.4 in the Appendix shows that there do not appear to be discontinuities around the cut-off
in the distribution of the covariates.
6.5.4 Descriptive analysis
Before discussing the regression results, we first give an overview of our descriptive evidence
for our main outcome variables in 2006, by treatment group, in Figure 6.2. The horizontal axis
plots the month of birth (where December 1942 - the first treated birth month - has value 0). All
quarters of 2006 are pooled. To calculate the value of each point in the graph (called “bins"), we
estimate a non-parametric regression on the entire window width where the outcome variable is
regressed on bin dummies of varying bin width depending on the level of aggregation shown in
the graph:
yi = bm+τq+X ′i ζ+εi (6.3)
where τq, X
′
i , and εi are defined as for Eq. 6.2. bm refer to bins, which can have the following
size:
• Bin size of 1 month, such that bm in Eq. 6.3 represents 40 dummies.
• Bin size of 2 months, such that bm in Eq. 6.3 represents 20 dummies.
• Bin size of 3 months. To obtain equally spaced bins of three months we restrict the window
width to 18 months on each side of the cut-off, such that bm in Eq. 6.3 represents 12
dummies.
• Bin size of 4 months, such that bm in Eq. 6.3 represents 10 dummies.
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The coefficients of the bin dummies in Equation 6.3 represent the bin averages of the outcomes
at different levels of aggregation. We plot the descriptive graphs for the other bin widths as well
in the figures in Appendix 6.D. In addition we super-impose on these estimates a quadratic fit.35
First, we consider the pension rate in Panel A of Figure 6.2. There is a big difference in pension
take-up between treated and non-treated women. Non-treated women have an average pension
take-up rate of around 65% in 2006, compared to around 30% for treated women. This difference
in pension take-up of around 35pp suggests that the policy succeeds in delaying take-up of a
full pension. Recall that treated women with a career length below 44 years and who do not
want to take an anticipated full pension are expected to claim a full pension on average two years
after the non-treated women (they are on average one year younger and their full retirement age
has been increased by one year). If all treated women would have these characteristics and if
all non-treated women would retire at the full retirement age the difference would be 100pp.
However, some treated women will have reached their career requirement by 2006 (cf. Table
6.4) or take an anticipated full pension and hence the pension take-up rate for treated women is
not zero in panel A of Figure 6.2. Likewise, not all non-treated women can claim a full pension
as some of them were never employed and hence their pension take-up rate is not 100%.
As we constructed our main outcome variables to sum up to 100%, a negative effect on the
pension rate should be compensated by a positive overall effect on the other outcomes (which
it does). Our main interest is however whether part of this compensation is through more
employment among the treated women. If this is the case, then this would be descriptive
evidence that the policy is successful. Panel B of Figure 6.2 shows the employment rate of
treated and non-treated women. The difference at the cut-off is around +2pp. Non-treated
women have an employment rate of around 6-8%, while treated women have an employment
rate of around 10%. Hence, it does not seem that the policy change induced an increase in the
employment rate of treated women.
Consequently, we should find a positive effect on the early retirement rate and/or take-up within
the rest category (panels C and D in Figure 6.2). On the one hand, we find that almost no
non-treated women are in early retirement in 2006, while around 14% of treated women claim
some early retirement benefit. The near zero take-up rate of early retirement among non-treated
35Note that this could also be for example a linear or cubic fit, cf. the discussion in Section 6.5.2. These results
are available from the authors upon requests.
6.5. Empirical Strategy 169
Figure 6.2: Descriptive evidence on the differences in take-up of the main outcome variables in 2006, by
treatment group (all quarters pooled, bin width of three months, quadratic spline, covariates
included, weighted by Wi)
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D: Other categories rate
women is not surprising, as these women have already reached the full retirement age at that
moment and cannot claim an early retirement benefit any more. For the treated women, the
result indicates that they substitute the full pension they would have been able to take without
the policy change for an early retirement benefit. In combination with the employment results it
appears that treated women merely lengthen the time in inactivity in 2006.36 A similar reasoning
can be followed for the rest category with the remaining inactivity such as sickness, disability,
or deceased women. Around 28% of non-treated women is registered in this category in 2006,
much lower than the about 46% of treated women. Again, this difference appears to be driven by
36This interpretation is strengthened by the finding that for the restricted sample of women still active right
before the reform there is only a 2-3pp difference in early retirement take-up (result available from the authors upon
request). The bulk of the effect thus seems to come from those already inactive before 2006.
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treated women who remain longer in this category due to the policy change and not (much) by
employed women transiting from employment to this category.
Overall, the descriptive evidence seems to indicate that the increased full retirement age does
not lead to more employment among treated women. Instead, the evidence suggests that treated
women substitute a full pension for other (social security) benefits until they can claim their full
pension. It should be noted though that at the moment of the policy change a lot of women had
already left employment. The absence of big effects on employment should thus perhaps not be
too surprising. In the next section we discuss the evidence from our regression analysis, where
we also study whether there is an impact on the potentially more affected group of women still
employed right before the policy change.
6.6 Results
In this section we discuss the results of our regression estimates based on Eq. 6.2. In Section
6.6.1 we evaluate the effects of the increased full retirement age from 63 to 64 on our main
outcomes. In Section 6.6.2 we then zoom in on private sector employment, first considering
the effect of the policy change on private sector employment for the full sample and then for
the restricted sample of women still employed right before the policy change, at the end of
2005. We report the regression results for our main results in Tables 6.6 - 6.9 for each of our six
specifications (linear, quadratic, or cubic polynomial, with or without spline).37 We cluster the
standard errors by month of birth to account for both the correlation in the outcomes of different
women born in the same month as the correlation in the outcomes of the same women over the
four quarters of 2006.
The estimates main results confirm our descriptive evidence. Treated Belgian women appear to
claim their full pension later. However, the additional time before claiming the pension is not
spent in employment, as we only find a small effect on employment in 2006. Instead, treated
women seem to substitute the time they would have spent in full retirement without the policy
change by time spent in other early exit regimes. An important factor contributing to this result
is the fact that many women have already left employment before 2006. As time spent in most
early retirement regimes is assimilated to time worked for the pension calculation (cf. Section
37The regression results for the private sector employment rate are reported in Appendix 6.E.
6.6. Results 171
6.3), the findings suggest that many treated women simply prolong their time in one of those
regimes.
We then consider the private sector employment rate, as the policy change should especially
affect this rate. First we consider this rate for the full sample. We find that private sector
employment can explain some but not all of the effect on the general employment rate. Lastly,
we again consider the private sector employment rate, but now for the restricted sample. In
principle this should allow us to zoom in on the potentially most treated women, as they have
not yet left employment before the policy change. However, we are unable to precisely estimate
an effect, possibly due to the limited sample size of the restricted sample.
Hence, overall the reform does not seem to be very effective in increasing employment of older
women. It appears that older women preferred to participate in other assistance schemes or exit
from the labour force rather than contribute longer to the social security system.
6.6.1 Main Results
6.6.1.1 Pension take-up rate
We find a significant discontinuity at the cut-off birth date of December 1, 1942 in Table 6.6.
There is a significant negative effect on the pension take-up rate of around +32pp, which indicates
that the increase in the full retirement age resulted in a delay in the pension take-up among
treated women. The result is robust in size and significance over our six specifications, albeit
that the cubic specification leads to somewhat larger estimates, potentially over-fitting the data
(graphical results available from the authors upon request).
This result is not too surprising, as many Belgian women do not meet the career requirement
mentioned in the institutional review in Section 6.3.38 As a consequence, to avoid a lower
pension they should start their full pension at the full retirement age. We could thus expect that
the policy change, with a tightened career requirement, did not lead to more anticipated pension
claims and thus a delay of the pension claim to the new full retirement age. The estimates
confirm this hypothesis and are in line with our descriptive evidence. Given this finding and the
fact that our outcomes variables sum to 100%, we should see an increase in the participation
38Table 6.4 shows that the average career length is only 12.7 years in 1996 for treated women, such that even
with 10 additional years of experience most women would still have a career length well below the required 44
years to claim an anticipated full pension.
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rates in the other three labour market states we consider.
6.6.1.2 Employment rate
Next, we focus on the employment rate. Given the results for the pension rate, we check whether
treated women remain employed in the additional year until reaching the full retirement age. The
results in Table 6.7 show a small positive effect of the policy change of +1.5 to +3pp. It is only
significant for our quadratic and cubic specifications though, although the linear specifications
are only just insignificant (p-values of 12.7 and 13.9) and graphical inspection suggests that
the linear specification underestimates the effect a little (not shown here, but available from the
authors upon request). Nonetheless, while the effect appears to be small in absolute size, it is
relatively important. Non-treated women right before the cut-off have an employment rate of
just 8% (cf. Panel A in Figure 6.6 in Appendix 6.D), resulting in a relative increase of 18.75 to
37.5%.
The modest increase in employment we find is comparable in size to what Tarantchenko (2016)
reports for the same Belgian reform. However, it is lower than for example the 11pp increase in
female employment that Staubli and Zweimüller (2013) find for Austria. Note that the Austrian
reform is a one year increase in the early retirement age and that their study has a different
sample selection rule. The lower result for Belgium follows the argumentation in the Austrian
study, as they argue that an increase in the early retirement age (ERA) is likely more effective
than an increase in the full retirement age (FRA).39 Moreover, Lefebvre and Orsini (2011) and
Jousten, Sigismondi, et al. (2012) find in their simulation studies for Belgium that partial reforms
that only modify the access to some retirement routes have limited effects. The rather limited
effects on employment could thus also be due to the fact that the reform we study did not change
the abundant early retirement options for Belgian workers.
Although our methodology is closer related to the studies of Lalive and Staubli (2015) and
Manoli and Weber (2016), we cannot easily compare our results to the results found by them.
Both studies consider a sample of labour market attached women, for whom they can calculate
among others the age of exit from employment and the age of claiming a full pension. However,
both studies find a clear positive effect on employment. Manoli and Weber (2016) explain that
39First, the ERA increase forces individuals to postpone benefit claiming, while the FRA increase is equivalent
to a benefit reduction. Second, they follow Gruber and Wise (1999) who find a more pronounced peak in the age
distribution at the early retirement age than at full retirement age.
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Table 6.6: Global parametric regressions on the pension rate - full sample
Linear Quadratic Cubic
No Spline Spline No Spline Spline No Spline Spline
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
βDi -0.3208*** -0.3200*** -0.3096*** -0.3136*** -0.3591*** -0.3716***
(0.0238) (0.0226) (0.0361) (0.0333) (0.0384) (0.0306)
Zi -0.0015 -0.0019** -0.0032 0.0014 0.0117 0.0149*
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0039) (0.0043) (0.0086) (0.0086)
Zi ∗Di 0.0006 -0.0088 0.0001
(0.0018) (0.0075) (0.0142)
Z2i 0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0018* -0.0017
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0010) (0.0011)
Z2i ∗Di 0.0005 -0.0009
(0.0003) (0.0017)
Z3i 0.0001* 0.0001
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Z3i ∗Di 0.0001
(0.0001)
Brussels 0.0029 0.0031 0.0029 0.0027 0.0024 0.0021
(0.0211) (0.0212) (0.0211) (0.0210) (0.0210) (0.0209)
Wallonia 0.0240* 0.0240* 0.0239* 0.0240* 0.0234* 0.0234*
(0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0138)
Non-Belgian -0.1297*** -0.1295*** -0.1301*** -0.1301*** -0.1294*** -0.1287***
(0.0292) (0.0292) (0.0293) (0.0292) (0.0292) (0.0288)
No spouse 0.1635*** 0.1634*** 0.1634*** 0.1632*** 0.1637*** 0.1636***
(0.0139) (0.0139) (0.0140) (0.0139) (0.0140) (0.0139)
Children 0.0032 0.0031 0.0032 0.0034 0.0032 0.0037
(0.0133) (0.0132) (0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0133)
PT work 0.0044 0.0044 0.0044 0.0042 0.0046 0.0043
(0.0152) (0.0152) (0.0153) (0.0152) (0.0153) (0.0153)
Blue collar 0.0091 0.0090 0.0090 0.0088 0.0097 0.0099
(0.0164) (0.0164) (0.0164) (0.0164) (0.0163) (0.0164)
FTE time worked -0.0026*** -0.0026*** -0.0026*** -0.0026*** -0.0026*** -0.0026***
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Number of jobs -0.0304*** -0.0303*** -0.0303*** -0.0301*** -0.0306*** -0.0304***
(0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0048)
Experience 0.0106*** 0.0106*** 0.0106*** 0.0106*** 0.0106*** 0.0106***
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011)
Earnings 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Constant 0.6450*** 0.6417*** 0.6395*** 0.6536*** 0.6655*** 0.6797***
(0.0119) (0.0112) (0.0172) (0.0173) (0.0202) (0.0162)
Observations 98,284 98,284 98,284 98,284 98,284 98,284
R-squared 0.1813 0.1813 0.1813 0.1815 0.1817 0.1821
P-value Q2=3=4=0 0.00378 0.00378 0.00378 0.00378 0.00378 0.00378
F-test Q2=3=4=0 5.271 5.271 5.271 5.271 5.271 5.271
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors clustered by month of birth. Entire sample, pooling all quarters in 2006, full
window width (40 months). Quarterly-specific effects included, centered at the mean computed over 2006. Covariates centered at
the mean computed over the sample. Omitted categories: Q1 dummy, living in Flanders, Belgian nationality, married, no children,
not working part-time in 90-96, not working as blue collar in 90-96. Covariates Brussels, Wallonia, Non-Belgian, No spouse, and
Children computed in 1998q4. Covariates part-time (PT) work, Blue collar, Full-time equivalent (FTE) time worked, Number of jobs,
and Earnings computed based on private sector labour market experience in 1990-1996. Experience counts the total years of private
sector experience from labour market entry until 1996.
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this result is obtained because treated individuals remain longer in their pre-retirement jobs. At
least for our full sample we do not find such effect. In Section 6.6.2 we will check whether we
find a different result for the restricted sample of women still employed right before the reform.
6.6.1.3 Early retirement rate
For our third outcome, participation in an early retirement scheme, we find a larger effect of
+14pp in Table 6.8. It thus appears that instead of being employed in 2006, treated women
claim an early retirement benefit in the extra year, de facto substituting the full pension with
the early retirement benefit. However, in line with Tarantchenko (2016) we argue that the effect
is likely not so much due to new transitions of treated women towards early retirement but
rather because already inactive women remain there one year longer until they reach the new full
retirement age (i.e. the effect is partly mechanical). This argumentation is strengthened by the
finding that for our restricted sample of women still employed right before the policy change the
effect on early retirement is only 2-3pp. Given that the restricted sample contains 17.6% of the
observations, the effect on transitions from employment to early retirement at the moment of the
policy change can only explain around 0.35 to 0.53pp of the total 14pp effect. It is important to
note that substitution of time with a full pension by time in certain early retirement schemes can
partly shift the burden of the policy change from the government to employers (cf. Duggan et al.
(2007)). For Belgium this is for example the case for the bridge pension, where the employer
pays a top-up to the early retiree. Holding the age of effective labour market exit constant, the
employer then has to pay for an additional year.
The relatively large positive (spillover) effect on the early retirement rate is also found in several
other studies. For Austria, Staubli and Zweimüller (2013) find large spillover effects on the
unemployment insurance program (+12pp for women) but small effects on disability insurance.
Remarkably, Manoli and Weber (2016) do not find this, although the two studies cannot be
compared as such due to their different set-up and sample. However, the former study offers a
potential explanation for the lack of an effect on disability insurance for the two Austrian studies.
As both samples consist of labour market attached women, it could be that at the moment of
sample selection women going to disability insurance had already left the labour market. This
reasoning is consistent with our finding for Belgium that the effect on early retirement is largely
due to women who had already left the labour market prior to the policy change. Lalive and
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Table 6.7: Global parametric regressions on the employment rate - full sample
Linear Quadratic Cubic
No Spline Spline No Spline Spline No Spline Spline
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
βDi 0.0155 0.0144 0.0244** 0.0216** 0.0299** 0.0305**
(0.0099) (0.0096) (0.0115) (0.0102) (0.0138) (0.0140)
Zi 0.0010* 0.0014** -0.0004 0.0005 -0.0020 -0.0046
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0015) (0.0019) (0.0047) (0.0070)
Zi ∗Di -0.0008 -0.0012 0.0044
(0.0010) (0.0027) (0.0095)
Z2i 0.0001 0.0000 0.0003 0.0006
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0006) (0.0009)
Z2i ∗Di 0.0000 -0.0006
(0.0001) (0.0013)
Z3i -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Z3i ∗Di 0.0000
(0.0000)
Brussels 0.0398** 0.0396** 0.0398** 0.0396** 0.0399** 0.0397**
(0.0150) (0.0150) (0.0150) (0.0150) (0.0150) (0.0150)
Wallonia 0.0287*** 0.0287*** 0.0287*** 0.0286*** 0.0287*** 0.0287***
(0.0084) (0.0084) (0.0084) (0.0084) (0.0084) (0.0084)
Non-Belgian -0.0468*** -0.0469*** -0.0472*** -0.0472*** -0.0472*** -0.0471***
(0.0107) (0.0107) (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0106)
No spouse 0.0396*** 0.0397*** 0.0395*** 0.0396*** 0.0395*** 0.0396***
(0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0073)
Children 0.0129** 0.0130** 0.0129** 0.0130** 0.0129** 0.0130**
(0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0057)
PT work 0.0340*** 0.0340*** 0.0339*** 0.0339*** 0.0339*** 0.0338***
(0.0118) (0.0118) (0.0118) (0.0118) (0.0118) (0.0118)
Blue collar -0.0102 -0.0101 -0.0102 -0.0101 -0.0103 -0.0101
(0.0109) (0.0108) (0.0109) (0.0108) (0.0109) (0.0108)
FTE time worked 0.0016*** 0.0016*** 0.0016*** 0.0016*** 0.0016*** 0.0016***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Number of jobs 0.0118*** 0.0117*** 0.0118*** 0.0118*** 0.0119*** 0.0118***
(0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0041)
Experience -0.0036*** -0.0036*** -0.0036*** -0.0036*** -0.0036*** -0.0036***
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Earnings -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Constant 0.0774*** 0.0818*** 0.0730*** 0.0786*** 0.0701*** 0.0689***
(0.0061) (0.0063) (0.0069) (0.0066) (0.0076) (0.0114)
Observations 98,284 98,284 98,284 98,284 98,284 98,284
R-squared 0.0353 0.0354 0.0354 0.0354 0.0354 0.0354
P-value Q2=3=4=0 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001
F-test Q2=3=4=0 12.59 12.59 12.59 12.59 12.59 12.59
Same comments as for Table 6.6
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Staubli (2015) also find a positive effect on unemployment (+0.5pp) and disability insurance
(+1 to 2pp) inflow in their Swiss study. This effect is comparable in size to the effect for our
restricted sample. Finally, Duggan et al. (2007) find spillover effects on social security disability
insurance for the US.
6.6.1.4 Other LM states rate
Finally, we find a significant positive effect of around 14 to 16.5pp on the rest category in Table
6.9. Again, the considerably bigger effect for the cubic specifications are likely due to over-fitting
the data (results available from the authors upon request). The reason for this effect is in line
with that for the early retirement rate. The effect is largely due to treated women remaining
in their inactivity status one year longer instead of transitioning there from employment at the
moment of the policy change. Given that disability insurance and mortality are part of the rest
category, this is not very surprising. Note that due to data limitations we do not observe the exact
social security status for each individual and thus cannot draw too many additional conclusions
from this category.
6.6.2 Private sector employment rate
In our main analysis we focussed on employment in the broad sense, combining private and public
sector salaried employment and self-employment. However, given that the reform of interest
should have had its strongest impact on employees in private sector salaried employment40, we
zoom in on this category. By doing so we can assess whether this indicator can explain the
bulk of the effect we found for the overall employment rate. First we consider the private sector
employment rate for the full sample, to see whether there are any effects in the population. In a
second step we consider this outcome for our restricted sample of women still employed right
before the reform. In principle this analysis should allow us to focus on the potentially most
treated women, as they have not yet left employment before the policy change. Moreover, the
sample we use for this analysis is also more similar to the studies discussed above, as they select
also select women still employed at the start of their analysis.
40Women in self-employment were also affected by the reform, but given the limited information we have on
self-employment spells we do not focus on those women here.
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Table 6.8: Global parametric regressions on the early retirement rate - full sample
Linear Quadratic Cubic
No Spline Spline No Spline Spline No Spline Spline
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
βDi 0.1403*** 0.1401*** 0.1428*** 0.1433*** 0.1106*** 0.1208***
(0.0126) (0.0117) (0.0154) (0.0127) (0.0244) (0.0209)
Zi -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0007 -0.0014** 0.0090 -0.0024
(0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0018) (0.0007) (0.0061) (0.0024)
Zi ∗Di -0.0002 0.0012 0.0193*
(0.0008) (0.0034) (0.0104)
Z2i 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0012* 0.0002
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0007) (0.0003)
Z2i ∗Di -0.0001 -0.0025**
(0.0002) (0.0012)
Z3i 0.0000* -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Z3i ∗Di 0.0001**
(0.0000)
Brussels -0.0137 -0.0138 -0.0137 -0.0137 -0.0141 -0.0139
(0.0118) (0.0117) (0.0118) (0.0118) (0.0117) (0.0117)
Wallonia 0.0097 0.0097 0.0097 0.0097 0.0094 0.0095
(0.0077) (0.0077) (0.0078) (0.0077) (0.0077) (0.0077)
Non-Belgian 0.0304** 0.0304** 0.0303** 0.0303** 0.0308** 0.0316**
(0.0148) (0.0148) (0.0146) (0.0146) (0.0143) (0.0141)
No spouse 0.0207*** 0.0207*** 0.0207*** 0.0207*** 0.0209*** 0.0210***
(0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0065)
Children 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0009
(0.0063) (0.0063) (0.0063) (0.0063) (0.0063) (0.0063)
PT work -0.0413*** -0.0413*** -0.0413*** -0.0413*** -0.0411*** -0.0414***
(0.0121) (0.0121) (0.0121) (0.0121) (0.0121) (0.0122)
Blue collar 0.0281 0.0281 0.0281 0.0281 0.0285 0.0289
(0.0181) (0.0180) (0.0181) (0.0180) (0.0181) (0.0181)
FTE time worked 0.0014*** 0.0014*** 0.0014*** 0.0014*** 0.0014*** 0.0014***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Number of jobs 0.0293*** 0.0292*** 0.0293*** 0.0292*** 0.0291*** 0.0291***
(0.0061) (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0060)
Experience 0.0042*** 0.0042*** 0.0042*** 0.0042*** 0.0042*** 0.0042***
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Earnings -0.0000* -0.0000* -0.0000* -0.0000* -0.0000* -0.0000*
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Constant 0.0016 0.0026 0.0004 -0.0014 0.0173 -0.0033
(0.0049) (0.0023) (0.0072) (0.0021) (0.0132) (0.0039)
Observations 98,284 98,284 98,284 98,284 98,284 98,284
R-squared 0.1855 0.1855 0.1855 0.1855 0.1861 0.1866
P-value Q2=3=4=0 0.133 0.133 0.133 0.133 0.133 0.133
F-test Q2=3=4=0 1.981 1.981 1.981 1.981 1.981 1.981
Same comments as for Table 6.6
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Table 6.9: Global parametric regressions on the other categories rate - full sample
Linear Quadratic Cubic
No Spline Spline No Spline Spline No Spline Spline
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
βDi 0.1650*** 0.1655*** 0.1424*** 0.1487*** 0.2186*** 0.2203***
(0.0265) (0.0248) (0.0404) (0.0373) (0.0471) (0.0406)
Zi 0.0010 0.0008 0.0044 -0.0005 -0.0186* -0.0080
(0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0045) (0.0041) (0.0102) (0.0101)
Zi ∗Di 0.0004 0.0088 -0.0238
(0.0022) (0.0085) (0.0173)
Z2i -0.0002 0.0001 0.0027** 0.0009
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0012) (0.0012)
Z2i ∗Di -0.0004 0.0040**
(0.0004) (0.0020)
Z3i -0.0001** -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Z3i ∗Di -0.0002**
(0.0001)
Brussels -0.0290 -0.0289 -0.0289 -0.0286 -0.0282 -0.0279
(0.0201) (0.0202) (0.0201) (0.0200) (0.0201) (0.0199)
Wallonia -0.0624*** -0.0624*** -0.0623*** -0.0623*** -0.0616*** -0.0616***
(0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0103) (0.0102)
Non-Belgian 0.1460*** 0.1461*** 0.1469*** 0.1470*** 0.1458*** 0.1442***
(0.0310) (0.0309) (0.0311) (0.0310) (0.0308) (0.0302)
No spouse -0.2238*** -0.2239*** -0.2236*** -0.2236*** -0.2241*** -0.2243***
(0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0111)
Children -0.0167 -0.0167 -0.0167 -0.0169 -0.0168 -0.0177
(0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0142) (0.0142) (0.0142)
PT work 0.0029 0.0029 0.0030 0.0031 0.0026 0.0033
(0.0135) (0.0135) (0.0135) (0.0134) (0.0136) (0.0136)
Blue collar -0.0270 -0.0270 -0.0269 -0.0269 -0.0280* -0.0287*
(0.0162) (0.0161) (0.0162) (0.0161) (0.0162) (0.0162)
FTE time worked -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Number of jobs -0.0106* -0.0106* -0.0108* -0.0109* -0.0104* -0.0105*
(0.0059) (0.0059) (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0060)
Experience -0.0111*** -0.0111*** -0.0111*** -0.0112*** -0.0111*** -0.0112***
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Earnings -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Constant 0.2759*** 0.2739*** 0.2872*** 0.2692*** 0.2471*** 0.2548***
(0.0137) (0.0115) (0.0193) (0.0182) (0.0243) (0.0218)
Observations 98,284 98,284 98,284 98,284 98,284 98,284
R-squared 0.2094 0.2094 0.2095 0.2097 0.2104 0.2115
P-value Q2=3=4=0 0.602 0.602 0.602 0.602 0.602 0.602
F-test Q2=3=4=0 0.627 0.627 0.627 0.627 0.627 0.627
Same comments as for Table 6.6
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For the full sample we find a positive effect of +1 to 1.5pp in Table 6.13 in Appendix 6.E (again,
the much bigger effects for the cubic polynomials appear to be due to over-fitting the data).
This effect is a little smaller than the one we found for the overall employment rate. Hence this
outcome can explain some but not all of the effect on the broader outcome, possibly because
there is also an effect on the self-employment rate. Note that the effect is not significant in all
specifications, which is likely linked to the relatively low participation rates in this outcome (cf.
Figure 6.9 in Appendix 6.D).
Finally, we consider the private sector employment rate for the restricted sample of women
employed in the private sector right before the policy change. In principle this sample contains
those women most affected by the reform, as they still have the option to transition to any of
the other states at the moment of the policy change. A clear positive effect on private sector
employment would then indicate that the policy is able to extend careers. Table 6.14 in Appendix
6.E shows the regression results of this analysis and Figure 6.10 in Appendix 6.D contains the
descriptive graphs.
The results in the Table are highly insignificant and even become negative for some specifications.
The reason for the imprecise results can likely be attributed to the much smaller sample size.
This is supported by the observation that there is much more variation between the bins in the
Figure than for the unrestricted sample. Nonetheless, both visually and using our regression
analysis it seems the effect on private sector employment does not differ much between the
treated and non-treated women. In contrast to for example Manoli and Weber (2016), it thus
does not seem that treated Belgian women remain longer in their pre-retirement job.
6.7 Conclusion
This paper evaluates the effect on employment and labour market exit of an exogenous increase
in the full retirement age for Belgian women in 2006, from 63 to 64. In recent years many EU
countries have introduced similar measures with the aim to raise the average effective retirement
age. The idea is that the basic pension value remains the same but that people have to work
longer to obtain it. Retirement at the previous retirement age results in a reduced pension (OECD,
2006). Evidence on the effectiveness of these changes suggests that increasing the eligibility age
to (early) retirement can be successful in prolonging careers. Comparable studies to our own by
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among others Lalive and Staubli (2015), Manoli and Weber (2016), or Staubli and Zweimüller
(2013) show a positive impact on the age at which the labour market is left or the employment
rate.
We contribute to this literature by studying a country where workers have many early retirement
options. As a result of this institutional context, the employment rate of Belgian older workers
is relatively low and workers have an average effective retirement age that is more than five
years below the full retirement age. Given that the policy was announced well before it was
implemented and at a moment where the women in our sample could not yet claim early
retirement benefits, affected women potentially had the time to adjust their careers. However, the
reform was only partial as it only involved the full retirement age and not the other early exit
schemes. This could limit the potential effect of the policy on labour market outcomes, as the
simulation results of Lefebvre and Orsini (2011) and Jousten, Sigismondi, et al. (2012) suggest.
Additionally, we evaluate the policy for the full population as well as for a more labour market
attached sample.
We find a significant negative effect of 32pp on the pension take-up rate in 2006. The policy
thus seems to have the expected effect, namely that Belgian women start to claim their full
pension later. However, treated women seem to substitute the time they would have spent in full
retirement without the policy change by time spent in early exit regimes. We only find a relatively
small effect on employment of 2pp. We do not find any effect on private sector employment for
our analysis on a subsample of women still employed right before the reform, possibly due to
the limited sample size.
An first important contributing factor to these results is the fact that many women have already
left employment before 2006. This suggests that although there was a long period between
the announcement of the policy and the actual implementation, treated women did not seem to
change their behaviour prior to the policy change. In general they are not heavily punished for
doing so as time spent in most early retirement regimes is assimilated to time worked for the
pension calculation. Hence, at the moment of the policy change there is little potential left for
the policy to have a strong effect.
Second, we argue that an another important driver of our results is the fact that the policy change
only involved the normal retirement scheme and not the many early retirement schemes. Treated
women could substitute full retirement with early retirement without receiving a much lower
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pension as the time in early retirement is assimilated to working time. Our results suggest that in
countries with many early retirement options it is important to consider the universe of (early)
retirement policies at once to give correct incentives. This is in line with the results from the
microsimulations in Lefebvre and Orsini (2011) and Jousten, Sigismondi, et al. (2012).
Our analysis has a few limitations. First, in line with the comparable studies mentioned above,
we only consider the effects of the policy on the extensive margin of labour force participation.
However, there might be other effects of the policy as well. de Grip, Lindeboom, et al. (2012)
find an adverse effect on mental health of treated older workers.41 In turn, this could influence
the decision to continue working after the policy change and limit the effectiveness of the policy
change (Hanel and Riphahn, 2012). Second, with our current sample we are unable to calculate
certain outcomes, such as the age of exit from employment. On the one hand, not all workers in
our sample are employed during the period of analysis, on the other hand not all workers exit
employment during this period.
Finally, we can think of several avenues for future research. A first possibility is to incorporate
the 2009 reform of the female full retirement age in our study as our data covers this period
as well. Pooling the data of the 2006 and 2009 reforms might give us a sufficient number of
observations to get good inference for our restricted sample. However, it should be formally
tested whether the data from the two reforms can be pooled. Another possibility would be to
further decompose our outcome variables to get a better understanding of the channels through
which the policy change works. Especially within the rest category we could discern several
categories such as sickness and mortality. A last avenue for future research we want to discuss
here would be to stratify our sample by the income level and the health status. Staubli and
Zweimüller (2013) find different effects for less healthy, low-wage workers compared to healthy,
high-wage workers. Workers in the former category appear to be protected from the policy
change as they can enter other government programs. The latter appear to be working longer in
response to the policy change. It would be interesting to see whether this result also holds for
Belgium, as the effects on employment are somewhat more limited than in the Austrian study.
41The authors note that mental health could also have been affected by the late announcement of the policy change
and the perceived unfairness towards younger generations, as both factors are beyond the control of the worker.
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6.A Policies related to early exit from the labour market
Table 6.10: Policies preventing early exits in Belgium around January 2006
Name Short Description
1. Pension bonus Pensions starting 1/1/2007 or later are increased with a lump
sum allowance for every day worked after the eligibility age
(62) or the eligibility career length (44). These days have to
be worked January 1, 2006 or later and up to 30 non-working
days can be assimilated under certain conditions.
2. Outplacement Professional job search assistance for laid-off workers aged
at least 45, to prevent early LM exit. Exists since July 1,
2002 for workers with ≥ 1y seniority in the firm. Since
April 1, 2006 this scheme is more intense in sectors under
restructuring or firms in difficulties. Participants receive their
normal salary from the previous employer. The scheme is
not aimed at workers above 58 as they are already exempted
from job search (see Table 6.11).
3. Late retirement It is possible to work beyond the FRA, for example to im-
prove the pension allowance, as this only covers the last 43
(44) career years. However, incentives to work after the FRA
are in general weak, as earnings above certain limits result
in a withdrawal of the pension allowances for as long as the
earnings are too high.
4. Structural wage
subsidy
Employer social security contributions for employees aged
58 are decreased since 1/4/2002. This age has been de-
creased to 57 since 2004 and 50 since 1/4/07, but irrelevant
for our sample).
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Table 6.11: Policies allowing early exits in Belgium around January 2006
Name Short Description Replacement Age Impact on Pension
Income (Career)1
1. Anticipated Full
Pension
Anticipate start of the full pension with same characteristics as full pension
after FRA.
Same calculation as
full pension
60
(35)
Fewer years of pension contribution imply
lower pension. No actuarial reduction in
full pension.2
2. Early retirement
(bridge pension)
Unemployment benefits (UB) in combination with allowance from previous
employer. Eligibility requirements can differ by sector. Recipients are not
expected to take up a new position.
UB + 1/2(last net
salary-UB)3
58
(25)
Need to stay in early retirement until FRA,
anticipated full pension not possible.
Period is assimilated to working period.
3. Pseudo Early
Retirement (Canada
Dry)
Same as normal Early Retirement, but based on an agreement between the
employer and the employee.4
UB + lump sum
payment from
employer3
45
(none)
Need to stay in pseudo early retirement
until FRA, anticipated full pension not
possible. Period is assimilated to working
period.
4. Involuntary
unemployment of
older workers
Removal of job search requirements, including the need to stay available on
the labour market or be registered as job seeker.
UB + old age
supplement3
58
(none)
Period is assimilated to working period.
5. Full-time time
credit
Allows workers to fully interrupt career in return for an allowance from the
government. Number of years in the scheme is limited.4
Lump sum allowance none
(none)
Up to 3y assimilated to working time.
6. Part-time time
credit for older
workers
Allows workers aged 50+ to reduce working time by 20 or 50% of a
full-time job until reaching the FRA. Participation can be interrupted. Part
of wage loss compensated by government.4
Remaining salary +
lump sum allowance
50
(5y tenure +
20y career)
Period is assimilated to working period.
7. Sickness and
Disability scheme
Provides benefits for individuals that suffer from a loss of their earnings
capacity in their usual job of at least 66% due to sickness or disability for
more than 12 months. The first 12 months are covered by the sickness
insurance.
65% of earnings
before injury (lower
if living alone).
none
(5y paid
contributions5)
Period is assimilated to working period.
1 Age eligibility (“Age") and the career length requirement (“Career") do not change around 2006. 2 For self-employed workers there is a penalty, which becomes bigger the more the pension is anticipated. 3 Unemployment benefits (UB)
are usually calculated at 60% of the last gross salary, subject to certain maxima. 4 From April 1, 2006 onwards social security contributions are levied on the (extra) allowances paid by the employer for the allowances started in 2006. This
excludes 20% reductions in working time of the old-age part-time time credit scheme. 5 At least three of those five years must have been during the last five years. There is no career requirement for professional diseases or accidents at
work.
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6.B Distribution of the Covariates around the Cut-Off
Figure 6.3: Distribution of personal characteristics per birth month (weighted by Wi)
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A: Share of women living in Brussels
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B: Share of women living in Flanders
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C: Share of women living in Wallonia
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D: Share of women with Belgian nationality
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E: Share of women with a spouse
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F: Share of women with children
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Figure 6.4: Distribution of private sector labour market characteristics per birth month (weighted by Wi)
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A: Share of women with blue collar experience (’90-
’96)
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B: Share of women with part-time experience (’90-
’96)
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C: Number of jobs (’90-’96)
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D: Full-timme equivalent working time (’90-’96)
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6.C Test for pooling all quarters of 2006
Table 6.12: Test that the policy variable is the same for all quarters of 2006
Linear Quadratic Cubic
No Spline Spline No Spline Spline No Spline Spline
Outcome (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Overall employment 0.16476 0.16476 0.16476 0.16477 0.16476 0.16477
Pension take-up 0.04477 0.04478 0.04478 0.04478 0.04478 0.04478
Early retirement 0.11380 0.11381 0.11381 0.11381 0.11381 0.11382
Other states 0.28174 0.28175 0.28175 0.28175 0.28175 0.28176
Private sector employment 0.54663 0.54663 0.54663 0.54664 0.54664 0.54665
The table reports the P-value of testing that the coefficients of the quarter-specific policy variable (τq * Di) that we add for this test to our
main equation 6.2 are jointly not significantly different from zero. We estimate this test on the full sample, clustering standard errors by
month of birth, pooling all quarters in 2006 and using the full window width (40 months).
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6.D Descriptive Graphical Results for all Outcomes
6.D.1 Pension Take-Up Rate
Figure 6.5: Graphical presentation - effect on pension rate
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6.D.2 Employment Rate
Figure 6.6: Graphical presentation - effect on employment rate
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6.D.3 Early Retirement Rate
Figure 6.7: Graphical presentation - effect on early retirement rate
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6.D.4 Other Statuses Rate
Figure 6.8: Graphical presentation - effect on other status rate
21
24
27
30
33
36
39
42
45
48
51
54
57
R
at
e 
in
 p
p.
-21 -18 -15 -12 -9 -6 -3 0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21
forcing variable=birthdate-cutoff(1/12/1942)
 born 04/41-11/42
 born 12/42-07/44
Quarter dummies included (Q1 reference). Bin-width of 1M. Quadratic fit. Incl. covariates.
A: Monthly bins + quadratic spline
24
26
28
30
32
34
36
38
40
42
44
46
48
50
R
at
e 
in
 p
p.
-21 -18 -15 -12 -9 -6 -3 0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21
forcing variable=birthdate-cutoff(1/12/1942)
 born 04/41-11/42
 born 12/42-07/44
Quarter dummies included (Q1 reference). Bin-width of 2M. Quadratic fit. Incl. covariates.
B: Two-monthly bins + quadratic spline
24
26
28
30
32
34
36
38
40
42
44
46
48
50
R
at
e 
in
 p
p.
-18 -15 -12 -9 -6 -3 0 3 6 9 12 15 18
forcing variable=birthdate-cutoff(1/12/1942)
 born 04/41-11/42
 born 12/42-07/44
Centered Q dummies included(Q1 ref). Bin-width of 3M. Quadratic fit. Incl. covariates.
C: Tri-monthly bins + quadratic spline
24
26
28
30
32
34
36
38
40
42
44
46
48
50
R
at
e 
in
 p
p.
-21 -18 -15 -12 -9 -6 -3 0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21
forcing variable=birthdate-cutoff(1/12/1942)
 born 04/41-11/42
 born 12/42-07/44
Quarter dummies included (Q1 reference). Bin-width of 4M. Quadratic fit. Incl. covariates.
D: Four-monthly bins + quadratic spline
6.D. Descriptive Graphical Results for all Outcomes 191
6.D.5 Private Sector Employment Rate (full sample)
Figure 6.9: Graphical presentation - effect on private sector employment rate
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Quarter dummies included (Q1 reference). Bin-width of 1M. Quadratic fit. Incl. covariates.
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6.D.6 Private Sector Employment Rate (restricted sample)
Figure 6.10: Graphical presentation - effect on private sector employment rate
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6.E Regression results for Private Sector Employment
Table 6.13: Global parametric regressions on the private sector employment rate - full sample
Linear Quadratic Cubic
No Spline Spline No Spline Spline No Spline Spline
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
βDi 0.0097 0.0100 0.0129 0.0161* 0.0240*** 0.0294***
(0.0070) (0.0068) (0.0100) (0.0086) (0.0087) (0.0074)
Zi 0.0003 0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0020* -0.0035* -0.0050
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0020) (0.0030)
Zi ∗Di 0.0002 0.0031 0.0009
(0.0006) (0.0019) (0.0039)
Z2i 0.0000 0.0001** 0.0004* 0.0005
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0004)
Z2i ∗Di -0.0001 0.0002
(0.0001) (0.0005)
Z3i -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Z3i ∗Di -0.0000
(0.0000)
Brussels 0.0250** 0.0251** 0.0250** 0.0252** 0.0251** 0.0253**
(0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0102)
Wallonia 0.0077* 0.0077* 0.0076* 0.0077* 0.0077* 0.0078*
(0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0039)
Non-Belgian -0.0125* -0.0124* -0.0126* -0.0126* -0.0128* -0.0129*
(0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0066) (0.0066)
No spouse 0.0174*** 0.0174*** 0.0174*** 0.0173*** 0.0173*** 0.0172***
(0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0042)
Children 0.0105*** 0.0105*** 0.0105*** 0.0104*** 0.0105*** 0.0103***
(0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030)
PT work 0.0448*** 0.0448*** 0.0448*** 0.0448*** 0.0447*** 0.0448***
(0.0064) (0.0064) (0.0064) (0.0064) (0.0064) (0.0064)
Blue collar 0.0028 0.0028 0.0028 0.0028 0.0027 0.0025
(0.0085) (0.0085) (0.0085) (0.0085) (0.0084) (0.0085)
FTE time worked 0.0019*** 0.0019*** 0.0019*** 0.0019*** 0.0019*** 0.0019***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Number of jobs 0.0089*** 0.0089*** 0.0089*** 0.0089*** 0.0090*** 0.0090***
(0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0025)
Experience -0.0020*** -0.0020*** -0.0020*** -0.0020*** -0.0020*** -0.0020***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Earnings -0.0000* -0.0000* -0.0000* -0.0000* -0.0000* -0.0000*
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Constant 0.0295*** 0.0281*** 0.0279*** 0.0200*** 0.0221*** 0.0142**
(0.0036) (0.0047) (0.0054) (0.0045) (0.0047) (0.0054)
Observations 98,284 98,284 98,284 98,284 98,284 98,284
R-squared 0.0796 0.0796 0.0796 0.0797 0.0797 0.0800
Quarter dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
P-value Q2=3=4=0 0.000003 0.000003 0.000003 0.000003 0.000003 0.000003
F-test Q2=3=4=0 13.91 13.91 13.91 13.91 13.91 13.91
Same comments as for Table 6.6
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Table 6.14: Global parametric regressions on the private sector employment rate - restricted
sample
Linear Quadratic Cubic
No Spline Spline No Spline Spline No Spline Spline
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
βDi -0.0086 -0.0288 -0.0276 -0.0147 0.0058 0.0633
(0.0441) (0.0444) (0.0695) (0.0706) (0.0796) (0.0761)
Z
i 0.0019 0.0056* 0.0048 -0.0062 -0.0058 -0.0393
(0.0019) (0.0032) (0.0072) (0.0146) (0.0168) (0.0243)
Zi ∗Di -0.0052 0.0164 0.0426
(0.0039) (0.0165) (0.0318)
Z2i -0.0001 0.0006 0.0012 0.0044
(0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0020) (0.0027)
Z2i ∗Di -0.0011 -0.0040
(0.0008) (0.0036)
Z3i -0.0000 -0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Z3i ∗Di 0.0001
(0.0001)
Brussels 0.0253 0.0242 0.0245 0.0227 0.0241 0.0232
(0.0264) (0.0262) (0.0267) (0.0263) (0.0268) (0.0263)
Wallonia 0.0340 0.0325 0.0342 0.0325 0.0338 0.0323
(0.0209) (0.0207) (0.0208) (0.0203) (0.0210) (0.0205)
Non-Belgian -0.0593 -0.0557 -0.0582 -0.0537 -0.0562 -0.0525
(0.0523) (0.0525) (0.0517) (0.0529) (0.0515) (0.0528)
No spouse -0.0028 -0.0025 -0.0025 -0.0023 -0.0024 -0.0024
(0.0232) (0.0234) (0.0231) (0.0230) (0.0231) (0.0229)
Children 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0009 -0.0004 -0.0016
(0.0214) (0.0213) (0.0214) (0.0212) (0.0213) (0.0209)
PT work -0.0014 -0.0031 -0.0010 -0.0023 -0.0011 -0.0021
(0.0207) (0.0204) (0.0207) (0.0204) (0.0206) (0.0202)
Blue collar -0.0152 -0.0174 -0.0152 -0.0193 -0.0154 -0.0200
(0.0306) (0.0299) (0.0305) (0.0300) (0.0304) (0.0300)
FTE time worked 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Number of jobs 0.0017 0.0017 0.0016 0.0016 0.0017 0.0017
(0.0072) (0.0072) (0.0072) (0.0072) (0.0072) (0.0071)
Experience -0.0022** -0.0023** -0.0022** -0.0022** -0.0021** -0.0022**
(0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010)
Earnings 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Constant 0.8737*** 0.9095*** 0.8834*** 0.8659*** 0.8654*** 0.7972***
(0.0241) (0.0335) (0.0352) (0.0547) (0.0414) (0.0596)
Observations 17,316 17,316 17,316 17,316 17,316 17,316
R-squared 0.0196 0.0213 0.0198 0.0235 0.0202 0.0245
P-value Q2=3=4=0 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
F-test Q2=3=4=0 31.15 31.15 31.15 31.15 31.15 31.15
Same comments as for Table 6.6
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Chapter 7
General Conclusion to the Dissertation
This dissertation investigates older age and policies aimed at older workers. Given the important
challenge of population ageing and its pressure on government budgets, the findings in this
dissertation are highly relevant from a policy perspective. By providing information to policy
makers about which policies are effective, they can make more informed decisions on future
policy initiatives. We argue that our findings are not only of interest to Belgian policy makers but
can also guide decision makers abroad as similar policies and ageing problems exist there as well.
In this last and concluding chapter of this dissertation I will first summarise my main findings.
This is followed by a discussion of the general limitations of the research presented here and
possible avenues for future research. I conclude with a section on specific policy advice based
on the findings in this dissertation. Note that this concluding chapter will look at the broader
picture generated by the different chapters. A detailed summary of the separate findings can be
found in the individual chapters.
7.1 Summary of the main findings
The findings in the different chapters of this dissertation can be summarised in several broad
conclusions: First, the results indicate that older workers face several barriers to employment.
More generally speaking, workers can not always follow the career path they most prefer. In
Chapter 1 this was demonstrated by results that suggested the existence of age discrimination in
case the older workers had a period of inactivity or non-relevant experience for the job for which
they applied in the additional post-educational years compared to the younger worker. Hence,
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the presence of age discrimination creates a barrier to employment for some older workers.
In Chapters 2 and 3 we do not find barriers towards employment in itself but rather barriers
towards the choice in career path. The eligibility rules for the Belgian old age part-time (OAPT)
scheme discussed in Chapter 2 could prevent some workers to access the scheme (e.g. due to an
insufficient number of years of tenure at the firm or years worked during the career). Chapter 3
contains a discussion of several additional potential barriers to a gradual reduction of working
hours at the end of the career, such as firm unwillingness to grant these reductions (Mooney et al.,
2002; Hutchens, 2010) or pension rules (Even and Macpherson, 2004; Pagán, 2009). In chapter
4 we find implicit indications for barriers to employment. We do not find a strong effect on
employment as response to the increased retirement age for women. This is likely because most
women have already left employment by the time of the reform, as they face strong financial
incentives to retire early. Hence, these early retirement incentives appear to act as a barrier to
(re-)employment as well. Note that these barriers seem to be higher for individuals with a weaker
position on the labour market. This follows from the above findings, as they suggest higher
barriers to (re-)employment and gradual retirement for individuals who have, among others, gaps
in their career trajectory (Chapter 1), few career years or tenure (Chapter 2), or who perform less
well than their peers (Chapter 3).1
Second, the existence of extensive early retirement possibilities appear to lead to worse effects
on employment and the time spent employed. This is especially evident in Chapters 2, 3, and 4,
where we focus on employed workers and not, as in Chapter 1, on hiring decisions. Our evidence
from Chapters 2 and 3 indicates that the initial positive effect gets reversed after a few years. The
results from Gielen (2009) suggest that the positive effect on employment is likely because in the
absence of the option of working part-time some of the workers who did reduce their working
hours would have completely stopped working to allow them to improve their work-life balance.
However, as participants in the OAPT schemes studied in Chapter 2 and Graf et al. (2011) are
not yet eligible for early retirement when they enter the scheme, this could also explain the
initial positive effect (without invalidating Gielen (2009)). As soon as they are eligible though,
participants have much higher incentives to enter early retirement than non-participants, because
the replacement rates in these schemes (with regard to their labour income) are much higher for
1Hutchens (2010) shows that older, better performing workers (i.e. workers who require less supervision and
make extra efforts to finish their tasks) have a higher probability to get phased retirement than workers who perform
less well.
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TC participants than for non-participants. Note that the more favourable results for women can
be attributed to their lower opportunities to enter early retirement. In Chapter 4 we find similar
results, as the potential positive effects on employment of the higher retirement age are likely
limited by the provisions in the various early retirement regimes. Given that time spent in most
early retirement regimes is assimilated to time worked for the pension calculation, and that these
early retirement regimes were not reformed simultaneously to the pension reform, there is little
punishment for entering early retirement. Hence, as many women have already left employment
at the moment of the policy change there is little potential left for the policy to have a strong
effect.
Finally, the effect that policies have on labour market outcomes such as employment appears
to be very sensitive to financial incentives within and outside these policies. As mentioned in
the previous paragraph, given the relative financial attractiveness of early retirement in Belgium
it should not be surprising that many workers make use of this option. An additional example
from Chapter 2 can illustrate this further: relative to full-time workers, participants in the OAPT
schemes receive a higher replacement income when going from employment to early retirement.
Indeed, the participants move from part-time earnings to full early retirement benefits, whereas
full-time workers move from full-time earnings to full benefits, which is less interesting for them.
Another example of the importance of financial incentives can be found in Chapter 3, where
we show graphically how a subsidy for part-time work could convince individuals who have no
initial preference for part-time work to either leave full-time work to start working part-time, or
to enter part-time employment from a state of inactivity.
7.2 Limitations and avenues for future research
Like all research, this dissertation is bound by several contextual and methodological issues.
In this section the general limitations within this dissertation, as well as potential avenues for
future research are identified. We start with the more conceptual limitations regarding the
topics discussed in this dissertation and end with a more methodological issue related to data
availability.
First and foremost, the aspects of older age and policies aimed at older workers discussed in this
dissertation are just the tip of the iceberg. There are many more policies currently active that
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are waiting to be analysed, in Belgium and abroad (e.g. ACTIVA). Moreover, several policies
have been revised recently, leading to potentially different results (examples for Belgium are the
increased eligibility age for the Belgian OAPT scheme and the announced increases in the full
retirement age from 65 to 66 in 2025 and to 67 in 2030).
Second, except for Chapter 4, all studies make use of Belgian data (or even Flemish, as in
Chapter 1). It is not certain that our results can be simply generalised to other Western European
countries, let alone to other regions. While the potential for age discrimination is in principle
present in every country and the old age policies discussed here are similar to those in other
countries, institutions differ greatly, even within Western Europe. Not all countries have as
many early retirement provisions or already have other mechanisms in place to incentivise
older workers. As such, readers should be careful when comparing our results to those in other
countries.
Third, most of the attention in this dissertation is devoted to labour supply (e.g. focus on the
employment rate or time spent employed), with the notable exception of Chapter 1 and in part
Chapter 3. Naturally, other angles to look at old age employment could be investigated as well.
To start with, it would be interesting to look at the role of the demand side as well. Employment
is a two-way street, where employer preferences also play an important role in the decision
to work part-time or retire later. The incidence of involuntary old age part-time employment
suggests that not all employers want to keep their older workers in full-time employment (for
example due to cost-related reasons). Next, we did not consider the impact of the old age policies
on worker productivity. Finally, it would be interesting to look more closely at the impact of
working longer on individual well-being. Not only is this effect in itself of importance, but
for example an adverse health effect could influence the decision to continue working after the
policy change and limit its effectiveness de Grip et al. (2012) and Hanel and Riphahn (2012).
Note that our sickness indicator in Chapter 2 did not seem to indicate such adverse health effects
for working hours reductions at the end of the career.
Finally, as in all empirical research one can only go as far as the data allows one to go. Limi-
tations of a database can become evident through among others the size of the sample or the
indicators the database contains. Limitations of the first kind are present in every study, as one
ideally wants as large a sample as possible to improve precision. Limitations of the second kind
are also present in this dissertation. For example, given more complete information on the full
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career of individuals (especially information on public sector and self-employment spells) and
more information on unemployment or (early) retirement benefits, it would have been possible
to improve the cost-benefit analysis of Chapter 2. Moreover, it would be interesting to repeat the
cost-benefit analysis for Chapter 4 as well, to see whether the increased retirement age is cost
effective.
7.3 Policy Advice
This dissertation on old age and policies aimed at older workers would not be complete without
a discussion of potential ways to improve future policy initiatives. While policy makers often
implement policies with a specific aim, it is not a priori certain that those policies deliver.
Therefore it is important to empirically verify the impact these initiatives have on the relevant
outcomes such that these policies can either be adjusted or potentially serve as an example to
policy makers abroad. In this section we put forward several recommendations based on the
general findings discussed above. These recommendations thus follow from common elements
in the different chapters and as such point to more general implications of old age and old age
policies. For an overview of the more detailed policy recommendations for the specific policies
we refer to their respective chapters.
First, barriers to old age employment should be reduced. As shown above, older individuals
(especially those with less stable careers) still face various barriers towards (re-)employment.
Several paths can be taken to reduce this issue, without being mutually exclusive. Employers
could be incentivised to hire and keep older workers. This requires to tackle the potential causes
for employer unwillingness to do so, for example by further lowering the wage cost for older
employees, or by providing more training for older workers to improve their human capital
stock (OECD, 2016). Another option would be to further improve control of workers over their
career path, as this not only potentially lowers barriers to employment but could also increase
well-being (De Vaus et al., 2007; Calvo et al., 2009; Nikolova and Graham, 2014). Policy makers
should be aware that there is no one-size-fits-all policy possible, as some workers prefer to work
full-time until they retire while others will want to gradually retire. Making sure workers have
sufficient access to these options is thus crucial. In that respect it might be wise not to strict
access to the OAPT scheme too much. Conversely, allowing workers to work past the official
7.3. Policy Advice 203
retirement age enlarged the set of possibilities workers can choose from (OECD, 2016).
Second, further efforts should be undertaken to limit the so-called early retirement culture in
Belgium (OECD, 2016; Desmette and Vendramin, 2014). This could be done by increasing the
eligibility age or make the eligibility conditions more strict. Given our findings for the OAPT
scheme in Chapter 2 and the increased retirement age in Chapter 4, this could lead to longer-
lasting and potentially bigger positive effects on employment, as workers have less alternatives
to exit early from the labour market. However, as Desmette and Vendramin (2014) note, limiting
early exit options should go hand in hand with more attention to work sustainability. As not all
workers are able to continue work on a full-time basis as they get older, policy makers should be
wary to avoid potential adverse health effects. The OAPT scheme already provides one way to
improve work sustainability to older workers. The Belgian federal and regional governments
have already been taking steps to limit early exit options in recent years.2 However, as mentioned
above, without efforts to maintain work sustainability this is likely not sufficient. For example,
by increasing the eligibility age for the OAPT scheme as well, the potential beneficial effect on
career length of the OAPT scheme is limited (cf. Chapter 2).
Finally, policy makers should be more aware of the fact that policy changes are not stand-alone
events but exist in complex web of institutions and individual preferences (of both employees and
employers). Taking into account the financial incentives potential participants face is crucial.
Indeed, in Chapter 2 we showed the sensitivity of the effect towards financial incentives created
by the various early retirement options, while the results in Chapter 4 seem to confirm the
findings in Lefebvre and Orsini (2011) and Jousten et al. (2012) that partial reforms that only
modify the access to some retirement routes have limited effects. These findings suggest that in
order to make extended careers rewarding, policy makers should focus on more comprehensive
reforms, not limited to singular policy initiatives at a time. This can only be done if the financial
incentives affecting older workers’ employment decisions are identified.
2For example, the eligibility age for bridge pension has increased for most workers from 58 to 62 since 2015
and the conventional early retirement age is being increased from 60 years (2012) to 63 (2019).
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